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Since the original version of this book (University of Chicago Press, 1996) went
out of print in the 2000s, I have continued to receive inquiries from people asking
how they can obtain a copy. I am therefore thrilled that Language Science Press
has offered tomake the title available again, as part of their Classics in Linguistics
series. I would like to thank series editors Stefan Müller and Martin Haspelmath,
as well as Sebastian Nordhoff and Felix Kopecky, for their help in making this
happen.
The content of this new printing is identical to the first printing, with the
following exceptions:
• I have altered the wording in a few places where I found it insufficiently
clear or terminologically outdated;
• my uses of the term informant(s) have been replaced with consultant(s) or
speaker(s), in keeping with current practice (of course, the former term still
appears in some quoted passages);
• I have updated the reference information for a couple of works that had
not been published at the time of the original printing, particularly Cowart
(1997);
• the original index has been split into name and subject indexes, and both
are now more comprehensive.
In terms of presentation, the following things have changed:
• the format of citations and references has been adapted to LangSci house
style, as have other minor typographical choices;
• full given names have been added to references whenever available;
• since the text has been freshly typeset, the page numbers do not match
those of the original printing; however, the (sub)section numbers are un-
changed: I suggest using those if it is necessary to specify a location within
a chapter. Example numbers are also unchanged.
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Importantly, I have not attempted to update the content in light of subsequent
relevant research, since this would undoubtedly have compelled me to try to
write a whole new book. Of course, linguistics and psycholinguistics have chang-
ed a great deal in the 20 years since I completed the original manuscript; e.g.,
“theoretical” linguistics has notably become more “experimental.” Also, some of
my own views on the issues have evolved over those two decades. There are
passages in the book that I would have omitted or altered, if I had allowedmyself
to make any substantive revisions. Instead, I have chosen to restrict all follow-
up discussion to this preface. In what follows I try to point readers to works that
should allow them to “get up to speed” on intervening developments.
For collections that are comprised mainly of papers on topics that are impor-
tant in the book, see McNair et al. (1996), Penke & Rosenbach (2004), Kepser &
Reis (2005), Borsley (2005), Featherston (2007) and replies in the same journal
issue, Featherston & Sternefeld (2007), Featherston & Winkler (2009), and Win-
kler & Featherston (2009). My more recent views can be found in the following
surveys: Schütze (2006; 2011) and Schütze & Sprouse (2013).
There have been (at least) four major developments involving the empirical
base of linguistics that anyone interested in the topic should be aware of.
1. The adaptation of the magnitude estimation task from psychophysics to
judgment collection (Bard, Robertson & Sorace 1996). This was touted as
having numerous potential advantages over the traditional Likert scale
task, most or all of which have been subsequently refuted (see Weskott
& Fanselow 2011 and Sprouse, Schütze & Almeida 2013).
2. The use of World Wide Web searches to establish attestation, and infer ac-
ceptability, of certain sentence/construction types. I discuss the limitations
of this approach in Schütze (2009).
3. The use of Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and potentially other crowd-
sourcing platforms as sources of subjects for acceptability judgment and
many other psycholinguistic experiments (so far, in only a handful of lan-
guages). For an empirical investigation of how AMT results compare with
judgments collected in the lab (on a small range of constructions in En-
glish), see Sprouse (2011).
4. Detailed empirical challenges to – and defenses of – the proposal, advo-
cated in Section 7.2 in the book, that Subjacency effects could be reduced
to processing factors. See Yoshida et al. (2014) as well as the Stanford/
Maryland debate (Hofmeister & Sag (2010); Hofmeister, Staum Casasanto
xii
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& Sag (2012a,b); Sprouse, Wagers & Phillips (2012a,b), and many of the
contributions in Sprouse & Hornstein 2014).
Finally, there is a statement by Chomsky, which I attribute in the book (p. 195)
to a popular press source, about which I have often been questioned, wherein
Chomsky calls it a truism that genetically based Universal Grammar (UG) is sub-
ject to some individual variation. For those who have asked whether Chomsky’s
position can be confirmed in any academic publications, I offer the following
quotes:
Putting aside genetic variation (an interesting but marginal phenomenon in
the case of language) and conceivable but unknown epigenetic effects, the
principles of UG, whatever they are, are invariant. (Chomsky 2013: 35)
It is hardly controversial that [the faculty of language] is a common human
possession apart from pathology, to an approximation so close that we can
ignore variation. (Chomsky 2008: 138)
I am aware of no empirical evidence that would indicate how much UG can vary
across individuals.
Carson T. Schütze December 2015
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The goal of this book is to demonstrate that the absence of methodology of gram-
maticality judgments in linguistics constitutes a serious obstacle to meaningful
research, and to begin to propose suitable remedies for this problem.Throughout
much of the history of linguistics, judgments of the grammaticality/acceptability
of sentences (and other linguistic intuitions) have been the major source of evi-
dence in constructing grammars. While this seems to have been an exceedingly
fruitful approach, some skeptics haveworried that theoretical linguists are in fact
constructing grammars of intuition, which might not have much to do with the
competence that underlies everyday production or comprehension of language.
Also, in the pseudoexperimental procedure of judgment elicitation there is typi-
cally no attempt to impose any of the standard experimental controls, and often
the only subject is the theorist himself or herself. Should we linguists be wor-
ried? I think so. I survey the way grammaticality judgments are currently used
in theoretical syntax, and argue that such uses, together with the problems of
intuition and experimental design, demand a careful examination of judgments,
not as pure sources of data, but as instances of metalinguistic performance.
Several important issues arise when this view of grammaticality judgments is
pursued, including which tasks one should use to elicit them, what people are
doing when they give them, and what they can really tell us about linguistic
competence. On the assumption that grammaticality judgments result from in-
teractions among primary language faculties of the mind and general cognitive
processes, I try to understand the process by identifying and analyzing its com-
ponent parts. I review the psycholinguistic research that has examined ways in
which the judgment process can vary with differences among subjects, experi-
mental manipulations, and spurious features of the stimulus. Parallels with other
cognitive behaviors are pointed out. After drawing together the substantive and
methodological findings into a schematic picture of what the overall process of
giving linguistic intuitions might look like, I propose strategies for collecting
these intuitions that avoid the pitfalls of previous work and take account of the
conditions that have been shown to influence such judgments. I suggest that we
can actually strengthen the case for linguistic universals by giving empirical ar-
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guments that much of the variability in judgments can be explained without ap-
pealing to differences in Universal Grammar. Finally, I discuss how mainstream
linguistic theory might be affected by the growing body of research in this area.
I think we will increasingly feel not just a need but also a desire to tackle dif-
ficult data questions, particularly as theoretically sophisticated psycholinguistic
research increases and we come to understand more about the ways in which
linguistic competence is put to use in the mind.
xviii
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Linguists have not formulated a
“methodology of sentence judg-
ments.”
(van Riemsdijk & Williams 1986)
1.1 Goals
I aim to demonstrate in this book that grammaticality judgments and other sorts
of linguistic intuition, while indispensable forms of data for linguistic theory, re-
quire newways of being collected and used. A great deal is known about the insta-
bility and unreliability of judgments, but rather than propose that they be aban-
doned, I endeavor to explain the source of their shiftiness and how it can be mini-
mized. I argue that if several simple steps are taken to remove obvious sources of
bias, grammaticality judgments can provide an excellent source of information
about people’s grammars. Thus, I respond to two of the most widespread criti-
cisms of generative grammar – namely, that it involves constructing theories of
intuition rather than of language use, and that it is highly subjective and biased
by the views of the linguist.This involves drawing from awide range of literature
and from linguistic theory (both pro- and antigenerative) and from the philoso-
phy of language. Linguists can expect to take away from this book numerous
practical suggestions on how to collect better and more useful data, and on how
to respond to criticisms of such data. As I set out to review almost all the major
psycholinguistic experiments that have been done to investigate the linguistic
judgment process, psycholinguists should also find much of interest, including
numerous suggestions for experimental work that they might wish to pursue.
Throughout much of the history of linguistics, linguistic intuitions have been
the most important source of evidence in constructing grammars. Major types of
intuition include canonical grammaticality judgments, intuitions about deriva-
tional morphological relationships among words, intuitions about correspond-
ences among different utterance types (e.g., question/answer pairs), identifica-
tionsof structural versus lexical ambiguity, and discriminations of the syntactic
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status of superficially similar word strings, amongmany others (Chomsky (1975)).
While I most often talk about grammaticality judgments in this book, I treat this
as a cover term, because these judgments have received much more attention
than other kinds of linguistic intuition. It should be understood that wherever
possible I intend the discussion to extend to other sorts of intuition, and I do
not wish to imply that grammaticality judgments in the narrow sense have any
special status.
It is not immediately obvious why a description of people’s competence in
understanding and producing language should be based on behavior in situa-
tions where they are doing neither but, rather, are reporting intuitions. There
are four key reasons for the use of grammaticality judgments. First, by eliciting
judgments, we can examine reactions to sentence types that might occur only
very rarely in spontaneous speech or recorded corpora. This is a standard rea-
son for performing experiments in social science – observational study does not
always provide a high enough concentration of the phenomena we are most in-
terested in.1 A second, related reason for using grammaticality judgments is to
obtain a form of information that scarcely exists within normal language use at
all – namely, negative information, in the form of strings that are not part of the
language.The third reason for using judgments is that when one ismerely observ-
ing speech it is difficult to distinguish reliably slips, unfinished utterances, and so
forth, from grammatical production. A fourth andmore controversial reason is to
minimize the extent to which the communicative and representational functions
of language skill obscure our insight into its mental nature. Thus, we construct
arbitrary situations for adults to deal with, which tap the structural properties of
language without having any real function (Bever 1986). This last rationale pre-
supposes a particular view of grammatical competence as cognitively separate
from other facets of language knowledge and use, and hence its validity depends
on one’s theoretical stand on this issue. The first three reasons, however, are rela-
tively theory-neutral. (See Grandy (1981) for these and other standard arguments
in favor of the use of grammaticality judgments; see Newmeyer (1983: 62–63), for
additional arguments against the use of alternative data sources.)
Such justifications seem sensible enough, perhaps even unavoidable, but that
1 In principle, the conclusion does not automatically follow. One could in theory do experiments
on the production and comprehension of sentences chosen by the researcher, without recourse
to judgments. In practice, however, this is problematic. On the production side, it is difficult
to induce a subject to produce precisely the sentence one wishes to study without actually
exposing the subject to the sentence. On the comprehension side, it is hard to discover anything
about the nature, or even the success or failure, of the comprehension process without eliciting
some additional reaction, such as a judgment.
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has not stopped some skeptics and critics from wanting to abandon the use of
judgments altogether: “I … regard the ‘linguistic intuition of the native speaker’
as extremely valuable heuristically, but too shifty and variable (both from speaker
to speaker and from moment to moment) to be of any criterial value” (House-
holder 1965: 15). Gethin (1990) believes that grammaticality judgments are useless.
Becker finds their very lack of communicative function problematic:
And so the “modern” linguist spends his or her time starring or unstarring
terse unlikely sentences like “John, Bill and Tom killed each other” (to pick
one at random from a recent journal), which seethe with repressed frustra-
tion and are difficult to work into a conversation. These example sentences
bear no discernible resemblance to the sentences which compose the text
that purportedly explains them – yet the linguist’s own sentences are also
alleged (implicitly) to be drawn from the same English Language! (Becker
1975: 70)
In response to such attitudes, some philosophers of language have adopted
positions that have gone farther in the opposite direction thanmost theoreticians
would likely feel comfortable with. For example, Carr (1990) states:
The arguments that intuitively accessed grammaticality judgments either
are not sufficient or are not necessary as the evidential basis for linguistic
theory cannot proceed, and the fact of theoretical linguistic practice shows
that autonomous linguistics proceeds with such evidence being not only
necessary but also sufficient for the testing of hypotheses. (p. 57)
As I make clear in this book, I do not believe that one can defend the sufficiency
of judgments alone.
Regardless of what the critics say, it is clear that the use of grammaticality
judgments is here to stay for the foreseeable future. Still, eliciting linguistic judg-
ments is problematic in a number of respects. Not only is the elicitation situation
artificial, raising the standard issues of ecological validity, but the subject is being
asked for a sort of behavior that, at least on the face of it, is entirely different from
everyday conversation.2 This has led some to suggest that theoretical linguists
2 Householder (1971; 1973) tried to find the closest conversational analogues to grammaticality
judgments. He suggests that the following are some of the typical reactions one is inclined
to have when a speaker utters something out of the ordinary: the listener is baffled (“I don’t
get it; come again”); the listener finds an inconsistency or implausibility (“You must mean X,
don’t you?”); the listener characterizes the speaker as being from another dialect area (“Aha,
a southerner!”); the listener concludes that the speaker is quoting a proverb or poetry (“You
mean ‘figuratively speaking,’ I suppose”).
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are in fact constructing grammars of linguistic intuitions or judgments, which
need not be identical with grammars of the competence underlying production
or comprehension (Bever 1970a; Birdsong 1989; Gleitman &Gleitman 1979). How-
ever, Wayne Cowart (personal communication) argues that linguistic judgments
do play a fairly central role in our day-to-day lives, and cites the following exam-
ples. We might use judgments of other people’s speech when we first meet them
in forming opinions about them and categorizing them on various dimensions.
We might assess other people’s utterances with respect to our own grammar
(and vice versa) in order to manipulate the extent to which we are perceived as
belonging to the same community. Children growing up in a multilingual envi-
ronment might judge the utterances they hear in order to assess which language
they most closely resemble, allowing them to differentiate languages they are
learning concurrently. The last of these three suggestions strikes me as the most
compelling, but given how little we understand about multilingual acquisition,
we cannot say with certainty that children’s evaluations of utterances are similar
to the explicit judgments of adults.
In addition to these problems, which are often found in psychology as well,
there are important shortcomings that arise because linguistic elicitation does
not follow the procedures of psychological experimentation. Unlike natural sci-
entists, linguists are not trained in methods for getting reliable data and deter-
mining which of two conflicting data reports is more reliable. In the vast majority
of cases in linguistics, there is not the slightest attempt to impose any of the stan-
dard experimental control techniques, such as random sampling of subjects and
stimulus materials or counterbalancing for order effects. (See Derwing (1979) for
a discussion of linguists’ “blatantly informal” methods.) Perhaps worst of all, of-
ten the only subject in these pseudoexperiments is none other than the theorist
himself or herself: “One of the unfortunate consequences of Chomsky’smentalist
view of linguistics is that in recent years a number of younger linguists have in-
dulged very heavily in arguments based on their intuitions about quirks of their
personal idiolects”3 (Sampson 1975: 74) (see also Newmeyer 1983 and Bradac et al.
1980). In the absence of anything approaching a rigorous methodology, we must
seriously question whether the data gathered in this way are at all meaningful or
useful to the linguistic enterprise. More than a few observers of linguistics have
agreed with Labov’s “painfully obvious conclusion … that linguists cannot con-
3 Such behavior is certainly not a consequence of the Chomskian view in the sense that he en-
courages or implicitly endorses it. If there is any causal link at all between the theory and such
practices, it presumably arises from the mistaken belief that if the object of study (grammar) is
in the mind of the individual, then the behavior of a single individual (e.g., oneself) constitutes
the only data one need consult. I discuss throughout the book why this does not follow.
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tinue to produce theory and data at the same time” (Labov 1972a: 199). What is to
stop linguists from (knowingly or unknowingly) manipulating the introspection
process to substantiate their own theories?4
The informal nature of judgment collection has long been acknowledged. Con-
sider, for example, the following passages from Chomsky (1969):
The gathering of data is informal; there has been very little use of experi-
mental approaches (outside of phonetics) or of complex techniques of data
collection and data analysis of a sort that can easily be devised, and that
are widely used in the behavioral sciences. The arguments in favor of this
informal procedure seem to me quite compelling; basically, they turn on the
realization that for the theoretical problems that seem most critical today,
it is not at all difficult to obtain a mass of crucial data without use of such
techniques. Consequently, linguistic work, at what I believe to be its best,
lacks many of the features of the behavioral sciences. (p. 56)
I have no doubt that it would be possible to devise operational and exper-
imental procedures that could replace the reliance on introspection with
little loss, but it seems to me that in the present state of the field, this would
simply be a waste of time and energy. (p. 81)
Derwing’s response to this attitude is unequivocal.
Such ‘arguments’ are not compelling at all. The choice here is between
proven data-collection methods and the reliable ‘hard’ data to which they
lead or inferior ‘informal’ methods and the ‘soft’ data which inevitably re-
sult. … This is hardly a choice. In linguistics there is reason to believe that
the choice is available, but has been ignored or neglected in the rush to the-
ory. … All that is necessary is ‘to replace intuition by some more rigorous
criterion’ ([Chomsky 1962: 24]) and attempt to establish, under controlled
experimental conditions, whether naive native speakers really can do all the
things which Chomsky says that they can (such as make consistent judg-
ments of grammaticality). (Derwing 1973: 250)
The conflict between these two positions is precisely what this book is about.
An additional rationalization for the use of grammaticality judgment data in
some cases seems to have been related to Chomsky’s competence/performance
4 One possible answer is that competition among linguists will prevent such manipulation; see
Chapter 4, fn. 19.
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distinction (see Section 2.2 for a detailed discussion of this matter). Actual speech
production and comprehension are supposedly fraught with errors of all kinds,
such as false starts, and are subject to humanmemory limitations.These so-called
performance variables serve to obscure a speaker’s underlying competence. But
what if we could relieve subjects of the “cognitive burden” of actual production
or comprehension and present them with ready-made sentences such that the
only task would be to judge their grammaticality? Would this not allow us to
get much closer to people’s true competence?5 Unfortunately, there is ample evi-
dence that it would not. While grammaticality judgments offer a different access
path from language use to competence, they are themselves just another sort of
performance (Birdsong 1989; Levelt et al. 1977; Bever 1970b; 1974; Bever & Langen-
doen 1971; Grandy 1981), and as such are subject to at least as many confounding
factors as production, and likely even more.
The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the search for resolutions to the
issues raised above and to outline the approach to be taken. The discussion will
be mostly at an informal, conceptual level, with technical terminology and de-
tails left for subsequent chapters. The structure of the chapter is as follows. In
Section 1.2, I use the problems raised above, along with others, to motivate the
goals and approach of the remainder of the book. Before intuitions (or any other
behavior) can really begin to tell us something about competence, we need at
least to be aware of, and ideally to understand the effects of, the component
psychological processes that intervene between the two. I propose that this un-
derstanding is achievable in principle if we construct a comprehensive model of
the judgment process. This model would allow the extensive research already
conducted by psycholinguists to be unified and integrated, and would allow con-
tradictory results to be scrutinized. At the very least, a well-supported model of
5 Sampson (1975) phrases the position as follows, although he goes on to reject it: “The part of
our brain which makes conscious judgments about the English language perhaps has a ‘hot
line’ to the part of our brain which controls our actual speaking, so that we know what we
can and cannot say in English in the same direct, ‘incorrigible’ way that, say, I know I have
toothache” (p. 72). I have not found many explicit examples of this reasoning in the theoretical
linguistic literature, but the belief seems to have been very widely held, because there are
numerous instances (cited in Birdsong (1989)) where Lasnik, Chomsky, and others attempt to
curb this view. For example, Lasnik (1981: 20) states that “grammaticality judgments are often
incorrectly considered as direct reflections of competence” (emphasis added). Certainly, many
authors have wrongly accused Chomsky of claiming that people have a consistent ability to
assess grammaticality (e.g., Nagata 1988). Gleitman & Gleitman (1970: 11) attribute to Chomsky
the claim that linguists’ judgments are free of contamination. The view might have stemmed




this type should raise the awareness of linguists to the vast complexities under-
lying the apparently simple task of deciding whether a sentence is grammatical.
In Section 1.3, I further motivate the endeavor by describing some real examples
of linguistic research that show how the approach I propose can work to benefit
the field. Section 1.4 presents a working hypothesis concerning the source of ex-
tragrammatical influences on judgments that I assume in much of what follows.
Finally, Section 1.5 sets out the scope and structure of the remainder of the book.
1.2 Approach
Linguistic intuitions became the royal way into an understanding of the compe-
tence which underlies all linguistic performance. However, if such a linguistic
competence exists at all, i.e., some relatively autonomous mental capacity for
language, linguistic intuitions seem to be the least obvious data on which to
base the study of its structure. They are derived and rather artificial psycholin-
guistic phenomena which develop late in language acquisition … and are very
dependent on explicit teaching and instruction. They cannot be compared with
primary language use such as speaking and listening. The domain of Chom-
skian linguistics is linguistic intuitions. The relation between these intuitions
and man’s capacity for language, however, is highly obscure.
(Levelt et al. 1977)
In this section I describe briefly the motivations for and approach to an in-
depth investigation of the process of forming grammaticality judgments, which
will be expanded upon in later chapters. I argue that an understanding of this
process would provide the basis for an objective method of establishing which
judgment data bear most directly on the grammar, and of extracting grammatical
information from judgments that are confounded by other factors.The idea of fac-
toring grammaticality out of acceptability judgments has been proposed before
(e.g., Birdsong (1989); Carroll, Bever & Pollack (1981); Botha (1973)). In the words
of Gleitman & Gleitman (1970), “if we could strip away various contaminating
factors in behavior, we might see the grammar bare” (p. 10). That contaminants
are present and in need of stripping will be demonstrated below. The traditional
view of how judgments relate to language use is too naive. For instance, Cohen,
while he shows considerable concern for the issues, in the end remains overly
simplistic:
A native speaker’s intuition that the string S is grammatical is just his im-
mediate and untutored (though in principle observable) inclination to take
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S as being well-formed, and in this sense he can have such an intuition if
and only if he would be (equally observably) inclined to utter S whenever
his circumstances, motivation, beliefs, etc., are precisely appropriate for a
communication with the sense of S and also he is applying ideal standards
of care and attention in the linguistic formulation of his utterance. It follows
that the difference between an utterance of S and an intuition of S’s gram-
maticalness, as data for grammar, is just that while the former constitutes
an actual occurrence of S in human speech, the latter establishes a potential
occurrence – i.e., a potential production by some speaker. Hence intuitions
of grammaticalness can always provide a vital kind of data that actual utter-
ances may often fail to present; and because of this it is exclusive reliance on
the observation of actual utterances, not reliance on intuitions of grammat-
icalness, that fails to mirror essential features of scientific method. (Cohen
1981: 240–241)
If one is concerned with the scientific method, it seems sensible to begin the
way other scientists do, by scrutinizing the data source. Bever (1972) makes an
appropriate analogy to natural science in this regard:
Such investigations are analogous to that of a biologist who checks the lim-
its on a microscope before examining single cells with it (for example, if he
does not know the refractory limitations of his microscope he may spuri-
ously attribute color bands to the cells). However, to explore the limits of the
available tools of observation is not to suggest that cells do not exist. Simi-
larly, I have tried to examine the limits on the most extensive observational
tool linguists utilize to gather data about linguistic structure: grammatical-
ity intuitions. This investigation does not suggest that linguistic structure
does not exist; indeed the investigation of interactions between manifest
intuitions and inner linguistic structure cannot proceed without the a pri-
ori assumption that the inner structure is itself as “real” as the expressed
intuitions. (p. 412)
It should not be controversial to suggest that linguists ought to study their
methodology for these standard scientific reasons: to get more reliable facts by
developing methods for gathering, processing, and reporting data so that the
results of different investigators are comparable and their methods of analysis
consistent; and to get more valid data by assessing what errors are present in the
data reports and trying to eliminate their sources (Labov 1978). In Chapter 2, I
present several examples showing that these measures are now necessary. The
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days are over when linguistics had more than enough to worry about with un-
controversial, commonplace judgment data, and the sophisticated and complex
judgments now in use by theoreticians assume much about human abilities that
remains unproved, even unscrutinized.We simply do not knowwhether the ques-
tions we are asking people are meaningful and can be answered in any principled
way. I argue below that there is much to be gained by applying the experimen-
tal methodology of social science to the gathering of grammaticality judgments,
and that in the absence of such practices our data might well be suspect. Elim-
inating or controlling for confounding factors requires us to have some idea of
what those factors might be, and such an understanding can only be gained by
systematic study of the judgment process. Finally, I argue that by studying inter-
speaker variation rather than ignoring it (by treating only the majority dialect
or one’s own idiolect), one uncovers interesting facts.
This general approach is not a new proposal; Levelt et al. and Bever have ar-
ticulated the general direction of this approach with great foresight:
Where do grammaticality intuitions come from? It makes no sense to as-
sume a priori that the domain of linguistic intuition is a relatively closed
one, as many linguists appear to do. Such intuitions are highly dependent
on our knowledge of the world and on the structure of our inferential ca-
pacities. (Levelt et al. 1977: 89)
What is the Science of Linguistics a Science of? Linguistic intuitions do not
necessarily directly reflect the structure of a language, yet such intuitions
are the basic data the linguist uses to verify his grammar. This fact could
raise serious doubts as to whether linguistic science is about anything at
all, since the nature of the source of its data is so obscure. However, this
obscurity is characteristic of every exploration of human behavior. Rather
than rejecting linguistic study, we should pursue the course typical of most
psychological sciences; give up the belief in an “absolute” intuition about
sentences and study the laws of the intuitional process itself. (Bever 1970a:
346; emphasis in original)
Elliot, Legum &Thompson (1969) make the case for studying variation: “There
are facts both about linguistic theory and about the grammars of particular lan-
guages whose existence will be obscured unless variation is taken into account”
(p. 52); “At least some variation is not completelymysterious and seems amenable
to statement in terms within the realm of linguistic theory. At the same time, lin-
guists have a responsibility to determine what kinds of variation exist rather
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than ignoring variation by basing syntactic descriptions on trivially small num-
bers of informants” (p. 58). Carden (e.g., 1973) makes the same case.These authors
go on to show that variability on theoretically important issues such as the do
so construction and reflexive anaphors falls into implicational hierarchies of ac-
ceptability.
Thus, the approach that I pursue in this work is to examine the process of
judging grammaticality, including the role of grammar in this process and its re-
lation to other relevant mental components. In addition to studying an intriguing
form of behavior, one that has been almost entirely overlooked in favor of pro-
duction and comprehension, I attempt to integrate the existing research findings
in this area by sorting out the facts from the specific theories proposed in each
study; assessing their consistency; clarifying how they fit into an overall theory
of cognition; establishing which methodologies are most reliable, valid, and in-
formative; and proposing new experiments to fill gaps in our knowledge. While
the psychology of grammaticality judgments might hold as many complexities
and and mysteries as language itself, that is no reason for despair or dismissal –
it is all the more reason for us to begin the task of unraveling them.
1.3 Motivation: Whither Linguistics?
A glance at the length of the reference section of this book shows that more
than a few language researchers have concerned themselves with the problems
that I am addressing here. Many of the experimental findings were published
a number of years ago, but experimental research seems to be on the increase
again, along with continued calls for greater use of formal experimentation for
collecting judgment data (e.g., Hirst (1981: 100–101)). Does all this work have any
real effect on the way theoretical linguistics is carried out on a day-to-day ba-
sis? While instances in which theoretical linguistics takes experimental research
into account are still few and far between, I believe that issues in grammatical-
ity judgment collection and interpretation are receiving greater attention. From
among the studies that make appropriate use of judgment data within the frame-
work of theoretical argumentation I will cite three examples of what I consider to
be cutting-edge work in the hope of facilitating and encouraging more research
along these lines.
The first suchwork is by Grimshaw&Rosen (1990) (building onwork by Chien
& Wexler (1990)), who argue that, contrary to first appearances, children’s lin-
guistic behavior does tell us something about their grammars – namely, that
they include Principle B of Binding Theory. Their reasoning is that
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Performance in an experiment, including performance on the standard lin-
guistic task of making grammaticality judgments, cannot be equated with
grammatical knowledge. To determine properties of the underlying knowl-
edge system requires inferential reasoning, sometimes of a highly abstract
sort. (p. 188)
The inevitable screening effects of processing demands and other perfor-
mance factors do not prevent us from establishing the character of linguis-
tic knowledge; they just make it more challenging. … An analysis of these
performance factors makes it possible to see, if only dimly, through the per-
formance filter. (p. 217)
Grimshaw & Rosen conclude that, while children do not show perfect mas-
tery of Binding Theory, they perform above chance, and treat violations of Bind-
ing Theory differently from nonviolations. They argue that inherent properties
of the relevant constructions, as well as of the experiments by which they are
evaluated, conspire to worsen children’s performance, especially as reflected in
their apparent lesser mastery of Principle B versus Principle A. The paper is un-
usual in that it represents work by theoreticians in which a major goal is the
explanation of the connection between behavior on judgment tasks and linguis-
tic knowledge. While a naive view of the facts contradicts their claim, they argue
that once psychological factors such as response bias and experimental demand
characteristics are taken into account, the results support their theory. One may
still dispute their conclusions, but their effort points in the right direction.
The second example of work that uses judgment data appropriately is a pa-
per by Carden & Dieterich (1981), the goal of which is to establish structural
conditions on pronoun coreference. Carden & Dieterich deal with cases where a
pronoun precedes the noun phrase with which it is coreferent, e.g., examples (1)
and (2), where cosubscripting indicates coreference:
(1) I knew himi when Harveyi was a little boy.
(2) We’ll just have to fire himi, whether McIntoshi likes it or not.
A handful of instances of these constructions have been found in texts, but pro-
portionately very few compared to cases of uncontroversial backwards corefer-
ence like that in (3):
(3) The boy who loves heri claims that Maryi is a genius.
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Langacker (1969), who claims that sentences like (1) and (2) are bad, pairs such
a sentence with a clearly good example in his paper, whereas Reinhart (1976),
who claims that sentences like (1) and (2) should be good, contrasts such a sen-
tence with a clearly bad one. This issue, according to Carden & Dieterich, also
illustrates the problem with corpus data: “How do we interpret this data? Do we
cheer because there were six examples, and conclude that Reinhart was right?
Or do we boo because there were only six examples, as against hundreds of the
uncontroversially good type? … We may have a good but (accidentally) rare con-
struction; or we may have a bad construction occurring a few times because of
errors” (Carden & Dieterich 1981: 591). The authors investigate the status of sen-
tences like (1) and (2) using an experiment that shows that these questionable
forms are accepted no more often than an uncontroversially bad form. (In each
case, only 1 of their 30 subjects accepted them.) The materials were constructed
so that a preceding context sentence allowed a plausible reading where the cru-
cial coreference relationship did not hold, as well as a reading where it did hold,
so that subjects would not be forced by considerations of plausibility into ac-
cepting an ungrammatical structure. They also tested the uncontroversially bad
sentences preceded by the same context sentence, so that the results would be
fully comparable. The one significant shortcoming of their methodology is that
they employed only two examples of each type of crucial sentence, so their re-
sults might have been affected by quirks of those specific sentences.
A third exemplary study also involves backwards coreference. It was
conducted by Gerken & Bever (1986), who were apparently not aware of Car-
den and Dieterich’s work in this area. On the basis of inter-speaker differences
in the interpretation of the same sorts of sentences, Gerken & Bever propose
that linguistic universals, and Binding Theory in particular, are not necessarily
applied to complete sentence structures as given by linguistic competence but,
rather, are applied to the speaker’s perceived structure as generated during sen-
tence processing. They point out that for many sentences it is not necessary to
compute a complete syntactic structure in order to extract the meaning, and sug-
gest that this computation might therefore be delayed until after the initial parse,
or might never be carried out at all. Gerken & Bever are specifically concerned
with Binding Theory’s prediction that there should be a strong contrast between
VP-attached and S-attached subordinate clauses with regard to potential back-
wards coreference, such that (4), in which the complement clause is under the
VP, should be much worse than (5), in which the adverbial clause is attached to
the S node, at least under certain versions of the theory.
(4) The dog told himi that the horsei would fall.
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(5) The dog hit himi while the horsei ate lunch.
However, Gerken & Bever’s acceptability experiment failed to find any such
overall difference. They argue that there are no general surface cues for the dif-
ference between S-node versus VP-node attachment, so it is possible that the
distinction is not made in on-line parsing structures. In fact, there is a tendency
for English speakers to segment sentences after a noun-verb-noun sequence, and
those subjects who performed strong perceptual closure at this juncture (as re-
vealed by another experiment) did not make the attachment distinction for pro-
nouns, whereas those who made less use of the closure strategy did make the
predicted contrast between (4) and (5). Subjects who exhibited strong closure
did not have a VP node accessible for attachment when they got to the subordi-
nate clause, because the VP had been closed off, and they therefore treated all
such clauses as S-attached, allowing coreference in both sentence types. Thus,
these individual differences do not require us to posit individual differences in
the formulation of Binding Theory. Besides the possibility that complete trees
are never computed, an alternative interpretation suggested by Gerken & Bever
is that we do compute full constituent structures but cannot access them for cer-
tain tasks, being left instead with the perceptual structure alone. This raises the
intriguing but rather unlikely possibility that linguists have developed introspec-
tive techniques to get at these fuller structures, while untrained speakers have
not.The lesson to be drawn from these three studies is that theoretical linguistics
can benefit from a concern for the judgment process.
1.4 A Working Hypothesis
In this section I set out my own basic working hypothesis regarding the inter-
action of metalinguistic6 performance factors and the grammar in determining
grammaticality judgments. My hypothesis is a reaction to countless studies that
have demonstrated that grammaticality judgments are susceptible to order and
context effects, handedness differences, etc., and have then concluded, on the
basis of this manipulability (or on the basis of the gradience of judgments, or
on other properties), that the grammar itself must have these properties, or that
these properties must be part of the language-specific component of the brain.
Such conclusions are not justified. In my view, we should start from the posi-
tion that the entire behavior of making grammaticality judgments is the result
6 See Chapter 3 for attempts at a definition of the term metalinguistic.
13
1 Introduction
of interactions between primary language faculties of the mind and general cog-
nitive properties, and crucially does not involve special components dedicated
to linguistic intuition. Thus, my hypothesis is that for any effect on a language
(judgment) task, there could be an analogous effect on a similar nonlinguistic
cognitive (judgment) task. I have parenthesized the word judgment to indicate
that I suspect that the truth of this hypothesis extends beyond judgments to other
metalinguistic tasks, although they will not be my concern here. In other words,
my claim is that none of the variables that confound metalinguistic data are pecu-
liar to judgments about language. Rather, they can be shown to operate in some
other domain in a similar way. (This is quite similar to Valian’s (1982) claim that
the data of more traditional psychological experiments have all the same prob-
lems that judgment data have.) It is not always easy to find convincing instances
of such effects in other domains, however. The most likely candidates would be
judgments in another sensory modality, such as taste, smell, or vision, which at
least at a low level are unlikely to involve the language facilities of the mind.
I will suggest just two arbitrary examples of cognitive domains that might be
affected by the same variables that affect linguistic tasks.
First, in the visual domain, shape recognition and judgments of size, numeros-
ity, etc., are potential candidates for parallels with linguistic tasks. Bergum &
Bergum (1979a,b) have found that in judging visually ambiguous figures (e.g.,
Necker cubes, Rubin vase figures, and Jastrow rabbit-duck figures) certain indi-
viduals experience reversals much more frequently than others. One might pre-
dict that these people also detect linguistic ambiguity more easily than others.7
Second, in the perfume industry, experts are employed to smell products that are
to be marketed and to test for certain properties that nonexperts in this field have
never heard of. These experts might differ from naive perfume smellers in the
same ways that linguists differ from naive sentence judges. Wherever possible
in the following chapters, I draw parallels of this sort between experimental re-
sults in psycholinguistics and known effects in other fields, or I propose a search
for such effects. Such findings could greatly assist us in factoring out these effects
from our grammatical judgment data, bringing us closer to an accurate picture
of linguistic knowledge.
My hypothesis represents common-sense expectations about the relation be-
tween language and other behaviors, and empirical support for it would thus not
be particularly surprising (Bever 1970a). However, even if the hypothesis is sup-
7 The two types of individuals were architecture majors and business majors, respectively. The
authors do not draw a conclusion as to whether the difference in reversal perception might be
due to an innate tendency toward perceptual instability, or might be a learned ability.
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ported, it still does not explain how cognitive principles and linguistic knowledge
come to interact in the mind to produce linguistic judgments. There are (at least)
two possible extreme interpretations. It could be that properties such as context
dependence and susceptibility to training effects belong to separate modules of
the mind that are implicated in judgment behavior but not in other forms of be-
havior (e.g., a decision-reporting component). At another extreme, it could be
that these properties are inherent in the cognitive substrate on which language
and all other higher cognitive functions are built. Both possibilities have impor-
tant implications that go far beyond the present work. My intuition is that each
is probably true of some properties, but it will not be possible to settle the is-
sue here. In principle the two explanations are empirically distinguishable, since
the modular theory predicts that there could be behaviors that circumvent the
modules in question and do not show the relevant effects, whereas the substrate
theory predicts that they are everywhere and inescapable. (These arguments are
of course drastically oversimplified.) If we should find that for a given effect
there seems to be no parallel elsewhere in human cognition, then and only then
would we have the beginning of an argument for the special nature of linguistic
judgment among human knowledge systems.
1.5 Scope and Organization
I do not attempt in this book to treat the subject of grammaticality judgments
in its entirety. Rather, I restrict my investigation on two somewhat arbitrary,
but fairly sensible, dimensions. First, in asking what grammaticality judgments
are judgments of, I look only at the acceptability (and grammaticality) of word
strings; i.e., I consider only syntactic, as opposed to phonological, wellformed-
ness, although in a broad sense acceptability/grammaticality often entails con-
formity to the phonology as well as to the syntax, and even to other linguistic
components. Second, while several sorts of experiment are potentially relevant
to the subject of grammaticality judgments, I systematically exclude a number
of subject populations. There will be little mention of the judgments of second
language learners and other nonnative speakers, except when they bear on our
understanding of native intuitions. Only a passing glancewill be cast on the devel-
opment of metalinguistic awareness (as it bears on adult awareness), which has
become virtually a field unto itself. And no data from aphasic speakers or others
with language impairments are considered. Putting it positively, I focus mostly
on the syntactic grammaticality judgments of “typical” adult native speakers. Fur-
thermore, I try to emphasize work on intuitions about general structures rather
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than work that bears only on the use of particular lexical items or constructions,
since the former are generally taken to be more fundamental indicators of core
linguistic knowledge.
Other sources cover parts of this territory, and the reader may wish to consult
them. Newmeyer (1983) devotes a chapter of his book to the data base of linguistic
theory, but his goal is to defend, rather than to (constructively) criticize, the gen-
erative modus operandi, and I disagree with many of his conclusions, although I
citemany of the same sources. Chaudron (1983) deals onlywith experimental psy-
cholinguistic work, but provides a useful summary chart of many of the studies
I discuss,8 and examines many procedural details that I omit;9 however, at least
half of his paper is devoted to studies of second-language learners. Labov (1975)
takes a position quite sympathetic with my own, but is concerned mostly with
sociolinguistic variation. While much of the experimental work he discusses is
not directly relevant to the issues discussed in this book, his methodological pro-
posals have heavily influenced my own. Finally, Birdsong’s (1989) review of the
literature, which occupies two of his chapters, overlaps considerably with mine,
but lacks the sort of principled overall organization that I attempt to provide. His
aim, like Chaudron’s, is to apply discoveries about grammaticality judgments to
issues in second-language learning and teaching research. Nonetheless, many
of his methodological proposals have been incorporated here. Thus, none of the
major previous studies of grammaticality judgments have attempted, within the
basic framework of generative grammar, to explain why grammaticality judg-
ments behave the way they do and to propose changes in the way that linguists
treat judgment data. That is what I attempt to do in this book.
The book is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I summarize the history of
the concepts of grammaticality and acceptability and their associated notations,
focusing on the ways in which grammaticality judgments are used by syntac-
tic theorists today and arguing that such uses demand a careful examination of
judgments, not as pure sources of data but as instances of metalinguistic perfor-
mance. I also consider where their use fits in the broader scheme of introspection
8 To compare the results of previous studies on the basis of Chaudron’s chart would be mislead-
ing, however; the experiments differed in ways too subtle and too complex for his categoriza-
tions to capture.
9 It will become apparent that my reports of experimental work are often concerned with two
particular features of elicitation experiments, the instructions that are given to subjects, and
the evaluation scheme (rating scale, categories, ranking procedure, etc.) that is used. The im-
portance of these two factors is discussed in detail in Sections 5.2.1 and 3.3.4, respectively.
Variation in these two features is perhaps the biggest reason why virtually no two studies of
grammaticality judgments are directly comparable.
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and intuition in social science. Chapter 3 is a discussion of several important is-
sues that arise when a performance view of grammaticality judgments is taken:
tasks one can use to elicit them, scales one can use to report them, how people
might go about giving them, and how and what they might tell us about lin-
guistic competence. Chapters 4 and 5 cover the major body of psycholinguistic
research that has been devoted to discovering ways in which the judgment pro-
cess can vary systematically with differences between subjects (Chapter 4) and
experimental manipulations (Chapter 5). Chapter 4 considers individual differ-
ences in two major categories: endogenous, or organismic; and exogenous, or
experiential. Chapter 5 examines task factors in two major categories: stimulus
materials, or what is to be judged; and procedural methods, or how it is to be
judged. In reviewing the literature in these two chapters, I attempt wherever pos-
sible to point out parallels with other cognitive behaviors. Chapter 6 represents
the integration of the substantive andmethodological findings and discussions of
Chapters 3–5. I present a preliminary model of the judgment process that reflects
what is known about linguistic intuitions, and I propose methods for collecting
grammaticality judgments that avoid the pitfalls of previous work and take into
account the factors that have been shown to influence judgments. Readers who
seek immediate practical advice on the collection of judgment data may wish to
consult Section 6.3 directly; it does not assume familiarity with preceding ma-
terial. Chapter 7 considers ways in which mainstream linguistic theory might
be affected by the growing body of research on grammaticality judgments and
suggests directions that could be pursued to advantage in future studies.
17

2 Definitions and Historical
Background
I dislike reliance on intuition as
much as anyone. … We should
substitute rigorous criteria just as




Thehistory of the concepts of grammaticality and acceptability and the notations
used to denote them is a long and controversial one. In this chapter I review the
important theoretical developments that have defined the use of these concepts
in generative grammar, because an investigation into the nature of grammati-
cality judgments demands a description of precisely what is meant by the term
grammaticality and an idea of what could constitute a judgment of it. I then turn
to the actual practice of linguists working within the generative paradigm today,
to see how they apply these notions.The chapter is divided as follows. Section 2 is
devoted to a brief history of the issues surrounding the notion of grammaticality,
the associated terminology, and diverse views on its role in linguistic theory. (See
Harris (1993: ch. 7) for more on this topic.) In Section 3, I survey the varied ways
in which grammaticality judgments are used in the linguistic literature, consid-
ering the types of data collected and the manner in which these are employed
to argue theoretical points. Section 4 raises the more fundamental question of
whether judgments ought to be used at all, in the light of another bit of social
science history – namely, the downfall of introspectionism in psychology. Sec-
tion 5 summarizes what I perceive as the major problems with linguists’ use of
judgments, identifying those that we can tackle with the results of the empirical
investigations discussed in subsequent chapters.
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2.2 A Short History of Grammaticality
The obvious danger exists, however,
that Chomsky’s “ideal speaker-
hearer” may be itself an artifact, a
mere woolen outergarment worn in
the attempt to achieve respectability
by slipping the wolf of an arbitrary
and artifactual grammar into an
unsuspecting flock of linguistically
naive psychologists.
(Derwing 1979)
Since my goal is to scrutinize the use of grammaticality judgments in generative
grammar, I adopt the assumptions of that framework without further comment,
although much of this investigation has theory-independent implications. Thus,
for the relevant definitions I turn to Chomsky, and in particular to the familiar
competence/performance distinction. Chomsky’s basic point is that we must dis-
tinguish what speakers of a language know (subconsciously) about the structure
of the language from their actual use of the language. The goal of linguistic the-
ory, under this view, is to describe the knowledge, independent of (and logically
prior to) any attempt to describe the role that this knowledge plays in the pro-
duction, understanding, or judgment of language.1 Whether a sentence is gram-
matical is a question about competence. A grammatical sentence is generated by
the speaker’s grammar; it is part of the language as delineated by his or her com-
petence. I will assume for the purpose of discussion that whether a sentence is
grammatical is determinate in all cases; i.e., that whatever form the competence
takes in the mind, it implicitly ascribes (perhaps some degree of) grammaticality
or ungrammaticality to each string of words.2 (See below for a refinement of this
assumption.) Whether a sentence is acceptable is a question about performance.
An acceptable sentence is consciously accepted by a speaker as part of his or her
language upon hearing it. This apparently simple distinction is often muddied by
1 There has been considerable criticism of this view. See Greenbaum (1976b) for a list of dissent-
ing opinions, and Derwing (1973) for the claim that competence versus performance is not an
instance of the kind of idealization usually made in the natural sciences.
2 It is conceivable, however, that competence in this sense of statically represented knowledge
does not exist. It could be that a given string is generated or its status computed only when
necessary, and that the demands of the particular situation determine how the computation
is carried out, e.g., by some sort of comparison to prototypical sentence structures stored in
memory. Since such a scenario would demand a major rethinking of the goals of the field of
linguistics, I will not deal with it further.
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the fact that the word performance has been used in different ways at different
times, by Chomsky and others. It is sometimes used to refer to specific instances
of behavior, or patterns of behavior in general, as opposed to static knowledge
that guides behavior. In other contexts it is used to refer to anything outside of
the grammar. including static knowledge of things like discourse structure or
mechanisms for using language. In this book, I use the term performance to re-
fer to behavior, as opposed to knowledge, including both people’s behavior on
specific occasions and their general patterns of behavior. (The importance of the
latter distinction will be discussed below.)
Concerning the relationship between performance and competence and the
approach to linguistic research, Chomsky states that
linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in
a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors
(random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in
actual performance. …
We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-
hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of lan-
guage in concrete situations). Only under the idealization set forth in the
preceding paragraph is performance a direct reflection of competence. In ac-
tual fact it obviously could not directly reflect competence. (Chomsky 1965:
3–4)
Noam Chomsky (personal communication) views the competence/perfor-
mance distinction as a simple truism: what we know and what we do are dif-
ferent things. The trick is how to learn about the former on the basis of evidence
from the latter. In the mid-1960s, Chomsky was already mentioning some of the
ways in which performance data, including judgment data, might be assessed: “It
is not that these introspective judgments are sacrosanct and beyond any conceiv-
able doubt. On the contrary, their correctness can be challenged and supported
in many ways, some quite indirect. Consistency among speakers of similar back-
grounds, as well as for a particular speaker on different occasions, is relevant
information” (Chomsky (1964: 56); I return to these suggestions in Chapters 4
and 5). Nothing in the above passages implies that variation among speakers is
either uninteresting for linguistic theory or necessarily an indication that incor-
rect judgments are involved. In practice, however, there might be a temptation
to take one of these easy outs in order to avoid confronting variation; I return
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to this matter in Section 2.3.2. Given that linguistic competence is only one con-
tributing factor in any observable behavior of a speaker, it is reasonable to ask
how we can hope to gather behavioral evidence about grammaticality.3 In The
Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (Chomsky (1955), hereafter LSLT )4 and Syn-
tactic Structures (Chomsky (1957), hereafter SS) we find the following remarks5
(I have emphasized some hedges that indicate that no particular operational test
can be expected to yield the right result in all cases):
We know that a speaker of the language can select, among sequences that
he has never heard, certain grammatical sentences, and that he will do this
in much the same way as other speakers. We might test this by a direct
determination of some sort of “bizarreness reaction,” or in various indirect
ways. (LSLT : 95)6
Yet (1) [Colorless green ideas sleep furiously], though nonsensical, is gram-
matical, while (2) [Furiously sleep ideas green colorless] is not. Presentedwith
these sentences, a speaker of English will read (1) with a normal sentence
intonation, but he will read (2) with a falling intonation on each word: in
fact, with just the intonation pattern given to any sequence of unrelated
words. He treats each word in (2) as a separate phrase. Similarly, he will be
able to recall (1) much more easily than (2), to learn it much more quickly,
etc. (SS: 16)
Such sentences with conjunction crossing constituent boundaries are also,
in general, marked by special phonemic features such as extra long pauses,
… contrastive stress and intonation, failure to reduce vowels and drop final
consonants in rapid speech, etc. Such features normally mark the reading
of non-grammatical strings. (SS: 35–36, fn. 2)7
At the same time, however, it was apparent that behavioral evidence was not
always the last word.Theoretical considerations could also dictate that some sen-
tences must be grammatical, regardless of how speakers might react to them.
3 See Oller, Sales & Harrington (1970) for commentary on the empirical status of generative
grammars and the nature of the competence/performance distinction.
4 All pages numbers refer to the 1975 edition.
5 I cite many of Chomsky’s passages verbatim, because the wording is often subtly nuanced
and easily misparaphrased. The reader is then free to disagree with my interpretation. See
Matthews (1993: ch. 4) for a detailed review of Chomsky’s early writings on these and related
topics.
6 The emphasis in all quoted passages in this chapter is my own, unless otherwise indicated.
7 Regarding this passage, Chomsky (1961) states that hewas careful not to suggest general criteria
for grammaticality.
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With regard to sentences containing embedded if-then and either-or pairs, Chom-
sky states, “Note that many of the sentences … will be quite strange and unusual.
… But they are all sentences, formed by processes of sentence construction so sim-
ple and elementary that even the most rudimentary English grammar would con-
tain them” (SS: 23). The reasoning seems to be this: given that certain sentences
are uncontroversially part of the language, our intuitions about what grammars
can look like tell us that certain other sentences must also be part of it, although
our judgments of these latter sentences are not so clear-cut. Such reasoning is
not, in and of itself, sufficient to conclude that a sentence is grammatical.8 It must
be shown that the factors that make it less than acceptable are extragrammatical,
i.e., that they exist independent of language structure.
Originally, Chomsky suggested that the evidence used to construct theories
be limited to clear cases, that is, ones where our intuitions leave no doubt as to
whether the sentence is acceptable or unacceptable, as the following passages
state explicitly:9
Our purpose is to construct an integrated and systematic theory, which,
when applied rigorously to linguistic material, gives the correct analysis
for the cases where intuition (or experiment, under more desirable circum-
stances) makes a clear decision. (LSLT : 415)
We may assume for this discussion that certain sequences of phonemes are
definitely sentences, and that certain other sequences are definitely non-
sentences. In many intermediate cases we shall be prepared to let the gram-
mar itself decide, when the grammar is set up in the simplest way so that it
includes the clear sentence and excludes the clear non-sentences. (SS: 14)
What is left unsaid here is why it is sometimes legitimate to let the grammar
decide, and how we are to know when such a move is allowed. The justification
seems to be a parsimony argument: Why say that a marginal sentence is ungram-
matical if that would complicate the theory? If we had access to no information
about the sentence in question beyond a judgment that it is marginal, this would
be a reasonable principle to follow, but I argue in subsequent chapters that we can
do better by looking for additional evidence that could bear on the status of the
8 Noam Chomsky (personal communication) believes that “everyone in the entire history of the
subject would agree” with my claim, and that the quoted passage from SS implies nothing to
the contrary. If that is true then the point of the passage is unclear to me; perhaps Chomsky
was presupposing other kinds of evidence as well.
9 Carden (1973) argues that in the 1960s, data on which there were disagreements were indeed
considered outside the domain of the theory.
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sentence. We can thus hope to avoid missing true complications in the grammar.
In answer to the second question raised above, we can then also avoid the need to
know when it is safe to let the grammar decide, since it is actually never safe but
always potentially erroneous. Fortunately, in practice it seems to be done fairly
infrequently anyway: see Labov (1975) for specific instances in which Chomsky
admits that data are unclear but proceeds to construct his theory solely on the
basis of his own intuitions. (This in turn is problematic for other reasons.)
Let me make a brief aside about terminology in reference to Chomsky’s writ-
ings. Note that Chomsky generally does not use the terms intuition and judg-
ment interchangeably. It is my understanding that judgment is a product of per-
formance and intuition is part of competence. When Chomsky says that “the
speaker has an ‘intuitive sense of grammaticalness’ ” (LSLT : 95),10 this does not
translate into the ability to judge grammaticalness. But the very close seman-
tics are probably responsible for the misapprehension alluded to in Chapter 1,
whereby the two are equated and thus judgments are seen as directly reflecting
competence, since competence consists of intuitions.This was not Chomsky’s in-
tent (see Chomsky (1965: 21)), although passages like the following could easily
serve to mislead the unwary reader: “The theory is refuted if the judgments are
not in accord with the predictions of the grammar” (Chomsky 1975: 36). In the
accompanying footnote, however, we find a qualification: “Note that there is a
further idealization here, in that we abstract away from other factors that may
interact with knowledge of language to determine judgments.” As for acceptabil-
ity, which speakers can judge, the Introduction to Chomsky (1975) describes the
concept as follows: “Sentences are acceptable (or perhaps acceptable under par-
ticular circumstances) if they are suitable, appropriate, adequate to the purpose
at hand, etc. The competence grammar contributes to determining acceptability,
but the latter concept involves many other factors” (Chomsky 1975: 8).11 It seems
that with linguistic training one can learn to abstract away from some of these
factors: linguists certainly assume that they can judge a sentence’s wellformed-
10 In Chomsky’s early writings, one often finds the term grammaticalness used instead of gram-
maticality. Most people treat these as synonymous, but this was apparently not Chomsky’s
original intent: “About the term ‘grammaticalness,’ … I purposely chose a neologism in the
hope that it would be understood that the term was to be regarded as a technical term, with ex-
actly the meaning that was given to it, and not assimilated to some term of ordinary discourse
with a sense and connotations not to the point in this context” (Noam Chomsky, quoted in
Paikeday (1985: 14)).
11 I have included passages from the 1973 Introduction of Chomsky (1975) as representative of
his early work, since it provides background to LSLT. Of course, the intervening years might
have brought a change in perspective.
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ness independently of its appropriateness to any actual discourse situation, for
example.
In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky (1965), hereafter Aspects), the rela-
tionship between acceptability and grammaticality wasmore explicitly discussed
in the following well-known passage:
For the purposes of this discussion, let us use the term “acceptable” to re-
fer to utterances that are perfectly natural and immediately comprehensible
without paper-and-pencil analysis, and in no way bizarre or outlandish. Ob-
viously, acceptability will be a matter of degree, along various dimensions.
One could go on to propose various operational tests to specify the notion
more precisely (for example, rapidity, correctness, and uniformity of recall
and recognition, normalcy of intonation). …The more acceptable sentences
are those that are more likely to be produced, more easily understood, less
clumsy, and in some sense more natural. The unacceptable sentences one
would tend to avoid and replace by more acceptable variants, wherever pos-
sible, in actual discourse.
The notion “acceptable” is not to be confused with “grammatical.” Accept-
ability is a concept that belongs to the study of performance, whereas gram-
maticalness belongs to the study of competence. … Like acceptability, gram-
maticalness is, no doubt, a matter of degree … but the scales of grammati-
calness and acceptability do not coincide. Grammaticalness is only one of
many factors that interact to determine acceptability. Correspondingly, al-
though one might propose various operational tests for acceptability, it is
unlikely that a necessary and sufficient operational criterionmight be invented
for the muchmore abstract and far more important notion of grammaticalness.
(Aspects: 10–11)
As Jim McCawley (personal communication) points out, the above definition
of acceptable is dispositional, in that it refers to a tendency across multiple actual
encounters with a sentence, rather than to a speaker’s reaction on any one occa-
sion. Therefore, whether a sentence is acceptable in general cannot in principle
be determined on the basis of a single situation wherein it is accepted. However,
a judgment about acceptability is presumably an attempt on the part of speakers
to assess what their reactions to a sentence would be across a range of situa-
tions. Thus, to elaborate on the definition of acceptability I gave above, whether
a sentence is acceptable is a question about performance in three senses: any
particular instance of a speaker accepting or rejecting a sentence is an act of per-
formance, i.e., behavior. Any sort of generalization across many such instances
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is a generalization about performance. A judgment of one’s disposition towards
accepting or rejecting a sentence is itself a type of performance.
The absence of an operational criterion for grammaticality has evoked nega-
tive reactions from many quarters. As Reich (1969) puts it, “when confronted by
adverse data, Chomsky retreated from his empirical position of 1957, to a theory
that he himself admits cannot be tested empirically”; Marks (1967) comments on
what he perceives as the incoherence of this position; Householder (1973: 365,
fn. 1) calls it “the paradox of linguistics: the only possible way of determining
whether or not a grammar is correct is by consulting the speaker’s intuitions,
but they are inaccessible”; Gleitman & Gleitman (1970: 25) have the following
reaction: “[Acceptability] tests cannot invalidate, they can hardly bear on, a the-
ory which when pushed will withdraw into successively deeper reaches of the
mind”. Chomsky (personal communication) believes that such comments belie
a confusion between evidence and criterion: while speakers’ behavior on some
task – for instance, the intonation they use in reading a string of words – might
constitute a piece of evidence concerning its grammaticality, one cannot define
the notion grammatical in terms of one or several of such tests; it is defined in
terms of some notion of the contents of the mind. (To borrow a favorite analogy
of Chomsky’s, while a litmus test might provide some evidence about whether
a substance is an acid or a base, chemistry does not define the concept acid in
terms of this test.) It seems to me that, in principle, there might someday be an
operational criterion for grammaticality, but it would have to be based on direct
study of the brain, not on human behavior, if it turns out to be possible to discern
properties of the mind (e.g., the precise features of the grammar) from physical
properties of the brain.
It does not make any sense to speak of grammaticality judgments given Chom-
sky’s definitions, because people are incapable of judging grammaticality – It
is not accessible to their intuitions (Newmeyer (1983: 51); Gombert (1992)). Lin-
guists might construct arguments about the grammaticality of a sentence, but
all that a linguistically naive subject can do is judge its acceptability. Neverthe-
less, in the remainder of this book I will follow the existing literature in treating
grammaticality judgment and acceptability judgment as synonyms,12 with the un-
derstanding that the former is unquestionably a misnomer, and only the latter
is a sensible notion. I do so because this usage occurs in many of the passages I
quote, and because acceptability judgment can have misleading connotations of
12 It is possible that researchers who have defined grammaticality and/or acceptability in other
ways might make a principled distinction between two types of judgment (this appears to be
the case for Langendoen (1973)), but since I follow Chomsky’s definitions I collapse the terms.
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its own in certain contexts. For instance, the term can indicate that one is dis-
cussing contextual appropriateness rather than structural wellformedness. I will
continue to follow Chomsky’s definitions in other contexts when the distinction
is important, for example, in acceptable sentence versus grammatical sentence.
Given that grammaticality is what Chomsky seeks to investigate, it would not
be surprising if he saw no useful purpose in the systematization of linguistic
data collection. In the end, no single empirical fact can be crucial to the issues
at hand. At the time of Aspects this seems to have been his view, but he allowed
for the possibility that circumstances might change, that there might be room at
some future time for a methodology more systematic than reliance on everyday
common sense:
There are, in other words, very few reliable experimental or data-processing
procedures for obtaining significant information concerning the linguistic
intuition of the native speaker. It is important to bear in mind that when
an operational procedure is proposed, it must be tested for adequacy … by
measuring it against the standard provided by the tacit knowledge that it
attempts to specify and describe. … If operational procedures were available
that met this test, we might be justified in relying on their results in unclear
and difficult cases. This remains a hope for the future rather than a present
reality, however. … There is no reason to expect that reliable operational
criteria for the deeper and more important theoretical notions of linguistics
(such as “grammaticalness” and “paraphrase”) will ever be forthcoming. …
The critical problem for grammatical theory today is not a paucity of evi-
dence but rather the inadequacy of present theories of language to account
for masses of evidence that are hardly open to serious question. … It seems
to me that sharpening of the data bymore objective tests is a matter of small
importance for the problems at hand. … Perhaps the day will come when the
kinds of data that we now can obtain in abundance will be insufficient to re-
solve deeper questions concerning the structure of language. (Aspects: 19–21)
I argue that this day has come, some 30 years later. I devote Section 2.3 to demon-
strating that the questions linguists are now addressing rely crucially on facts
that are indeed “open to serious question.”
Note also that Chomsky again assumes that there is a core of “unquestion-
able data concerning the linguistic intuition of the native speaker” (Aspects: 20),
which would presumably include judgments of some sort, and that these “obvi-
ous” facts would keep linguists busy for a long time, thus postponing the need for
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reliable tests applicable to “less obvious” cases.13 That is, for some sentences, ac-
ceptability judgments provide transparent evidence about grammaticality, while
still not constituting judgments of grammaticality in the literal sense. But how
is it determined whether a given datum constitutes such a clear case? For whom
must it be clear (Ringen 1979)?The problem, of course, is that each investigator is
free to pick and choose these “unquestionable” cases to suit the theory. (McCaw-
ley (1976) argues that, by Chomsky’s own definition of grammaticality, all sen-
tences must be considered unclear cases, because we never have direct informa-
tion about grammaticality.) That there is no standard way to make this decision
is argued in detail by Botha (1973): “The level of rationality at which grammatical
inquiry and general-linguistic inquiry are conducted would be raised if it were
clear … under what circumstances an intuitive evidential statement may be prop-
erly regarded as being evident” (p. 188); “Transformational grammar lacks a set
of conditions … governing the evidentness or obviousness of intuitive evidential
statements” (p. 193). Furthermore, even at an intuitive level, clear-case judgments
are not necessarily windows into competence: “In terms of the notion ‘clear case’
spurious linguistic intuitions could, despite their spuriousness, qualify for mem-
bership of the evidential corpus; in terms of the notion ‘unclear case’ linguistic
intuitions which were both genuine and correct could, despite their genuineness
and correctness, be denied membership of this corpus” (p. 206). Botha (1981) de-
fines a spurious judgment, in contrast to a genuine one, as one that does not
reflect competence, because it has been influenced by extralinguistic factors. In
this book, I propose more reliable means to make these discriminations.
As our concept of the theory is refined, the status of any given sentence can
change from ungrammatical to grammatical, or vice versa. (See McCawley (1979)
for a variety of definitions of grammaticality that have been used by different
theoretical factions at different times.) For instance, in LSLT Chomsky examines
the naturalness of particle movement as a function of the complexity of the in-
tervening NP and concludes, “This is systematic behavior, and we might expect
that a grammar should be able to state it” (p. 477). But in Aspects he says of the
same sentences (and, more celebratedly, of multiply center-embedded ones), “It
would be quite impossible to characterize the unacceptable sentences in gram-
matical terms. For example, we cannot formulate particular rules of the gram-
mar in such a way as to exclude them” (pp. 11–12). The latter claim seems to
be an exaggeration, at least with regard to center embedding. In fact, Katz &
13 An argument against this position is that the large masses of unquestionable data, if indeed
they exist, might still be of insufficient quality for linguistic theory, if they do not bear on the
crucial issues that it must address (Botha 1973; Labov 1972a). Section 2.3 shows this to be true.
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Bever (1976) elaborate Chomsky’s position by saying that a recursion counter
would do the job, but this is the only part of the grammar of English where it
would be used, which should make us suspect that this is not the right analysis
of the phenomenon. Noam Chomsky (personal communication) finds the idea
of a recursion counter “ridiculous, since it is obvious that whatever is involved
in constraining recursion is quite different in character from the devices made
available in UG … and may not even involve language.” If the implicit empirical
argument here were spelled out and supported, it would constitute a reasonable
basis for not attributing limits on recursion to the grammar.
In general, there seem to be three lines of defense by which a theoretical claim
is protected from potentially falsifying data, before any change in the theory can
be incited. This book is intended to help objectify two of these three procedures.
For instance, when faced with a sentence that apparently contradicts a claim,
e.g., an acceptable sentence that a grammatical rule excludes, the first line of de-
fense would be to argue that the data are invalid, that the sentence is not really
acceptable as claimed. While it is trivial to make this statement for one’s own
intuitions, such arguments ought to be supported by empirical investigations of
others as well. To the extent that we can standardize this process, we can reduce
data disputes. The second defense is to claim that the data are not relevant to
the theoretical issue at hand, that the sentence is good because it is allowed by
some other part of the grammar and is not under the jurisdiction of the disputed
construct. This approach generally relies on logical reasoning and might be sub-
ject to differing opinion but not to factual dispute; therefore, I do not discuss
it further. The third defense, typically indicative of the least understanding on
the part of the theory’s proponent, is to say that the sentence is prohibited by
the grammar, but non-grammatical factors are causing judgments not to reflect
this fact. Until we have an explicit understanding of such factors, such a claim
is unfalsifiable. (For a much more detailed examination of the roles of argumen-
tation and evidence in generative theory, see Botha 1973.) This state of affairs is
presumably what prompts Postal (1988) to quip:
Great strides are being made in linguistic rhetoric, whose progress puts the
stasis in mere description and theorizing to shame. In the great rhetoric
laboratories of the north-eastern United States, defensive shields are being
perfected that can render any theory virtually impervious to factual corro-
sion. (p. 129)
As I see it, this is precisely why we should strive for a better understanding of
acceptability judgments. It would allow us a principled way to establish to what
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extent any such piece of evidence should be considered to bear on the grammar.
We will still not be able to draw direct conclusions from such data, but it will at
least be a matter of objective fact what the relevant data are. We clearly do some-
times use speaker judgments as evidence about grammaticality, so we should
rigorously define when and why they can and cannot be used as such, and then
try to expand the range of caseswhere they can be used. As Birdsong (1989) states,
until we do so, if we do not agree on what our data represent, we cannot hope
to agree on an analysis. If we can understand what factors intervene between
the grammar and performance, we can circumscribe the cases where these fac-
tors might cause (un)acceptability not to reflect (un)grammaticality, and exclude
these cases as evidence. Chomsky seems to agree with this approach:
In actual practice, linguistics as a discipline is characterized by attention to
certain kinds of evidence that are, for the moment, readily accessible and
informative: largely, the judgments of native speakers. Each such judgment
is, in fact, the result of an experiment, one that is poorly designed but rich in
the evidence it provides. In practice, we tend to operate on the assumption,
or pretense, that these informant judgments give us “direct evidence” as to
the structure of the language, but, of course, this is only a tentative and
inexact working hypothesis, and any skilled practitioner has at his or her
disposal an armory of techniques to help compensate for the errors introduced.
In general, informant judgments do not reflect the structure of the language
directly; judgments of acceptability, for example, may fail to provide direct
evidence as to grammatical status because of the intrusion of numerous
other factors. (Chomsky 1986: 36)
If we could go a (large) step further and deduce a general reverse mapping from
acceptability to grammaticality, we could in principle determine the grammatical
status of any sentence operationally, and thus fully specify the range of facts over
which grammars must have scope. “We require a science of linguistic introspec-
tion to provide a theoretical and empirical basis for including some acceptability
judgments as syntactically relevant and excluding others” (Bever 1974: 195).
Under Bever’s proposed approach, only those unacceptable sentences whose
badness cannot be explained by any plausible extragrammatical aspect of speech
behavior are ungrammatical. (Bever’s example of such a case is I hope it for to be
stopping raining when I am having leaving; see also Bever 1971.)14 The argument
is that “if a constraint may be adequately treated by independently motivated
14 Bever goes on to make some preliminary suggestions about sentential properties that will
likely affect acceptability but are outside the realm of the grammar. These include sentence
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systems outside the grammar, its inclusion in the grammar is unwarranted and
obscures the descriptive and explanatory power of the grammar” (Bever, Carroll
& Hurtig 1976: 150). Of course, the paradigmatic example in this category would
be the short-term memory limitations that are said to result in the unacceptabil-
ity of multiply center-embedded sentences. More generally, the parser may be
misled (garden-pathed) into an incorrect parse that makes a well-formed sen-
tence seem bad, as in the following example from Ellis (1991), where the parser
presumably first tries to attach which book as the object of believes.
(1) Which book did you say John believes offended many people?
Wemust add to this proposal the converse case, in which acceptable sentences
that have been ameliorated by extragrammatical factors are not the responsibility
of the grammar. Again, multiple center embedding provides a plausible example.
Sentences like (2a) below are clearly ungrammatical, lacking the necessary num-
ber of verb phrases, but because participants apparently cannot keep track of the
number of subject noun phrases that have accumulated, they often judge such
sentences to be acceptable, in contrast to the grammatical (2b), which is judged
unacceptable (Frazier 1985).
(2) a. The patient the nurse the clinic had hired met Jack.
b. The patient the nurse the clinic had hired admitted met Jack.
Another class of examples in this category involves the use of resumptive pro-
nouns, as in (3a), which is clearly better than the version without a pronoun in
(3b), even though nonlinguists may generally reject both utterance types:
(3) a. the guy who they don’t know whether he wants to come or not
b. *the guy who they don’t know whether wants to come or not
Kroch (1981) argues that possible grammar-based accounts of the distribution of
such resumptive pronouns are unappealing, and takes this as a reason to con-
sider a processing account in terms of on-line production, which he argues is
more straightforward and hence is to be preferred. On this account, resumptive
pronouns are the result of the generator’s inability to look far enough ahead to
determine that the trace of an already uttered wh-expression is within an island.
Thus, the production mechanism is forced to produce ungrammatical sentences
in some cases, and this fact somehow renders them more acceptable than other
length, absurdity, difficulty of comprehension and difficulty of pronunciation – these will be
the subject of Section 5.3 (see also Katz & Bever 1976).
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ungrammatical sentences, for reasons that are not entirely obvious. (Examples
like this motivate a link between the generator and the judgment routine in the
model to be presented in Section 6.2.) While this argument for attributing judg-
ments to performance rather than to competence is theory-internal, it makes
empirical predictions, for instance that carefully planned speech or writing will
not contain sentences like (3a) at all; the astute reader will find a counterexample
to this claim in Footnote 17.
(See Langendoen & Bever 1973 and Bever 1974 for more instances of suppos-
edly ungrammatical acceptable sentences.)
A third possibility we must consider when deciding the grammaticality sta-
tus of a sentence is that it might have no status at all. This possibility is raised
by Morgan (1972), who presents unquantified data on interspeaker judgment dif-
ferences to show that certain pathological cases of subject-verb agreementagree-
ment, subject-verb in English display a large degree of variation and uncertainty:
(4) a. ⁇Are/⁇Is John or his parents here?
b. I, who the FBI thinks *am/*is an anarchist, will doubtless be here.
Morgan speculates that this variation might exist because speakers’ grammars
simply do not contain a rule elaborate enough to apply in such cases, so when
forced to make judgments they may apply ad hoc strategies. It is hard to see what
the general criteria for reaching this conclusion of grammatical indeterminacy
might be. Morgan’s argument is based on the inability to find plausible gram-
matical principles that cover all the judgments that are firm, plus the fact that
many speakers find neither variant of the problematic sentences grammatical.
Presumably, indeterminacy is distinguished in principle from mere interspeaker
grammar differences if individual speakers seem not to have systematic judg-
ment patterns, but what constitutes a systematic pattern is not always obvious
a priori.
Naturally, there might not be total agreement on the status of a particular
effect.15 For instance, Reich (1969) and Spencer (1973) questionwhy limitations on
center embeddings should not be taken to reflect the grammar. (See Katz & Bever
(1976) for discussion of how such decisions can be argued for.) More broadly, the
role of meaning vis-à-vis the grammar has been a point of great debate over the
history of generative linguistics. The distinction between syntactic and semantic
intuitions is liable to be based on one’s own theory (Cohen 1981). McCawley,
in his introduction to Postal (1976), expresses the view that such arguments are
15 Newmeyer (1983) believes that discrepancies on this point account for many cases of what
appear to be data disagreements among theorists.
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pointless. Once you know why a sentence is bad, it does not matter whether that
cause is considered inside or outside the grammar.
If a distinction between “ungrammatical” and “unacceptable” is to be made,
the ungrammatical items are those unacceptable items whose unacceptabil-
ity is for a reason that the linguist takes to be in his province. That means
that in order to tell whether an unacceptable item is ungrammatical, one
must identify why it is unacceptable. But if one can identify why it is un-
acceptable, nothing is gained by in addition classing it as grammatical or
ungrammatical. A grammar that specifies what is grammatical and what
is ungrammatical but does not enable one to pinpoint what is wrong with
all unacceptable sentences (or better, unacceptable uses of sentences) is of
questionable value; and if a grammar performs the latter task, there is no ob-
vious reason why one should care whether it performs the former. (p. 202)
I do not accept this argument. First, if one can identify why a sentence is un-
acceptable, then by definition one has also determined its grammatical status.
It is grammatical if the cause of its unacceptability is behavioral (i.e., outside
the grammar), and ungrammatical otherwise. No further arbitrary decision is re-
quired. Second, if one accepts that the nature of explanation differs for different
kinds of unacceptability (e.g., that some kinds are due to UG and some are due
to working memory constraints), then it is important to establish which kind of
explanation a particular datum calls for. A grammar of the type that McCawley
finds to be of questionable value is useful if it provides a theory of a well-defined
module of the mind. It will be less useful if it simultaneously tries to provide a
theory of some unrelated module.
In fact, as McCawley has also pointed out, linguists are not really interested
in judgments about strings of words. Rather, they seek to know whether a given
string is a grammatical expression of a particular meaning. In this sense, seman-
tics is crucially involved.
The alleged ability of speakers of a language to distinguish between “gram-
matical” and “ungrammatical” strings of words is about as rare and as per-
verse as the ability to construct puns, an ability towhich I believe it is closely
related. Anyone who has taught an introductory syntax course has had the
experience of presenting an “ungrammatical” example only to be told by
some smart-aleck about an unsuspected interpretation on which the sen-
tence is quite normal. … Such interventions are usually greeted with the
sort of groans that are the accepted form of expressing appreciation of puns,
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and they provide the same sort of comic relief that puns do in the midst of
what is at times a boring enterprise. However, the extent to which com-
ical virtuosity is required for a person to notice the existence of such an
interpretation, as contrasted with the ease with which one recognizes its
acceptability once it has been pointed out, shows that the strings of words
on which grammaticality judgments are allegedly made exist only as typo-
graphical or acoustic objects, not as perceptual or cognitive objects, just as
Necker cubes exist only as graphical objects and not as perceptual objects,
as contrasted with their two interpretations, which do exist as perceptual
objects. These points are in fact implicitly recognized by virtually all mem-
bers of the generative grammar community, as is evidenced by the fact that
the “grammaticality judgments” on which they base arguments systemati-
cally ignore interpretations other than those relevant to the points at issue,
and the “sentences” are often exhibited with supplementary information
as to the intended interpretation, for example, subscripts to indicate pur-
ported coreference of items, much in the same way that one might present
the Necker cube with shading or context that picked out one of the inter-
pretations. Generative grammarians speak as if they were doing linguistics
in terms of something like sense data, when they in fact are doing it in
terms of something more like the perceptual data of gestalt psychologists.
(McCawley 1982: 78–79)
It is interesting to examinewhat other theoretical linguists today believe about
the types of evidence that are available to them.The following unusually explicit
passage (whence the epigraph of Chapter 1 is drawn) confirms that judgment
data are still considered the primary source of linguistic evidence, and thus un-
derscores the importance of studying their properties. It also reaffirms that we
continue to lack a principled criterion for choosing data.
No kind of data is excluded in principle, only as a matter of practice – judi-
cious practice, we think, but not irrefutable. … Grammarians use data like
“such and such a string of words is a sentence in such and such a language”
or “such and such a string of words means such and such,” where such facts
are determined by native speakers of the languages in question. Data of this
kind vary enormously in quality – ranging from the clear fact that He are
sick is not grammatical in English to the rather subtle judgments involved
in determining whether John and his can refer to the same person in His
mother likes John. Despite this variation in quality and despite the fact that
linguists have not formulated a “methodology of sentence judgments,” such
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data remain the principal source of information about grammar, again, not
as a matter of principle, but because they have so far provided successful
insights.
Thus, the study of grammar is not the study of sentence judgments; rather,
sentence judgments are our best current avenue to the study of grammar.
In other words, the grammar is a real thing, not an artifact erected on top of
an arbitrarily demarcated set of facts or types of facts. Therefore, it is often
difficult to determine whether a given fact bears on grammar or not; this is
not an arbitrary decision, but ultimately an empirical question about how
the world divides up.” (van Riemsdijk & Williams 1986: 2)
It is at least possible a priori that the reason judgments seem to work well for
linguists is that they can be manipulated and distorted to suit the purpose of
an analysis. In this connection, (Birdsong 1989: 82) suggests that “linguistics is
a potentially fraudulent enterprise when elicitation data can be manipulated to
instantiate pet theoretical analyses. It would be hard to imagine a more power-
ful argument for understanding the psychology of metalinguistic performance.”
Indeed. Most linguists profess ignorance of the reasons why judgment data are
useful. For example, Baker notes:
We focus on those linguistic behaviors which for some reason are most
likely to reveal the mental structures in their true light. The situation can
be likened to the physicist who tries to determine the force of gravity. …
Unfortunately there is every indication that much of the linguistic behav-
ior we have record of is like the autumn leaf – complicated by many other
external factors. … I do not claim to have the wisdom to reliably discern
which linguistic behaviors are like autumn leaves and which are like steel
ball bearings. (Baker 1988: 29)
Despite his lack of “wisdom,” Baker implicitly chooses to continue the tradition
of making primary use of judgment data.
Before closing this section, I wish to dispel one possible misinterpretation that
has been an all too common result of linguists’ admission that judgments are
their primary data. That is the view that grammaticality judgments are the ob-
jects of study in linguistics, that its purpose is to describe them, and that they
therefore constitute the only kind of data the field requires (see Sampson (1975)
for views along these lines). That this is not the case has been stated repeatedly
and unequivocally by Chomsky:
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To say that linguistics is the study of introspective judgments would be like
saying that physics is the study of meter readings, photographs, and so on,
but nobody says that. …
It just seems absurd to restrict linguistics to the study of introspective judg-
ments, as is very commonly done. … Many textbooks that concentrate on
linguistic argumentation for example are more or less guided by that view.
(Chomsky 1982: 33–34)
2.3 The Use of Judgment Data in Linguistic Theory
2.3.1 Introduction
I cannot make native speakers
behave the way Mr. Chomsky
says they do, and if they insist on
breaking his rules, it might be hard
to pin down the grammatical and
the ungrammatical.
(Sledd 1962)
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, I wish to demonstrate the claim,
made in Section 2.2, that current issues in linguistic theory require nonobvious
data for their resolution. Second, and relatedly, I wish to illustrate that the use
of judgments in theoretical work has moved far beyond making distinctions of
good versus bad, or even graded goodness and badness decisions. The situation
is characterized most poignantly by Levelt:
In the early years of the transformational grammar [the low reliability of
absolute grammaticality judgments] was not an important issue, since the
‘clear cases, i.e., the highly uncontroversial cases of grammaticality and un-
grammaticality, were sufficient for constructing and testing linguistic the-
ory. It was expected that, in its turn, the theory constructed in such a way
would decide on the ‘unclear cases.” This hope has vanished. (Levelt et al.
1977: 88)
It has slowly but surely become clear that it is not possible, on the basis of
incontrovertible, directly evident data, to construct a theory so extensive
that all less obvious cases can be decided upon by the grammar itself.’ It
is becoming more and more apparent that decisions on very important ar-
eas of theory are dependent on very unreliable observations. … There is a
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tendency toward preoccupation with extremely subtle distinctions, not the
importance, but rather the direct observability of which can seriously be
called into question. (Levelt 1974: Vol. 2, p. 6)
The same complaint has been made throughout much of the history of gener-
ative grammar, e.g., by Bever (1970a: 348), Labov (1972a: 191), Langendoen (1972),
Coppieters (1987), and Birdsong (1989: 81). It has come to be generally acknowl-
edged that not all speakers of “the same language” might have the same com-
petence, but that does not justify basing the theory only on sentences for which
there is universal agreement, and extrapolating by some means to dictate the sta-
tus of the remainder. In cases where people disagree, that fact cannot be ignored;
the theory must be able to describe every speaker’s competence, and thus must
allow for variation wherever it occurs. This is why establishing the extent of in-
terspeaker agreement is important. Theories are now being based on sentences
whose status turns out not to be unanimous, as I discuss in Section 2.3.2. See
Section 6.3.3 for further discussion of the implications of individual differences
in grammaticality judgments and in linguistic competence.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of work in linguistics today, unlike that re-
viewed in Section 1.3, has paid little heed to the issues involved in using judg-
ment data. What follows is surely not a random sample of the theoretical syntax
literature, but it includes some very influential and widely cited papers. My par-
ticular interest will be not just the types of judgment data that are employed,
and hence the judgment abilities attributed to native speakers, but also the im-
portance of these judgments to the theoretical arguments, i.e., to what extent the
arguments would be weakened if the fine-grained judgments were unavailable.
In many cases I will not mention the details of the theoretical issues, since they
are irrelevant to my purpose.
2.3.2 The Dangers of Unsystematic Data Collection
All too often the data in linguistic books and articles are dubious, which in
turn casts doubts on the analyses. Since analyses usually build on the results
of previous analyses, the effect of one set of dubious data left unquestioned can
have far-reaching repercussions that are not easily perceived.
(Greenbaum 1977c)
Let us begin with an important case where interspeaker variation in judgments
has been ignored, to the detriment of the theory, before examining the ways in
which judgments are used by theoreticians. The belief seems to be widely held
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among theoreticians that the majority of the data on which their theories are
based is indisputable. But one cannot assume that what is a clear-cut judgment
for oneself is obvious to all, or even to a large majority of, speakers. A case in
point is the widely cited article by Lasnik & Saito (1984). One of the major propos-
als in this work is a substantial revision of themechanisms of Proper Government
to allow sentences like (5):
(5) Why do you think that he left? [= Lasnik & Saito’s (99)]
The authors assume that such sentences are ambiguous, i.e., that why can be
taken as questioning the reason for the thinking or the reason for the leaving. In
general, they assume that adjunct wh-words do not show that-trace effects, so
that all sentences of this form should also be ambiguous when why is replaced
by where, when, or how. On the basis of these assumptions, they propose various
complications to the operation of the Empty Category Principle (ECP) and a pro-
cess of that-deletion at Logical Form so that the sentences will not violate the
ECP, as they did in earlier theories. But are the crucial readings grammatical?
In a subsequent paper, Aoun et al. (1987) propose an alternative theory in the
same domain, this time with the goal of accounting for the ungrammaticality
of some of the very same sentences that Lasnik & Saito went out of their way
to include in the grammar, namely those containing why and how as the wh-
words. Anticipating reaction to the apparent data disagreement, they make the
following comments:
Some speakers claim to get a lower-clause interpretation for why in (51a)
[Why did she say that there are men outside] even if a complementizer is
present. However, we have found that when asked to repeat the sentence,
those speakers omit that, as if it were not perceived.
English speakers who accept (51a) may be able to use why referentially, in
the sense of ‘for what reason’. But the acceptability of (51a) for such speakers
does not seem to us to indicate grammaticality, unless they also accept (26)–
(28) [e.g., *Who remembers what we bought why?] and the like; rather, an
analogical process is involved. (pp. 563–564; emphasis in original)
Aoun et al. seem to be proposing two different explanations. On the one hand,
they suggest that the judgment data are inaccurate, that people really cannot get
the relevant reading of this kind of sentence. On the other hand, they propose
that this reading is acceptable for some speakers, and then attempt to argue on
theory-internal grounds that it still must not be generated by their grammars,
since we would then expect certain other sentence to be acceptable as well.
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This area provides a striking demonstration of why linguists must improve
their data-gathering techniques. In the first case, Lasnik & Saito show no evi-
dence of being aware that the only sentences that prompt their major revision
of the theory are not universally accepted. If their proposal had been uncritically
adopted, it would have constituted a major step in the wrong direction, in the
absence of any explanation for why many speakers should find the sentences
bad. In the second case, Aoun et al. conclude on the basis of a less than rigorous
survey that only a small number of speakers claim the sentences to be acceptable,
and that some or all of these judgments are incorrect, i.e., that subjects did not
consider the crucial presence of that. My own preliminary survey suggests that
this is not the case either. About two-thirds of the people I surveyed accepted the
sentences after the presence of that was explicitly pointed out to them, again call-
ing the analysis into question. Given the extent to which judgments are divided,
I suspect that syntacticians would not want to base any conclusions about Uni-
versal Grammar (UG) on these sentences. But until the detailed judgment facts
are known, there is no way to assess the situation accurately.16
A similar case is made by Sobin (1987) with regard to wh-extraction across
that versus whether. He points out that most theories assume that these two
kinds of extraction, exemplified in sentences (6) and (7) below, are equally bad –
categorically ungrammatical.
(6) *Who did you say that kissed Harriet? [= Sobin’s (1)]
(7) *Who did you ask whether loves Mary? [= Sobin’s (4)]
But the results of Sobin’s questionnaire survey (corroborated by various anec-
dotal observations by others) present a distinctly different picture. He asked 42
nonlinguists to classify sentences into one of three groups, representing active
acceptance, passive acceptance, and rejection.17 He found the average rejection
16 Newmeyer (1983) attempts to play down the significance of a similar situation from the early
1970s, describing it as a case of “letting the theory decide” on a marginal case, as Chomsky
proposed in SS. In the situation under discussion, however, both camps went out of their way
to account for the judgments they perceived, which were not predicted by existing versions of
the theory.
17 His descriptions to subjects were worded as follows: “(a) it sounds like a sentence that you
… (the informant) … might say in the right context or situation; (b) it sounds like a possible
English sentence, one that even if you don’t say it that way, you would not be particularly
surprised to hear someone else say it to you that way or to see it written; (c) it sounds odd,
so that you doubt that people say it that way.” One might raise some questions about these
instructions; for instance, they require subjects to have some sense of what a “possible English
sentence” is, and to be aware of how other people might speak.
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rate for sentences like (6) to be 17.5%, whereas for sentences like (7) it was 97.6%.
The active acceptance rate for (6) was 45.2%. These differences certainly imply
that we cannot rely on identical grammatical constraints to rule out both sen-
tence types. While the whether sentences are almost unanimously rejected, the
that sentences are quite widely accepted. Once again, several theories had been
constructed on the assumption that (6) is bad for everyone, and furthermore these
analyses predicted that it should be just as bad as (7), since it violates precisely
the same constraint.18 As before, these are core data for the formulation of the
ECP and associated constraints. Sobin proposes that structures like (7) be ruled
out universally, whereas a parametrized rule could determine whether (6) would
be allowed. Whatever the eventual analysis, it is clear that ignoring variation led
the theory astray in this case too.
Bley-Vroman, Felix & Ioup (1988) also gathered data on Comp-trace effects.
While their primary purpose was to look at the influence of UG on second-
language acquisition, they needed native English speakers as controls. Their 34
subjects made three-way judgments (accept/reject/not sure) on 32 sentences for
which the authors already had a set of normative judgments in mind. On the av-
erage, subjects agreed with these norms 92% of the time (where “not sure” was
never counted as agreement).19 On 6 of the 32 sentences, however, their mean
accuracy fell below 90% (the authors’ arbitrarily chosen cutoff for good agree-
ment), and two of these involved Comp-trace violations. Only 48% of subjects
rejected What did John say that would fall on the floor, if we’re not careful? and
only 74% rejected What does Mary want to know whether John has already sold?
This study also found that supposedly good sentences are not always judged very
good. Only 68% of the subjects accepted Which information would it be possible
for Mary to persuade Susan to tell the reporters?
18 Such an analysis might be salvageable if something like the process of that-deletion proposed
by Aoun et al. is going on in sentences like (6) to yield a grammatical sentence. Note that there
is no closely related grammatical version of (7) (Elan Dresher, personal communication).
19 Unfortunately, the article does not report the number of “not sure” responses, making it difficult
to know how clear-cut the disagreements are.
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2.3.3 A Case Study in the Use of Subtle Judgments
The kinds of arguments that seem
to bear very crucially on the nature
and operation of syntactic systems
involve [today’s grammarian] in
grammaticality decisions that are
extremely difficult to make.
(Fillmore 1972)
Let us now consider various ways in which judgments are used in theoretical ar-
gumentation, beginning with Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) influential work on psych-
verbs in Italian. They wish to argue that (some) Experiencer subjects are un-
derlying internal arguments, so they rely heavily on the ability to diagnose de-
rived subjects. One criterion they use is the inability of derived subjects to bind
anaphors, which generally holds for the Experiencers in question. However, they
admit that with nonclitic anaphors the resulting sentences are not entirely bad;
they rate them as “*?” or “(?),” where by the latter they seem to mean “very close
to fully acceptable.” They clearly consider the lack of total badness an important
problem, since they propose an analysis to explain it. Parallel constructions in
English, they point out, “are judged deviant to some extent,” which they appar-
ently consider to be support for the Italian data by implicitly assuming the same
explanation in both cases. Another correlate of derived subjecthood is the impos-
sibility of arbitrary pro, but again there are generic contexts where the contrast
with underlying subjects is “weaker, but still detectable” as compared to specific
event contexts, the predicted bad sentences being marked “?” or “⁇.” (No defini-
tion is given for “⁇” in relation to “*?,” but in general, people seem to assume that
any rating containing a star is worse than one containing only question marks.)
Here again, an explanation is proposed by Belletti & Rizzi. In both of these cases,
in the absence of an explanation the marginality facts would undermine main
arguments for their analysis. On the very next page, however, a “⁇” sentence
is treated as bad with no further comment, and the same is true for a sentence
marked “(*)” later on.20 Why is it that some instances of marginality demand
20 Belletti & Rizzi do not exhaust the possible annotations. In addition to the five already men-
tioned, they employ the standard “*” and show grammatical sentences as unmarked, for a total
of seven distinctions. But there are others in the literature. For instance, there are occasional
uses of “**” that mean “much worse than a sentence that is already pretty bad.” As Hagège
(1981) puts it, “The stars have also been eked out with further signs” (p. 137). Jim McCawley
(personal communication) points out that the real problem with all these annotations is that
linguists often do not use them consistently. For example, linguists are not clear on whether
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comment whereas others do not? Most likely because the authors have no ex-
planations for some marginal cases, but know that readers will not be upset if
certain marginal data are left unaccounted for. Thus, we have another case of
selective treatment of judgment data.
Later in Belletti & Rizzi’s paper we find an instance where (citing Burzio (1981))
they equate two uses of the question mark, claiming that the marginal status of
one sentence is unchanged by the application of a passivization rule, i.e., that the
original sentence and its passive counterpart are equally marginal:
(8) a. ? John gave pictures of each other to the kids.
[= Belletti & Rizzi’s (69)]
b. ? Pictures of each other were given to the kids.
Their argument is that binding requirements may be satisfied at D-structure, be-
fore passive movement, so no change in grammaticality is predicted. However,
in the corresponding Italian cases the apparent surface binding violations (paral-
lel to (8b)) are “slightly more awkward, … but the contrast is much weaker than
cases involving violations of the Binding Theory” (p. 316). In the abstract, their
argument takes the following form:
The difference in grammaticality between sentences A and B is significantly
less than that between sentences C and D.
D constitutes a binding violation, but A and C are fine.
Therefore, B does not constitute a binding violation because it is not bad
enough.
The assumption is that all (Principle A) binding violations cause exactly the same
change in grammaticality rating, independent of any properties of the sentences
themselves. This is an assumption we ought to test.
It is interesting to look at the prose descriptions that Belletti & Rizzi use to
accompany the various annotations of sentences. Their sentence (75), marked
“?,” is “more or less acceptable” but such sentences with one question mark “still
produce a weak violation of the chain condition.” That is, the sentence is bad
enough that it must violate something, and just bad enough to be a violation
of this condition, but must not be violating anything else or it would have to
“*” represents the worst point on a two-point versus a five-point scale or some intermediate
point.
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be worse. Examples labelled “⁇” are variously described as “quite strange” and
“weakly deviant”; does this mean that the notation underdifferentiates, or is the
descriptive prose merely being stylistically varied?
Despite their distinction of no fewer than seven degrees of grammaticality,
Belletti & Rizzi remark about some other sentences that “these judgments are
extremely subtle, and the usual OK vs. * notation is perhaps not appropriate for
characterizing such contrasts. In fact, examples like (79a)–(80b) are already quite
marked; still, there seems to be a detectable systematic difference in the indicated
direction” (p. 322). Now, for some reason, any detectable pattern warrants an
explanation. Furthermore, a sentence that is “quite marked” receives no stars or
question marks at all. After proposing an account of the difference between the
starred and unstarred items, the authors then claim independent support for it
by suggesting that another subtle contrast seems “exactly on a par with” this
one. That is, we must allow for judging strict equality, as well as inequality, in
contrasting pairs of judgments.
In this paper we also find the paradigmatic case of comparison of degrees of
badness, ECP versus Subjacency violations: “The relatively mild ill-formedness
of (94b) [which they mark “⁇”] suggests that the empty category left after extrac-
tion is properly governed within NP, otherwise these examples would violate the
ECP, and a stronger unacceptability should result” (p. 328, fn. 22). Thus, people
supposedly have an absolute sense of how bad ECP violations are and the sen-
tence in question is not bad enough to be an ECP violation. Furthermore, since
Subjacency violations are usually not as bad as ECP violations, this is probably a
Subjacency violation. But there is no general theory of which principles should
cause worse violations. The theory makes no prediction about the relative bad-
ness of, say, θ-Criterion versus Case Filter violations, let alone about how bad
each one is in some absolute sense. The notion of relative and absolute badness
of particular violations is ad hoc, and is used in just those cases where it is con-
venient.
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2.3.4 The Interpretation of the Annotations and Degrees of Badness
Twinkle twinkle sentence starred,
The asterisk means that you are marred.
Because of you the linguists try
Inventing rules which you defy.
Twinkle twinkle sentence starred.
From linguistics you should be barred.
The truth is rarely all or none,
Not even with an N of one.
(Peter Reich, 1980)
Householder (1973) accepts both the credit and the blame for originating,
around 1958, the use of asterisks tomark ungrammatical sentences. He complains
that what was once a simple and unequivocal notation has come to be used in
highly ambiguous ways, many of which are detailed below.21 At the time of his
writing, the asterisk seemed to have at least three possible interpretations:
1. “I would never say X”;
2. “I have never seen or heard a sentence of the type of X and hereby wager
you can’t find an example”; and
3. “This is quite comprehensible, and I have heard people say it, but they
were all K’s [foreigners, Southerners, etc.]; in my dialect we would say Y
instead.” (Householder 1973: 370–372)
As we shall see, this is only the tip of the iceberg.
Another kind of ambiguity with judgment notation involves two distinct uses
of marginality markings, chiefly the question mark, in the literature. One use de-
notes variable interspeaker ratings, i.e., a sentence that is good for some people,
bad for others. The second meaning is that (most) individuals rate the sentence
as marginal. One could imagine the combination of these situations as well. The
same is true of disjunctive notations like “/” or “{}”: Are both alternatives accept-
able to all speakers, or are there two groups, each of which accepts only one?
This situation is at best a notational inaccuracy that could be easily corrected by
21 According to Householder, the originally marked forms that were “quite obviously ungram-
matical by anyone’s standards.”
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adopting new symbols.22 Unfortunately, there are cases where the surrounding
prose description does not make clear which meaning is intended. An example of
the second kind of ambiguity appears in verb agreement with nominative objects









[= Thráinsson’s (3), p. 466]
“There are some idiolectal differences as to the preference of verb forms, but the
fact that some speakers prefer the 3rd sg. form here indicates that the nominative
NP is not perceived as the subject” (p. 466). One interpretation of these comments
might be that there is between-speaker variation across degrees of preference for
each form.23
Andrews (1990) examined this and a number of other subtle agreement phe-
nomena in Icelandic.. He is an unusual theoretician in that his work actually re-
ports the results of grammaticality questionnaires that he administered. In one,
Andrews elicited ratings on a 6-point scale, characterized as follows (this is one
of the rare instances in which an explicit meaning is given for the symbols):24
✓ Completely acceptable and natural
? Acceptable, but perhaps somewhat unnatural
⁇ Doubtful, but perhaps acceptable
?* Worse, but not totally unacceptable
22 One does occasionally find “%” used to mark acceptance by some speakers but not others.
Neubauer (1976) states that he and Larry Horn introduced this symbol to indicate important
dialect variation. It should be noted that dialect here is not necessarily meant in the sense of
regionally or socially based group speech, but simply in the sense of a number of speakers who
share the same judgments.
23 Newmeyer (1983) suggests that there is an even more basic inconsistency in the use of stars,
question marks, and other symbols – namely, their indication of ungrammaticality versus un-
acceptability. My impression is that the authors of works reviewed here, like most current
authors, intend the latter interpretation. McCawley (1985) explicitly states that he uses aster-
isks to mark “whatever kind of oddity of a sentence … I am at the moment concerned with; thus
I use it to report data, not conclusions as to ‘grammaticality’” (p. 673). As noted in Section 2.2,
McCawley rejects the notion of grammaticality, as opposed to acceptability, anyway, feeling
that there is nothing to be gained by classifying sources of unacceptability as being inside or
outside the grammar.
24 Labov (1972b) gives the following definitions: ? = questionably ungrammatical, * = ungram-
matical, ** = outstandingly ungrammatical. See Householder (1973) for another version.
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* Thoroughly unacceptable
** Horrible (p. 203)
Andrews reports results for 20 sentences, with between 12 and 17 subjects re-
sponding. Of these sentences, only three were rated uniformly “✓”; none were
rated uniformly “*” or uniformly “**”, and only two were rated as either “*” or
“**” by everyone. But despite having access to such detailed information, An-
drews fails to clarify the status of Thráinsson’s variability, stating that “either
of the above [agreement variants] seems to be acceptable (on the basis of ques-
tionnaires returned by seven informants)” (p. 212), which is still ambiguous. The
implications of interspeaker differences versus intraspeaker marginality should
be clear. The former, if not reflective of extragrammatical factors, demand differ-
ent grammars for the two groups, whereas the latter demands a single grammar
with a less severe constraint.
Another use of “?” is illustrated by Pollock (1989) in his widely cited paper on
the structure of IP (Inflection Phrase), with regard to French sentences like the
following:
(10) ?Je pensais ne pouvoir pas dormir dans cette chambre.
[= Pollock’s (20b)]
According to Pollock, “the question mark is meant here as an indication that
[sentences such as the one in (10)] have a very literary ring to them, not that
they are unacceptable” (p. 375). Such data are in serious danger of being misin-
terpreted out of context, especially since on the very next page “?” is used to
indicate marginal acceptability. On this next page we also find “(?)” indicating
that some speakers find another sentence better than the question-marked one,
although Pollock admits to having found other speakers who hold the opposite
opinion. One could see this either as again confounding marginality with inters-
peaker variability, or as an indication that ratings may reflect arbitrarily chosen
subgroups of speakers.The contrast between “?” and “(?)” does not affect his argu-
ments, but the difference between these marginal sentences and certain starred
ones is crucial to several arguments in Pollock’s paper. Later on, “(?)” is used not
to mean “slightly better than ?” in a relative sense, but “perfect, with at worst a
slightly literary ring,” which might or might not correspond in an absolute sense
to the prior usage. Indeed, literariness and marginality might be separate dimen-
sions of ratings altogether, which cannot be meaningfully compared on the same
ordinal scale, much as height and weight as integers cannot.
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Finally, let us consider a paper by Browning (1987) in which more than half
of the example sentences are marked with some number of question marks or
stars.25 Since the paper is concerned with (among other things) the definition of
Subjacency, one of the few Government-Binding (GB) principles that has graded
behavior in its very definition, it is not surprising to find extensive reliance on
relative judgments. One of Browning’s proposals is to account for themarginality
of parasitic gaps as in (11) and (12) by the same mechanism that accounts for
paradigm Subjacency violations such as those in the sentences in (13):
(11) ?Which paper did you read before filing? [= Browning’s (1)]
(12) ?an artist that close friends of admire [= Browning’s (2)]
(13) a. Which car is it time for John to wash? [= Browning’s (40)]
b. Who did John buy a suit to impress?
c. What did John wonder how to fix?
d. Who did they leave before meeting?
Consider first the degree of ungrammaticality which results from one bar-
rier intervening between two points in a chain. Several examples are given
above in [(13)]. I have been assuming the standard judgment for parasitic
gaps such as [(11)] and [(12)], namely, a mild marginality. If this marginality
is due to the intervening barrier, then the severity of the violation is clearly
in the ball park represented by [(13)]. (pp. 68–69)
Two things are noteworthy in Browning’s account. First, as we have seen before,
there is a standard rating for constructions of a particular type, independent of
the sentences themselves. This is surely a huge idealization – there are experi-
ments showing that identical structural violations are given different grammati-
cality ratings depending on their particular lexical content (see Sections 5.3.5 and
5.3.6). To the extent that linguists give uniform ratings for all such sentences, it
is much more likely to be because they recognize them (perhaps subconsciously)
as instances of parasitic gaps than because of any pretheoretic goodness rating.26
That is, they are judging conformity to sentence patterns or templates and then
25 Hagège (1981) finds this trend unappealing: “In extreme cases, the pollution of starred, forbid-
den forms brings us to what has been called ‘a linguistics of the impossible’" (p. 158, fn. 16).
26 This hypothesis is supported by the fact that people’s absolute judgments are highly unstable,
as I discuss in later chapters. Identical ratings of the kind linguists claim to have could not
arise on the basis of acceptability judgments alone.
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reporting the standard rating for that pattern.27 Second, Browning’s analysis is
another example of equating the badness of sentences and taking this as sup-
port for a common violation. But is it not possible that two different principles
could yield the same degree of ungrammaticality when violated? Just because
two sentences are equally bad does not mean they violate exactly the same con-
straint(s), especially since most of GB’s constraints have yet to be rated accord-
ing to seriousness. Browning goes on to draw support for her arguments from
alleged differences in goodness between sentences with no question marks or
stars whatsoever.
2.4 Introspection, Intuition, and Judgment
Being a native speaker doesn’t
confer papal infallibility on one’s
intuitive judgments.
(Raven McDavid, quoted in
Paikeday 1985)
Over the history of generative grammar, much has been made of its heavy re-
liance on introspective judgments and their nonequivalence to production and
comprehension. Interestingly, this same feature has been used both to criticize
and to defend the generative practice. In fact, Ringen (1977) notes Chomsky’s im-
plicit suggestion that introspective psychology or psychophysics could serve as a
model for the use of linguistic intuitions. But, as Ringen argues, the first of those
analogies would be counterproductive to the field, and the second would be in-
appropriate (but see Cowart (1997: 6–7) for a different view). Let us consider how
these paradigms operate, and why linguistics should not be striving to emulate
them.
In the introspectionist paradigm, established byWilhelmWundt in 1879 in the
first experimental psychology laboratory, trained subjects were asked to describe
their impressions of a wide variety of physical objects and experiences (Wundt
(1896); Boring (1953)). The idea was to describe internal experience in terms of el-
ementary sensation. That is, rather than saying that one sees a book, one should
relate the colors, shapes, etc., that are perceived. There were several problems
with this approach. One was that the elements of most experiences simply can-
not be discerned by reflecting on them, just as one cannot discern the elements
27 I assume that sentence processing itself does not work primarily by templates.
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of water by looking at it (Dellarosa 1988). Another was the fact that Wundt’s sub-
jects were far from naive with regard to the experimental procedure. They had
to undergo at least 10,000 supervised practice trials before they could be used
in an experiment, during which time they were taught special terminology in
which to describe their sensations. One cannot help but suspect that Wundt’s
own ideas on what experience was like affected subjects during this training pe-
riod, although at the time it was thought that subjects were merely unlearning
bad perception habits. Each of these problems is applicable to the linguist’s situ-
ation today to some degree (Levelt 1974: vol. 3), but perhaps the most significant
drawback, which led to the demise of introspectionist psychology, is strikingly
evident among modern-day linguists. Dellarosa (1988) describes it as follows:
Despite the careful training that observers received, agreement among in-
trospective reports was the exception rather than the rule. It was not un-
usual to obtain markedly different reports from two observers who were
exposed to the same stimulus. Such disagreements could not be settled in
any scientific fashion owing to the inherently private nature of internal
events. In more technical terms, introspection failed as a bona fide scientific
method because it violated a fundamental rule concerning scientific investi-
gation: that of independent access to both causes and effects. Although the
cause (i.e., stimulus) was open to public observation, the effect (i.e., internal
sensation) was not. Without such independent observation of the internal
sensation, it was impossible to tell which of two conflicting introspective re-
ports was the correct one.The conflicting reports could have arisen because
(a) Subject A was truly experiencing a different sensation than Subject B, or
(b) Subject A was experiencing the same sensation as Subject B but was
misreporting it, or (c) Subject A was simply lying. …There was no scientific
way to determine which of these three conditions was true. (p. 5)
See Householder (1965) for the view that there is no way to evaluate conflicting
claims about linguistic intuitions either, and Levelt (1972) for some more general
background on the historical relationship between psychology and linguistics. I
should stress that I do not believe that appealing to linguistic intuitions about
sentences is a form of introspection, for reasons that are detailed immediately
below. However, the methodologies seem to have some disturbing commonali-
ties.
Now, it is true that there has been somewhat of a resurgence in the use of
introspectionist-style protocols in psychology recently, specifically in the use of
“talk aloud” and “think aloud” methods. In their comprehensive review of this ap-
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proach, however, Ericsson & Simon (1984) point out a fundamental difference in
how such reports are used today. In a nutshell, they are not taken as facts about
the inner workings of subjects’ minds, but are studied from the point of view of
understanding how it was that subjects were able to say what they did about a
mental process, independent of its veracity. This distinction is too easily over-
looked, but it is crucial, and many linguists have not taken heed of it yet. Except
in those cases where they fail to suit the linguist’s purpose, subjects’ intuitions
are taken to reflect their true linguistic knowledge.We do not ask, “What must be
in subjects’ minds in order for them to react this way to a sentence?” but, rather,
“What must be in subjects’ minds in order for this sentence to have the status
they claim it has?” This is what Bever & Carroll (1981) mean when they say that
“intuitions are not empirical primitives but complex behavioral performances in
their own right” (p. 232). Thus, current psychological practice does not redeem
linguistic practice.
Ringen (1977) summarizes the problem with a Wundtian approach thus: if sub-
jects are reporting on truly privatemental states (to which only they have access),
then their reports are in principle uncheckable; therefore, if intuitions are to be
any good as data, they must differ in some way from this sort of introspection.
Fortunately, I believe they do. Linguists are not asking subjects to describe an in-
ternal mental process when they encounter a sentence – not even thinking aloud
is involved, only reporting a reaction (Cohen 1981). Introspection is reflection,
analysis, or careful thought applied to accessible contents of the mind, which do
not include grammatical knowledge. Thus, linguists are not introspectionists.
Ringen goes on to consider Chomsky’s second analogy, to psychophysics. Like
linguistic intuition gathering, psychophysics experiments involve first-person
utterances given in response to stimuli (e.g., responses to questions like “Which
weight feels heavier, the one in your right or your left hand?”). But in psycho-
physics we can ask not only if the subjects’ reports correctly describe their judg-
ments (as opposed to being instances of lying, misspeaking, or carelessness), but
also how accurate the judgments are (e.g., which of the two weights really is
heavier). Psychophysics concerns the relationship between objective features of
stimuli and subjective judgments of them, but grammaticality judgments have no
objective standard to be measured against.28 One is the final authority on what
28 Wayne Cowart (personal communication) suggests that the analogy is useful because the ex-
ternal standards against which judgments can be measured are the linguistic norms of the com-
munity where speakers learned their native languages. Beyond the obvious practical problems
in applying this idea, there is still the conceptual problem of distinguishing inaccurate judg-
ments from real differences in the grammars of people native to the same speech community.
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one’s psychophysical judgments are, but not on whether they are correct. Thus,
psychophysics also fails as an analogy to grammaticality judgment.
There is one type of report that does seem to parallel linguistic intuitions, as
Ringen points out: reports about mental states, e.g., whether one is in pain.These
certainly can be shown to be false – we can show that a person is lying about
being in pain, but once we show that the report is sincere, no other evidence
can disprove the assertion (it makes no sense to talk about the correctness of a
sensation), and if two people’s reports conflict in response to the same stimulus,
that does not undermine the veracity of either report. And so it seems to be with
linguistic intuitions. Pateman (1987) makes the case most eloquently:
[Core grammatical rules] can be studied by means of intuition, which is a
quite distinct method or process from introspection. In my view, the ex-
ercise of intuition – for example, offering intuitions as to the grammati-
cality or ungrammaticality of token sentences-provides us with indexical,
that is, causally related, symptomatic evidence for the character of under-
lying mental representations. An intuition of grammaticality is not a social
judgment, but the output of a computational process which the speaker as
subject registers and reports, just as in the case where the viewer as sub-
ject registers and reports visual phenomena which may well be resistant
to judgment proper (so, for example the Müller-Lyer illusion persists even
when we know it is an illusion). Of course, this is not always true, and it is
clear and admitted that intuitions of grammaticality are liable to all kinds
of interference ‘on the way up’ to the level at which they are given as re-
sponses to questions. In particular, they are liable to interference from so-
cial judgments of linguistic acceptability. Ontologically, the difference may
be expressed this way: mentally represented grammars compute grammati-
cality categorizations, but they do not care about them any more than the
perceptual system cares about perceptual illusion. In contrast, speakers as
subjects can and do care about grammaticality (and the veridicality of per-
ception), and can and do convert the categorization they register into social
judgments. This can sometimes lead them into error. (p. 100)
I use the term ‘intuition’ to designate that which gives us causally related in-
dexical or symptomatic evidence for the character of underlying psycholin-
guistic (or, more generally, psychological) processes. Intuitions are not ex-
ercises of judgment which claim certainty or any kind of objectivity for
the content of the judgment and hence which claim the assent of all those
implicated by the judgment. Rather, intuitions are reports of appearances,
hence subjective expressions which make no judgment about how others
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will or should respond. In intuition we tell how something strikes us, how
it appears to us and thereby provide causal evidence about our minds. In
Wittgenstein’s terms, intuitions provide symptoms rather than criteria of
what underlies them. … Intuition is used to establish claims of form (1),
not form (2), which involves the exercise of judgment (introspection in my
terms).
(1) Sentence P seems grammatical to subject S.
(2) Sentence P is grammatical in language L, according to subject S. (p. 135)
See Carr (1990: 117) for a somewhat different conception of intuition versus in-
trospection, as well as Katz (1981) and Lyons (1986) on the same topics.
Thus, much of the common terminology surrounding the use of grammati-
cality judgments is somewhat misleading. They are certainly not introspective.
They are not judgments or intuitions in the everyday sense, in that they cannot
be verified or resolved by observation or calculation. They also do not have an
evaluative component as do social judgments. Perhaps more accurate terms for
grammaticality judgments would be grammaticality sensations and linguistic re-
actions. Nonetheless, for the sake of familiarity I shall continue using traditional
terminology, on the understanding that it must not be taken literally. As Pate-
man (1987) points out, treating grammaticality judgments like sensations does
not preclude our looking for ways in which they might be inaccurate, just as our
primary senses can be. Even staunch supporters of the generative enterprise such
as Newmeyer (1983) admit that the theory might well be skewed by artifacts of
the introspection/intuition/sensation process, but they usually resign themselves
to this as being part of the early stages of the field of linguistic investigation. I
suggest that a more useful approach would be to try to learn more about the crea-
ture rather than simply to accept its influence over us. If indeed metalinguistic
judgment behavior can tell us anything at all about normal language use, how
can we extract that information? That is the question I begin to address in the
next chapter.
2.5 Conclusion
In general, it is clear that subtle judgment data have become important to theo-
retical argumentation. If they were not crucial, surely they would be ignored –
clear-cut data make a much more impressive case. I have identified three kinds
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of problems in the use of these data, one of which will be the main focus for
the remainder of this book. The first is that judgment data are not systemati-
cally reported or notationally identified. The second is that they are sometimes
used or discarded as it suits the linguist’s fancy. The third is that their use at-
tributes various sophisticated abilities to native speakers without any evidence
that speakers are actually capable of reliably making the discriminations in ques-
tion, and without any attempt to systematically control the process of obtaining
these judgments. The first two problems are more properly examined under the
rubric of philosophy of science, and I will have little more to say about them.The
third falls in the domain of psychology, which has the means to determine what
people can actually do and provide a method for collecting the data when they
do it. Subsequent chapters address these two goals and relate the results to the
needs of the generative enterprise.
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3 Judging Grammaticality: The Nature
of Metalinguistic Performance
Metalinguistic data are like 25-cent
hot dogs: they contain meat, but a
lot of other ingredients, too. Some




The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the basic qualities of gram-
maticality judgments and some current thinking on their theoretical status, as
a prelude to examining detailed studies of their behavior under various experi-
mental manipulations in the two subsequent chapters. I cite some experimental
work, but also a fair amount of theoretical discussion.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, I ask how it is that we
can get people to assess grammaticality, what tasks have been invented for this
purpose, and what their relative merits are. I then consider in Section 3.3 what
has been a most important and controversial feature of the judgments that result
from these tasks – namely, that people seem to judge grammaticality in a graded
rather than a dichotomous fashion.This is perhaps the most widely studied topic
in the literature on grammaticality judgments; a major issue is how to get at these
scalar judgments reliably. In Section 3.4, I speculate on how the intuitions behind
our judgments might arise, how a sentence is processed for judgment, the extent
to which the hypothesized process could reflect the grammar, and howwe might
make it do so more transparently. Section 3.5 tackles more directly a view that
has become almost unanimous among psycholinguists, that no privileged status
can be accorded to judgment data over any other sort of performance data, and
that we therefore cannot draw direct conclusions about grammar from them. Nu-
merous researchers have made this argument in various ways, and I review the
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major contributions. Finally, I relate the high-level properties of grammaticality
judgments discussed in this chapter to the low-level properties to be examined
in the next two chapters.
3.2 Tasks that Access Grammaticality
In this section I look at some of the methods researchers have used to induce
subjects to express their feelings on the grammaticality of sentences, as a pre-
lude to the detailed discussion of experimental work that begins in Section 3.3.2.
This list is not exhaustive (see Labov (1972b: 106), and Bialystok & Ryan (1985) for
other types of intuitional judgments), and I concentrate on those methods that
require the least inference on the part of the experimenter. For instance, I am not
concerned here with inferring grammaticality on the basis of spontaneous con-
versations or texts, because such inference is problematic and because subjects
are not engaged in explicit judgment, which is the focus of this examination.1
Still, a number of tasks have been used productively to investigate subjects’ intu-
itions indirectly, or to gain additional information. Many of these are represented
in the studies I review in subsequent chapters. I start by extending the term judg-
ment beyond the paradigm case of asking the subject, “Do you think this is a
good sentence?”
The first extension we can make is to supplement judgments in various ways.
For instance, we can ask subjects to explain their judgments. In the case of sen-
tences judged bad, this can involve asking subjects why they feel the sentence is
bad, or where in the sentence the problem is. Such questioning helps to ensure
that the reasons for which subjects reject sentences are relevant to the theoretical
issue at hand. While there is potentially a lot of information to be gained by this
method, there are problems as well. For instance, it is not clear that subjects will
be able to answer such questions in all cases. As Birdsong (1989: 110) puts it, the re-
sponse “ungrammatical” can result from a “rather vague, gestalt-like impression”;
it just sounds bad. At other times, a subject can detect something specific that is
deviant about a sentence. It would be worthwhile to examine under what condi-
tions these two feelings tend to arise, assuming subjects can reliably report the
difference; the question appears not to have been studied. Some researchers deny
1 As an example of such an activity, one could imagine using almost any measure that is corre-
lated with grammaticality. For instance, Miller & Isard (1963) show that amid loud background
noise, grammatical sentences can be shadowed much more accurately than ungrammatical
ones, but one would not want to take such differential perceptibility as sufficient evidence for
grammaticality.
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that posing such questions to subjects is ever a useful procedure. Botha (1981), for
example, believes that people do not know the reasons for their intuitive judg-
ments and cannot justify them, so it is senseless to ask for such justification. (See
Section 2.4 on introspection for more discussion of this issue.) This suggestion
poses another methodological problem as well, namely, how to balance this task
for the sentences that are considered good, to avoid a biased procedure. It seems
to make no sense to ask, “Why is this sentence good?”2 Some experimenters who
have worried about this problem seem to have used a paraphrase task instead,
which is useful in the sense that it helps to ensure that a subject actually thinks
about the sentence in question and takes the intended reading. (In fact, Connors
& Ouellette (1993) had their subjects paraphrase the stimuli before judging them.)
Another type of extension of the judgment task, particularly useful in marginal
cases, is to ask under what conditions, if any, the sentence could be grammati-
cal. The subject could refer to a number of different conditions: the context of the
utterance (e.g., “Only in a cartoon world where toasters can think”); prosodic fea-
tures (e.g., “It’s OK with heavy stress on dog”); restrictions on referents (e.g., “It’s
good as long as they refers to something animate”); or novel lexical items (“Then
of would have to be a noun”). A parallel task for the ungrammatical cases might
be correction, i.e., asking the subject how to fix an ungrammatical sentence (e.g.,
what words to add or remove). Generally, we are interested in the minimal nec-
essary changes. If the initial judgment is scalar rather than binary, it might make
sense to ask both kinds of questions about the same sentence, i.e., “When would
it be good as it stands?” and “How could you make it completely good?”
We can also go beyond explicitly asking for grammaticality assessments and
look to other metalinguistic tasks in collecting this information.3
2 A linguist might respond to such a question by demonstrating that the sentence judged to
be grammatical can be generated from the available mechanisms in the grammar, or that it
satisfies all the relevant well-formedness constraints, but naive subjects cannot be expected to
attempt this.
3 Even Birdsong (1989), whose entire book is devoted to metalinguistic performance, believes
this term requires a “rather vague interpretation.” Its most important feature seems to be the
objectification of language, or attention to linguistic form rather than content. Birdsong also
suggests that metalinguistic performance describes “language-related activities typically not
associated with the casual conversation and listening of non-linguists” (p. 62). Cazden (1976)
describes it thus: “It is an important aspect of our unique capacities as human beings that we
can not only act, but reflect back on our own actions; not only learn and use language, but treat
it as an object of analysis and evaluation in its own right. Metalinguistic awareness, the ability
to make language forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves, is a special kind
of language performance, one which makes special cognitive demands, and seems to be less
easily and less universally acquired than the language performances of speaking and listening”
(p. 603). See Gombert (1992) for a survey of uses of the term.
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One simple variation is to request rank orderings of sentences by grammat-
icality, a procedure that I examine further in Section 3.3.4. One might also ask
for a comparison of the type of violation in bad sentences, e.g., asking whether
two sentences are bad in the same way. Another interesting method makes use
of ambiguity. If we have a sentence that is uncontroversially good under one
reading, but questionable under another (e.g., the that-trace sentences discussed
in Section 2.3.2), we can ask subjects whether it is ambiguous, and then verify
their answers by eliciting paraphrases of the readings they find. In fact, the latter
task without the former can provide some of this information without putting
subjects in a judging mode at all, which (it will be argued in Section 3.4) might
be important. Getting at the grammaticality of an alternative reading of a sen-
tence via judgments is particularly tricky, as Householder (1973) points out. The
kind of judgment needed –whether the sentence is grammatical under reading X,
when it is clearly good under reading Y – might require a different kind of judg-
ment than one of simple grammaticality, in that the task involves evaluating a
structure-meaning pair.
The most widely cited nonjudgment tasks, which were very popular in the
1960s and early 1970s, are the so-called compliance tests.Quirk & Svartvik (1966)
are often cited as the originators of these tests. The task is to transform a stimu-
lus sentence in some way, for example, to convert it from a statement to a ques-
tion, to make it negative, or to switch its pronouns. The experimenter is actually
not interested in these operations at all, but in whether the subject changes the
remaining portion of the sentence while converting it. For instance, in investi-
gating the grammaticality of a bare adjective complement of regarded, the task
might be to convert the sentence He is regarded insane into a question. The de-
pendent measure is the number of relevant noncompliances (RNCs), instances
when subjects change the relevant part of the sentence, in this case the com-
plement (e.g., by the insertion of the word as). This constitutes noncompliance
with the instructions, since subjects are told to make only the change that the
experimenter requests. An RNC suggests that the subject considers the original
form to be ungrammatical, although we must be careful about potential inter-
fering effects such as forgetting the exact syntax of the original. Key to such an
interpretation is the requirement that the transformed sentence would be just as
deviant as the original – the operation must neither remove nor add deviance.
Of course, whether a sentence meets this criterion is up to the judgment of the
experimenters. (See Itkonen (1979) for the criticism that what constitutes an RNC
in these experiments also depends on the experimenters’ own intuitions.)
Quirk & Svartvik’s (1966) original series of experiments compared tests mea-
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suring RNCs (operation tests)compliance tests with two other types of task. Se-
lection tests are like operation tests except that a set of possible responses is given
to the subjects, who must simply select the response they prefer. Judgment tests
involve rating sentences on a 3-level scale: “wholly natural and normal,” “wholly
unnatural and abnormal,” or “marginal or dubious.”The researchers argue for the
use of a three-tiered scale as a compromise between the arbitrary responses that
they believed would result from the use of a two-tiered scale, which they con-
sider “absurdly gross,” and the 7-point scale that is more typical in psychology,
which they consider “unduly arbitrary.” In eliciting judgments, they preferred to
ask about natural and normal language, combining grammaticality with mean-
ingfulness and other factors, rather than trying to focus on structure alone. They
wanted to compare judgments with the other tasks because they believe that di-
rect questioning is the least reliable way of getting at structural intuitions. They
wanted to shift subjects’ attention away from the issue of interest, and the no-
tion of grammatical deviance in general, by the use of operation tests. The use
of judgment and operation tests involving the same sentences allowed Quirk &
Svartvik to pinpoint the reasons for an ungrammatical judgment without asking
subjects about them directly. Interestingly, though, a graph of the number of sub-
jects accepting various sentences does not at all resemble a graph of the number
of compliances on the same sentences. Although the overall correlation of these
measures is r = 0.73, this figure drops to 0.5 when 13 clearly grammatical con-
trol sentences are excluded. One major reason for this discrepancy is that there
might be no obvious way to repair certain kinds of ungrammaticality, so that no
RNC response was possible although a given sentence was clearly bad in some
way, e.g., the semantically anomalous Timber was creeping up the hill. Based on
the two graphs, Quirk & Svartvik conclude that there is no clear-cut threshold
of grammaticality. Stolz (1969) correctly points out that the generalizability of
their results is limited by the fact that they did not look at specific classes of rule
violations, but often tended to focus on particular lexical items.
In a subsequent book, Greenbaum & Quirk (1970) describe in great detail sev-
eral orally-administered batteries of operation tests, as well as relative and ab-
solute judgment tasks. The obvious question again is whether compliance tests
and judgment tests gave the same results for particular sentences. Unfortunately,
their presentation does not allow a concise overall summary of the results, so we
are limited to somewhat vague generalities. Greenbaum & Quirk found a large
degree of agreement between the two measures, and they attempt to provide
very detailed explanations of the minor systematic discrepancies. For instance,
sentences that violate lexical co-occurrence restrictions are judged bad but are
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not changed, whereas sentences with certain word order errors are changed but
not judged bad. Tottie (1977) rightly cautions, in response to performance tests
like these (although her comments could apply equally well to judgment tests),
that we should ask ourselves
whether we are actually justified, from a psychological as well as from a
linguistic point of view, in asking subjects to substitute one word for an-
other or to produce negative or interrogative counterparts of affirmative
sentences. Obviously, the sentences produced in that way cannot a priori be
assumed to be equivalent to spontaneously produced linguistic structures
of the same type. … However, we need to know a good deal more about the
psychology of speech production before we can arrive at anything more
than a very tentative evaluation of such tests. (p. 209)
Amore recent technique for assessing grammaticality, which is just beginning
to show its full potential, is the measurement of event-related brain potentials
(ERPs;; see Garnsey (1993) for an excellent introduction to the use of this tech-
nique in language research). These are patterns in the electrical activity of the
brain, measured by scalp recordings during the presentation of stimuli, in this
case, sequential visual presentation of words. Electroencephalogram readings
are broken down into component waveforms and categorized by the direction
of change of the potential, positive (P) or negative (N), and the typical latency
in milliseconds (e.g., 300, 400, etc.) from the stimulus onset. Three ERP compo-
nents have been identified with well- or ill-formedness of sentences: N400, P300,
and P600. Kutas & Hillyard (1983) teased out the triggers of N400 using three
types of stimulus sentence: syntactically well-formed and coherent; well-formed
but containing one semantically anomalous content word; and ill-formed but se-
mantically coherent, containing mismatches of tense or plural morphemes. In all
cases, the primary task for the subjects was reading for content, although they
were warned that errors might appear. The experimenters found that semantic
anomalies elicited N400s, but grammatical errors did not, although they point out
that the latter were considerably more subtle than the former. In a later study,
Van Petten & Kutas (1991) compared syntactically well-formed anomalous sen-
tences with random word strings and found that the ERPs elicited by the final
word of each string type differed significantly. They interpreted the reaction to
the well-formed strings as belonging to the P300 class of ERPs, which occurs in
a wide variety of tasks, but here seemed to be associated with syntactic closure,
the realization that a sentence is complete. P600 appears to indicate temporary
parsing failures, whether or not they are subsequently resolved. In particular, it
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occurs in certain garden-path sentences at the point where the initial parsing
choice fails, e.g., at to in (1a), but not at the same word in the superficially simi-
lar non-garden-path sentence (1b). (Osterhout & Holcomb 1992). A P600 has also
been found to occur upon presentation of the word was in (2a), but not in (2b)
(Osterhout, Holcomb & Swinney 1994).
(1) a. The broker persuaded to sell the stock …
b. The broker hoped to sell the stock …
(2) a. The lawyer charged the defendant was lying.
b. The lawyer charged that the defendant was lying.
Ideally, onewould also hope to find a reliable ERP correlate of actual, not just tem-
porary, grammatical violations, so that overt judgments could be independently
verified, but in practice this will not be so straightforward. Not only are ERP ex-
periments costly and difficult to conduct, requiring very carefully controlled and
unnatural reading conditions, but the interpretation of the results is not straight-
forward. Still, we might hope that someday ERP research will at least help us to
disentangle various sources of judgments of ungrammaticality (See Section 7.2
for a description of a promising study.)
There are obviously many important questions about the relationships among
metalinguistic task performance of the kind we have been considering, regular
linguistic performance, and competence, several of which are considered in Sec-
tions 3.4 and 3.5 below. (Many of the authors I cite in those sections construe
the area of metalinguistic performance even more broadly than I have in this
section, and include tasks that do not bear on grammaticality, but I believe that
their discussion applies equally well to our domain.) It is not even clear whether
we should speak of metalinguistic indicators as a whole, because there is consid-
erable debate as to whether metalinguistic skill is a unitary phenomenon. From a
developmental perspective, Hakes (1980) argues that it is, whereas from a cross-
cultural perspective, Scribner & Cole (1981) argue that it is not, because people
who do well on one task often do poorly on another (see Section 3.5, and also
Section 4.4.2, for the latter). Birdsong (1989) views metalinguistic performance as
a collection of skills, arguing that it shows three typical features of skilled behav-
ior: there are differences in the number and kind of skills that individuals exhibit;
there are differences in the degree to which individuals exhibit a given skill; and
the skills tend to improve with practice or training. The reader is referred to
Birdsong (1989: 51–54) for detailed evidence on each of these points, which are
somewhat controversial (not all of Birdsong’s evidence comes from judgments).
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Within the scope of the present book, Scribner & Cole’s work bears on the first
two features of skilled behavior, and linguist/nonlinguist differences (see Sec-
tion 4.4.1) bear on the third. If Birdsong’s view is more or less correct, then these
skills can be expected to make their own contributions to acceptability results,
apart from the contributions of linguistic competence. Intertwined with these
issues is the deeper question of whether we are really interested in what forms
people actually use, as opposed to what they claim they use, or what they pas-
sively accept. We know that use of a construction does not imply acceptance and
vice versa (Greenbaum 1976a), and sociolinguists have long known that speakers
might deny using forms that they actually use frequently in everyday speech.
As Labov (1975) demonstrates, this phenomenon is not even limited to socially
significant linguistic variables. He describes numerous subjects who used posi-
tive anymore in recorded conversations, yet when asked directly, they claimed
never to have heard it, felt that it is not English, misinterpreted its meaning, and
showed other signs of bewilderment. Labov points out that “this puts us in the
somewhat embarrassing position of knowing more about a speaker’s grammar
than he does himself” (p. 35). (Hindle & Sag (1975) give similar anecdotal reports.)
Various metalinguistic tasks will reflect the three sets of sentences – those actu-
ally used, those claimed to be used, and those accepted – to different degrees.4
Which set is most relevant might depend on whether one believes that linguis-
tic competence is separate from production and comprehension mechanisms, a
question I take up again in Chapter 6.
3.3 The Nature of Graded Judgments
3.3.1 Is Grammaticality Dichotomous?
The following passage, from R. Lakoff (1977), probably reflects the beliefs of most
newcomers to linguistics regarding the possible grammatical status of sentences:
“It was tempting to believe that linguistic markers, like other animals, came in
pairs, and it was therefore natural to assume that grammaticalitywas an either-or
question. … This seemed to us the way things ought to be in a well-ordered uni-
verse, and we were still capable of believing, with our endearing childlike faith,
that the linguistic universe was well-ordered” (p. 73). Despite Lakoff’s apparent
disillusionment, many linguists have wanted to maintain the principle that gram-
4 For instance, Hindle & Sag (1975) present anecdotal evidence suggesting that the task of judging
shows a bias towards incorrect rejections as opposed to incorrect acceptances, i.e., towards
lower-than-deserved ratings, as measured by speakers’ actual usage.
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maticality is a dichotomous notion: “In general, then, if we find continuous-scale
contrasts in the vicinity of what we are sure is language, we exclude them from
language” (Hockett 1955: 17); “What with vigorous leadership and willing fol-
lowership, the doctrine of discontinuity has found its fullest acceptance among
American scholars” (Bolinger 1961: 2). On the other hand, it is clear that judg-
ments of grammaticality come in more degrees, and in many cases these repre-
sent genuine multivalued phenomena (see below). Even in as early a work as
LSLT, Chomsky asserts that “there is little doubt that speakers can fairly consis-
tently order new utterances, never previously heard, with respect to their degree
of ‘belongingness’ to the language” (p. 132). How are we to reconcile scalar judg-
ments with an underlying dichotomy? Is it that the grammar assigns degrees of
status to strings after all, and judgments simply reflect these? Or is it the judg-
ment process itself that maps two-valued grammaticality to scalar acceptability
by factoring in behavioral variables? Both views have been argued for in the lit-
erature, along with a third, intermediate position. Let us consider them in turn,
before surveying the experimental literature to see to what extent each gains
empirical support.
The best-known proponents of the view that grammaticality occurs on a con-
tinuum are Haj Ross, George Lakoff, and their followers in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Ross (e.g., 1972) used the term squish to refer to a continuum of gram-
maticality in connection with a particular construction (see Hindle & Sag (1975)
for more on squishes). Lakoff (1973) summarizes the conclusions of this line of
research as follows:
(i) Rules of grammar do not simply apply or fail to apply; rather they
apply to a degree.
(ii) Grammatical elements are not simply members or nonmembers of
grammatical categories; rather they are members to a degree.
(iii) Grammatical constructions are not simply islands or non-islands;
rather they may be islands to a degree.
(iv) Grammatical constructions are not simply environments or non-envi-
ronments for rules; rather they may be environments to a degree.
(v) Grammatical phenomena form hierarchies which are largely constant
from speaker to speaker, and in many cases, from language to lan-
guage.
(vi) Different speakers (and different languages) will have different accept-
ability thresholds along these hierarchies. (p. 271)
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Lakoff continues, “We are saying that fuzzy grammar has a mental reality. The
judgments that people make, which are matters of degree, are functions, perhaps
algebraic functions, of unconscious mental judgments, which are also matters of
degree” (p. 286). (See Levelt et al. (1977) for a somewhat different application of
fuzzy grammar.) While I cannot review in detail the evidence that led to these
conclusions, the key point is that the features of sentences that lead to graded
judgments when varied do not have perceptually related causes, such as the tax-
ing of short-term memory capacity, but rather are based on linguistic concepts
such as clause, nominal, adverb, etc.
Let us take as an example some slightly later work by Watt (1975), who inves-
tigated whether grammaticality occurs in degrees. His domain of investigation
was strained anaphora, as illustrated by the following set of related sentences:
(3) a. All those who follow Nixon say they approve of his annexing
Mackenzie Territory as the fifty-fifth State.
b. All followers of Nixon say they approve of his annexing Baffin Island
as the fifty-sixth State.
c. All Nixon-followers say they approve of his annexing The Bahamas
as the fifty-seventh State.
d. All Nixonites say they approve of his annexing British Honduras as
the fifty-seventh State.
From a very detailed study of contrasts in sentences involving strained anaphora,
Watt concludes that there are gradations among grammatical sentences that are
not due to known performance factors, such as memory limits. Rather, these
gradations can be accounted for in terms of factors that are already part of the
grammar itself, such as linear order, contrastive stress, and specificity of refer-
ence. Watt argues that to try to account for such gradations by extragrammati-
cal means would require needless duplication of the grammar in another part of
the mind. This is the complement of Bever’s argument, presented in Section 2.2.
Bever attempts to avoid duplicatingwithin the grammar features that are already
required outside of it.
Despite their seemingly complementary lines of argumentation, it is clear that
Bever andWatt disagree strongly in the conclusions that they draw. Bever (1975a)
is unequivocal in his position:
To give up the notion that a grammar defines a set of well-formed utter-
ances is to give up a great deal. This is not to say that it is impossible in
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principle that grammars are squishy. Rather the possibility of studying pre-
cise properties of grammar and exact rules becomes much more difficult, as
Ross himself points out. Thus, if we can maintain the concept of discrete
grammaticality, we will be in a better position to pursue an understanding
of grammatical universals. (p. 601)
Bever argues that, if at all possible, judgment continua should be derived from
independently-motivated theories of speech perception and production, while
the grammar should be left discretely intact. He and Carroll lay out two alterna-
tive positions, then proceed to knock them down:
First, we may with Ross assume that non-discrete data directly imply non-
discrete theories of grammar. This is not satisfactory: Non-discrete gram-
mar offers no account of why the continua are the way they are. The corre-
spondences between such grammatical analyses and the predictions of our
behavioral account would have to be viewed as mere coincidence. More-
over, no distinction at all could be drawn between the squishy intuitions we
have been concerned with here and the ineluctable intuitions upon which
linguistic theory relies. A second option is to treat all acceptability phenom-
ena as behavioral and non-structural (Clark & Haviland 1974). This alterna-
tive also is inadequate: It cannot explain the categorical (un)acceptability of
examples at either end of a continuum.
The third alternative is that examples with intermediate acceptability rest
on an internal confusion by the informant between the application of a lin-
guistic process to a category (e.g., “S”) and to the typical behavioral reflex of
that category (e.g., “perceptual clause”). This explanation explains a variety
of acceptability facts as well as predicting hitherto unnoticed ones. How-
ever, it is important to specify what the general conditions are that will
lead to an acceptability squish. …
An underlying theme of our proposal is that all grammatical properties are
categorical and that all apparent departures from this have a general expla-
nation in an interactionist framework – a totally discrete system of gram-
mar interacting with behavioral processes. (Bever & Carroll 1981: 232–233)
(An argument for the third alternative is presented in the study by Gerken &
Bever discussed in Section 1.3.) Thus, the claim that the grammar is discrete does
not preclude the existence of graded phenomena like those studied by Watt, it
merely asserts that part of their explanation must be extragrammatical; see Katz
& Bever (1976) for a more detailed general argument.
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Bever & Carroll’s dismissals of positions other than their own are not entirely
convincing. First, I do not see how one could ask for more of an account of “why
the continua are the way they are” than Ross et al. provide, unless one already
presupposes that the continua do not come from the grammar – language just
is the way it is. Second, Clark & Haviland do not wish to exclude structural ac-
counts of acceptability phenomena; rather, they argue that structural sources
cannot be disentangled from the effects of processing. They claim that grammat-
ical knowledge is not separable from comprehension and production processes,
and that traditional grammatical constraints can be alternatively formulated as
constraints on the comprehension process, but the latter can still contribute to
structurally based judgments. There is no reason why they cannot get categor-
ical judgments from their model. Furthermore, it is an open empirical question
whether there really are large classes of sentences at either end of the scale within
which people do not find any acceptability differences.
The discrete, dichotomous view of grammar has been defended from a some-
what different angle by Carr (1990):
It is as well to respond briefly to a frequently voiced but unworrying ob-
jection concerning grammaticality judgements as evidence. It is at times
pointed out that there are cases of ‘asterisk fade’, where intuitive responses
supply us with a gradient scale of well-formed to ill-formed expressions.
The objection is that the evidence here contains grey areas and that the ill-
formed vs. well-formed distinction upon which [autonomous linguistics]
rests is thus undermined.
A moment’s reflection shows that, far from undermining the distinction,
asterisk fade presupposes it: one cannot coherently speak of a cline from
well-formed to ill-formed without a clear conception of what these are. Fur-
thermore, once we have erected a set of theoretical proposals to deal with
the ill-formed and well-formed cases, the theory itself will allow us to de-
cide on the status of asterisk-faded expressions, as Chomsky has long since
observed. (p. 57; emphasis in original)
I argue against Carr’s second point in Sections 2.2 and 2.3; his first argument
also does not stand up to scrutiny. One can certainly speak coherently of a con-
tinuum, e.g., from rich to poor, without there being any non-arbitrary dividing
line between the two. To my mind, the most compelling reason to believe in
grammars embodying small numbers of discrete choices comes from learnabil-
ity. Given the standard poverty-of the-stimulus argument, arriving at settings of
continuous valued parameters would seem to be impossibly hard for children.
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Although Chomsky already assumed in LSLT that there were degrees of un-
grammaticality, hewent further inAspects: 148–153), proposing that the grammar
predicts at least three levels or kinds of deviance, corresponding to the violation
of selectional restrictions, subcategorization, and lexical category requirements.
It is important to recognize that Chomsky’s theory assumes the existence of ab-
solute grammaticality. Sentences that violate no constraints of the grammar are
assumed to be uniformly grammatical. If a sentence is less than absolutely gram-
matical, it must violate some constraint(s) of the grammar, and these constraints
come in varying degrees of importance. Thus there are no degrees of grammat-
icality, but there are degrees of ungrammaticality. (See Levelt (1974: vol. 3) and
below for some alternative proposals.) In terms of string sets, then, we have a
primary dichotomy of good versus bad, with no distinctions among the good
sentences but graded distinctions among the bad. It is reasonable to ask whether
there is any psychological evidence that this theoretical distinction reflects cog-
nitive reality. Even though acceptability is affected by factors other than gram-
maticality, one might expect the good/bad dichotomy to show through them, if
the other factors are relatively independent of grammaticality and ungrammati-
cality. I am not aware of any clear evidence of this sort. Ross (1979), reported in
Section 4.2, did make a distinction between good, marginal, and bad sentences
(on the basis of questionnaire data) and found that judgments on the first class
showed the least interspeaker and intraspeaker variation, but his study was so
methodologically naive that this result cannot be taken as anything more than
suggestive until further experimentation is done.Quirk & Svartvik (1966) make a
similar distinction. Watt (1975) claims that his findings argue against Chomsky’s
proposal because his sentences are all generated by the grammar of English, and
yet they show differences of goodness. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
these differences are of some other kind than the differences we find among un-
grammatical sentences. Chomsky’s proposal also suffers from amajor theoretical
problem – namely, there is no algorithm for determining which grammatical sen-
tence to compare an ungrammatical sentence to, in order to compute its degree
of ungrammaticality (Fillmore 1972). (See Watt (1975) for a review of Chomsky’s
later proposals, which I do not discuss here.)
More likely than Chomsky’s proposal is a scenario in which grammaticality
rating works in much the same way as conceptual classification ratings of the
sort elicited by Rosch (1975) under the rubric of prototype theory. Just as we can
ask, “How good an example of a bird is a robin/ostrich/butterfly/chair?” we can
ask, “How good an example of a grammatical sentence is X?” for any string X.
The responses will likely spread along a continuum with no indication of a clear-
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cut break of the sort discussed above, provided they are not biased by a lopsided
rating scale. Kess & Hoppe (1983: 47) concur: “Apparently shared linguistic abili-
ties operate on the same type of a graded continuum scale that cognitive abilities
of a more general sort do.” (See Section 6.2 for an attempt to formalize judgment
gradience along these lines.) We must be cautious in extrapolating from such a
result (if it is found) to the nature of grammar, however. Prototypicality effects do
not necessarily imply the absence of an underlying discrete system. As G. Lakoff
(1987) reminds us, Rosch herself never suggested that graded classification effects
reflect degrees of category membership or representation in terms of prototypi-
cal features or exemplars. In fact, empirical demonstrations to the contrary have
been made.
Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) applied Rosch’s original experimen-
tal paradigms to uncontroversially discrete concepts such as even number and fe-
male. Subjects were instructed to rate the extent to which exemplars represented
the meaning of the category, and were timed on their responses to true/false
categorial questions. They found that the discrete concepts presented the same
pattern of results as Rosch’s original taxonomic materials. Specifically, the good-
ness of various exemplars was rated quite uniformly across subjects, and reac-
tion times for deciding membership in a category were longer for the worse
exemplars, again with as much cross-subject consistency as for the taxonomic
concepts that Rosch studied. Despite being able to grade exemplars consistently
on a continuum, the subjects demonstrably knew that membership in categories
such as even number was an either/or proposition. Which behavior reflects sub-
jects’ true cognitive representations of these concepts? Armstrong, Gleitman &
Gleitman do not see these results as contradictory, because their experiment
involved two different tasks, judging exemplariness and deciding membership.
They discuss various possible theoretical explanations of their results, assuming
that the real concepts are discrete and suggesting possible origins of the grada-
tions, e.g., that they might stem from a quick, heuristic identification procedure.
Lakoff argues against this last idea, and proposes that prototype effects reflect a
mismatch between potentially discrete conceptual knowledge and the real world.
For example, in the real world not all unmarried men are eligible to be married,
and hence cannot be rated as bachelors to the full extent. However, there are
still concepts for which there appears to be no discrete decision criterion, e.g.,
whether someone is rich, and these also exhibit prototypicality effects. Thus, it
appears that graded structure in prototype tasks tells us nothing about the nature
of the underlying mental representations. Is the same true of graded structure in
grammaticality judgments and its bearing on mental grammars?
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Barsalou (1987) suggests that graded structure might be a universal property of
categories, and that the properties of an exemplar that determine its goodness as
an instance of some category can vary depending on the situation. These proper-
ties might include, but are not limited to, similarity to the central tendency; simi-
larity to the ideals of the category frequency of occurrence; and context. Barsalou
summarizes his conclusion as follows:
The graded structures within categories do not remain stable across situ-
ations. Instead a category’s graded structure can shift substantially with
changes in context. This suggests that graded structures do not reflect in-
variant properties of categories but instead are highly dependent on con-
straints inherent in specific situations. (p. 107)
As I argue, particularly in Chapter 5, Barsalou’s view jibes well with the findings
on grammaticality. Judgments are not invariant, and any of a large number of fac-
tors can come into play in making a judgment. Barsalou also looked at intra- and
intersubject reliability across a wide variety of conceptual types. When people
order exemplars by typicality, the average between-subject correlation is about
.45. For the same subject judging the same stimuli on two occasions one month
apart, it is roughly .75. In both cases it is the moderate exemplars (neither very
good instances nor very good noninstances) that are the most unstable. These
results also jibe with Ross’s findings. Barsalou goes on to argue that there sim-
ply are no invariant representations of categories in the human cognitive system.
Invariant representations are merely analytic fictions created by psychologists;
perhaps linguists should be added to the list of culprits. Nonetheless, he suggests
that the task of judging typicalitymight notmake use of the same representations
as judging set membership; the former might use probable properties, while the
latter might use discriminative ones.
It might be that the nature of the particular tasks used by prototype theorists
(and linguists) inherently induces graded behavior, independent of the nature of
the underlying knowledge. If this is so, the status of that underlying knowledge
as discrete or continuous must be demonstrated by other means. But how could
we ever know whether a grammar, if it exists independent of performance mech-
anisms, classifies sentences dichotomously? If performance mechanisms induce
graded structure by themselves, and if (as I argue) they can never be circum-
vented because competence is not directly accessible, then it might not be pos-
sible to investigate empirically how a grammar itself classifies sentences.5 There
5 Wayne Cowart (personal communication) suggests that part of the problem here could lie at
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are many possible combinations of mental structures that could yield graded ac-
ceptability judgments. For instance, Fillmore, Kempler &Wang (1979b) argue that
judgment ratings might reflect the interaction of discretely varying elementary
components that only have the appearance of continua.6 Carroll (1979) follows
Bever in suggesting that graded acceptability can result from a discrete grammar
plus performance rules of some sort. In either case, neither grades of grammati-
cality nor grades of ungrammaticality would be part of the grammar. It could be
that while fully grammatical sentences can be judged as such without much ref-
erence to their meaningfulness, interpretability becomes an important factor in
judging some ungrammatical sentences. That is, the closer we can come to figur-
ing out what an ungrammatical sentence is supposed tomean, the more likely we
are to judge it to be acceptable. (See Fowler (1970) for essentially this argument;
he insists that “an ungrammatical sentence is an ungrammatical sentence is an
ungrammatical sentence,” regardless of how it might be interpretable on the basis
of extragrammatical information. Others, such as Katz (1964), have claimed that
there is an identifiable class of semigrammatical sentences, by which is meant
ungrammatical utterances that are comprehensible.) Questions about the nature
of the concept grammatical sentence might eventually be answerable, but for now
I leave them open and move on to a related question that likely is answerable –
can we obtain useful judgments of degree of acceptability from subjects?
3.3.2 Experiments on Chomsky’s Three Levels of Deviance
An enormous amount of research on degrees of (un)grammaticality was gen-
erated by Chomsky’s identification of three levels or kinds of deviance. (See
Schnitser (1973) for comparison of Chomsky’s ideas with other contemporary
ideas about degrees of badness.) The discussion in Aspects spurred a flurry of ex-
periments designed to test Chomsky’s idea by obtaining judgment ratings. In ret-
rospect, these experiments seem somewhat misguided. Chomsky himself never
claimed that degrees of grammaticality would correspond to degrees of accept-
ability; in fact, he explicitly states that the two do not coincide (see Section 2.2).7
the level of implementation: although our brains may be trying to realize a discrete system,
their hardware is analog, which makes the implementation imperfect.
6 Technically there cannot be a true continuum of grammaticality values of sentences, because
continua involve an uncountably infinite number of values, and most linguists believe that
there are only a countably infinite number of sentences. When linguists speak of grammati-
cality being a continuum, they typically mean that it is a discrete scale with more than two
possible values.
7 It is ironic, then, that current work in syntactic theory regularly makes heavy use of relative
degrees of badness.
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Predictably, the ensuing results have often been contradictory.8 Nevertheless, we
can learn quite a bit about the nature of scalar judgment from these experiments.
I present here a selective review; see Moore (1972) and works cited therein for
further references.
Downey & Hakes (1968) studied the effects of Chomsky’s three levels of de-
viance on acceptability ratings, paraphrasing, and free recall. Subjects rated sen-
tences on a scale from 0 (“completely acceptable”) to 3 (“completely unaccept-
able”). Subjects were given two examples of how a sentence could be unaccept-
able, but Downey & Hakes do not provide details of these examples. The order
among subjects’ mean acceptability ratings was as predicted, although the differ-
ence between subcategorization and phrase structure violations was not signifi-
cant. However, the recall scores showed a reversal of this pattern, with sentences
containing selectional violations being harder to remember correctly than those
with subcategorization errors.9 Stolz (1969) performed a replication of this study,
adding finer distinctions from Chomsky’s hierarchy of selectional features, e.g.,
that the difference between mass nouns and count nouns is greater than that
between human nouns and nonhuman nouns, although problems with materi-
als made the possible effect of this difference inconclusive. Stolz also used a 4-
point response scale, and told subjects that their responses should be based on
any kind of deviance, including anomalous meanings as well as form. His re-
sults showed that sentence types were rated in the following order from least
to most acceptable: random strings; sentences with subcategorization violations;
sentences with selectional violations; analytic grammatical sentences; and con-
tingently true grammatical sentences.10
Moore (1972) set out to test a hypothesis somewhat more general than Chom-
sky’s proposal, which applies only to verbal features. He asked whether there
is an acceptability hierarchy created by Chomsky’s three types of violation, re-
gardless of where in a sentence they occur. He also sought corroboration for
such a hierarchy from sources other than judgments, in particular, subjects’ re-
action times in making those judgments. Moore’s prediction was that a severely
ungrammatical sentence should be processed faster than a marginally ungram-
matical one, because more thorough processing would be required to detect a
8 There has been much selective interpretation of acceptability as bearing on grammaticality in
this area. If the results go the right way, they are taken as evidence; if not, they are dismissed
as performance artifacts.
9 Results from the paraphrase task were not quantitatively analyzable; the authors merely dis-
cuss what strategies they believe the subjects used.
10 An analytic sentence is true simply by virtue of the meanings of its words, whereas a contin-
gently true sentence makes a true claim about something in the world.
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subtler error. His first experiment used a paradigm that was adopted in many
subsequent studies. Subjects were shown a written sentence with a blank line
where a missing word would go (e.g., Sincerity may the boy). They were
then shown a word that could fill the blank on a separate screen and were asked
to decide as quickly as possible whether the sentence would be “appropriately
completed” by that word.11 The incomplete sentences were designed so that there
was no way of assessing their grammaticality until the missing word was seen.
The sentences in (4), (5), and (6) below illustrate stimulus sentences with blank
lines in verb, subject, and object position, respectively (shown by the underline
under the subsequently presented target word). In each set, the first sentence
contains a lexical category violation. Example (4b) violates strict subcategoriza-
tion, while (5b) and (6b) violate selectional restrictions between the verb and the
noun phrase. Example (4c) violates a selectional restriction of the verb, while
(5c) and (6c) violate selectional restrictions between the noun and its modifying
adjective.12
(4) a. Smart voters uncle honest politicians.
b. Noisy dogs growl night animals.
c. Catchy slogans believe unwary citizens.
(5) a. Modern wanders improve factory efficiency.
b. Sensible ideas distrust public officials.
c. Nosey ditches annoy suburb dwellers.
(6) a. Large factories utilize efficient hesitates.
b. Big corporations appoint many machines.
11 Moore apparently wanted to ensure that subjects took selectional restrictions into account
in making their decisions. He says, “The [experimenter] explained to [the subject] that terms
such as ‘appropriate’ and ‘acceptable’ were deliberately being used, instead of ‘grammatical,’
because of the fact that the inappropriate sentences were inappropriate for varying reasons,
some more syntactic than semantic. Inasmuch as ‘ungrammatical’ is frequency employed as
being synonymous with ‘syntactically deviant,’ such instructions attempted to preclude any
such dichotomy being set up by [the subject].” Since his subjects were not linguistics students,
however, being presented with this terminology may only have confused them.
12 Moore did not consider strict subcategorization to be a property of nouns, and therefore could
not make all violations in the (b)-level sentences of the same type. He seems to assume that
Chomsky’s theory predicts that all selectional restriction violations are equally ungrammatical,
so (5b) and (5c) should be equivalent, and (6b) and (6c) should be equivalent. However, since
I am not particularly concerned with the theoretical implications of Moore’s study, I do not
address this issue here.
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c. Factory foremen appreciate eager tools. (Moore 1972: 553)
The main effect of level of violation seemed to support Chomsky’s theory: re-
action times increased from (a) to (b) to (c) sentences. Interestingly, the mean
reaction time for filler sentences that were grammatical was between those for
(a) and (b) sentences. However, there were several mitigating interactions. In
particular, there was no difference between reaction times for sentences like (4b)
and (4c), while sentences like (5c) and (6c) did show longer decision time than
their (b) counterparts (but Chomsky’s theory might not have predicted the latter
difference). Moore takes this as evidence that the process of checking grammati-
cality occurs in two passes. First, the major relations between subject, verb, and
object are checked, and then relationships within the NP constituents are exam-
ined. Under this view, both verbal subcategorization and selectional restrictions
are examined in the first pass and have no differential status, as reflected in the
reaction time data. Several results support the importance of the verb in deter-
mining requirements for the rest of the sentence. For instance, although (4c) and
(5b) constitute exactly the same type of violation, (4c) took significantly longer
to reject. A large problem with this paradigm, of course, is that the sentences
differ in many ways not relevant to the violations under study.
A second experiment examined whether grammaticality ratings of the same
sets of sentences on a 20-point scale would conform to Chomsky’s hierarchy. A
new group of subjects was told that a sentence was “acceptable” if it “could occur
in normal, everyday usage.”13 Subjects were asked to rate acceptable sentences
with a score of 1, whereas scores of 2 to 20 represented increasing unacceptabil-
ity.14 Once again, the main effect of level of violation was as predicted. Mean
ratings for (a), (b), and (c) sentences were 13.5, 11.0, and 9.2, respectively, but
the latter two ratings did not differ significantly for sentences with blank lines
in verb position, contradicting several previous studies. 15 Moore & Biederman
(1979) attempted to distinguish various possible serial and parallel models that
could account for subject-verb-object relations being checked faster than noun-
adjective ones, using the same blank-line paradigm that was used in Moore’s
first experiment, but with sentences that contained two kinds of violation, e.g.,
13 Moore does not explain why the definition of acceptability was changed from that of the first
experiment.
14 One positive feature of Moore’s instructions was that they explicitly encouraged subjects to
look over a few of the (practice) sentences to get an idea of the range within which they were
working. Subjects were told to make use of the full range of the rating scale.
15 Moore suggests that other studies failed to control for the location of the violation, and hence
would not have seen the crucial interaction.
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Old houses quarrel valuable relics, where both subject-verb selection and verbal
subcategorization are violated. If both kinds of violation are searched for in par-
allel, one would expect an average judgment speed gain on such sentences as
compared to the judgment time required to search for either of the two viola-
tions by itself (assuming the search for ungrammaticality is self-terminating),
but no such significant gain was found. On the other hand, no significant in-
crease in judgment time was found, suggesting that the search does terminate
when one violation is encountered. Moore & Biederman take this as support for
a serial model, where subject-verb-object relations are checked before internal
NP relations. A follow-up rating task with no time constraint showed that dou-
ble violations did decrease the grammaticality of sentences as compared to single
violations, so that this rating process, unlike the speeded determination of gram-
maticality, does not terminate on encountering the first violation.16
The most recent study dealing with Chomsky’s three levels of deviance was
performed by Nagata (1990b). His subjects used a 7-point scale to rate three types
of violation: lexical category violations; selectional restriction violations between
verbs and their objects; and selectional restriction violations between nouns and
their modifying adjectives. Nagata found significant differences of rating in the
predicted order; his results thus support Chomsky’s distinctions.
3.3.3 Other Experiments
Chomsky’s three levels of violation are not the only theoretical constructs that
have spawned experimental work on levels of grammaticality. Around the time
of Chomsky’s proposal, some researchers were taking different approaches to the
study of degrees of grammaticality. Coleman (1965) looked at four kinds of stim-
uli, ranging from random strings to strings where each word correctly matched
a valid phrase structure rule in lexical category. His intermediate levels were less
sensible; they involved choosing words from the correct phrasal category, e.g.,
approximating a noun phrase by choosing any two words that could appear in a
noun phrase. Example (7) shows sample sentences from each of Coleman’s four
levels.
(7) a. Think apron the wits for about.
b. One the could to a her.
c. The grass seldom were struck Lindy.
16 This experiment used a 100-point rating scale, but the authors do not say why they felt that
such a wide range of possible ratings was necessary.
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d. The dust could always be Disneyland.
Coleman found that subjects’ rank-orderings were significantly monotonically
correlated with degree of grammaticality defined in this way. Moreover, other
measures besides judgment correlated with this scale. For example, the more
grammatical strings were easier to memorize and to perform a cloze test (Taylor
1953) on correctly. Likemany cases to be reviewed in this subsection, these results
seem neither particularly surprising nor particularly informative.
Around the same time, Marks (1968) looked at those most mystical of linguistic
beasts, multiply self-embedded sentences. He instructed subjects to judge their
grammatical structure, not their length, complexity, difficulty of comprehension,
or frequency of usage. For sentences with up to five self-embeddings, his results
showed a power-law correlation between degree of embedding and subjects’ rat-
ings. That is, unacceptability grew as a function of the number of embeddings to
a constant exponent. Another study byMarks (1965; 1967) was inspired by Chom-
sky’s informal statement that some ungrammatical sentences obviously have
more structure than others. Marks’s hypothesis was that, in forming judgments
of ungrammatical sentences, people consider the serial position of a violation
within a sentence as well as the sentence’s status as described by the grammar.
Since sentences are processed from left to right, earlier errors should interfere
more with processing, because early words prepare the processor for later ones
and set up expectations and restrictions. Marks constructed stimulus materials
by taking simplex sentences and sentences with infinitival clauses and reversing
the order of two adjacent words in various positions, producing a paradigm like
the one in (8):
(8) a. The boy hit the ball.
b. Boy the hit the ball.
c. The boy hit ball the.
d. The hit boy the ball.
e. The boy the hit ball.
Sentences were presented in groups with random order and subjects were asked
to rank them from the best English to the worst English. As predicted, noun-
determiner inversion was judged less acceptable if it occurred earlier in the sen-
tence. Moreover, sentences like (8d) were judged to be worse than those such as
(8e), although Marks points out that the two types of inversion found in these
sentences are not the same, and serial position might not be the important factor
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here. But at least in the former case, it is hard to see how any traditional gram-
mar would distinguish the grammaticality of the sentences, since such grammars
treat all noun phrases as equivalent. Serial position of anomaly thus constitutes
a reasonable candidate for an extragrammatical factor that contributes to accept-
ability.
Scott performed a series of similar experiments (Scott 1969; Scott &Mills 1973),
except that he used a single basic sentence order (subject-verb-object-qualifier)
and rearranged whole constituents rather than words. His subjects rated each
permutation as “acceptably grammatical” or “not grammatical.”17 The percentage
of subjects who accepted various permutations ranged from 100% to 0%. Scott
takes the results to show that there are at least five degrees of grammaticality
among these sentences, but this number seems to be arbitrary. We should also
keep in mind that, unlike Marks’s subjects, Scott’s were only giving good/bad
judgments, so the gradations appeared only in the pooled results and do not
bear on the judgments of individual subjects. Scott tries to account for the num-
bers of acceptances on the basis of how many constituents were moved and in
how many places the canonical constituent order was split. This index does not
yield a perfect correlation with judged grammaticality, so Scott & Mills looked
for other factors that might have determined the outcome – in particular, mean-
ingfulness.18 This factor was found to have no significant effect, but a useful
outcome of the experiment was that when the permutations were not presented
all together with their canonical form, grammaticality was rated much lower,
suggesting that people accept a sentence more often if they can see that it is a
rearrangement of a grammatical sentence.
In yet another study of the effect of word order on grammaticality judgments,
Danks & Glucksberg (1971) considered violations of adjective ordering con-
straints (e.g., Swiss red big tables versus big red Swiss tables) using a ranking test
with the six possible permutations of three prenominal adjectives. The results
showed that the position of the adjective that was most closely related to an in-
trinsic property of the noun was the primary determinant of acceptability: the
closer it was to the noun, the higher the sentence was ranked.
More recently, Crain& Fodor (1985, 1987) looked at the effects of different kinds
of ungrammaticality on a sentence matching task, where the subject must decide
17 Subjects were offered a third choice, namely, “grammatical but with a different meaning from
the unpermuted sentence”; we shall not be concerned with this possibility here.
18 Scott & Mills cite various psychological sources for their definition of meaningfulness as “the
association value of a single written verbal unit,” for which they use frequency of occurrence
as a metric.This does not correspond to what other authors have meant by the meaningfulness
of a sentence.
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whether two simultaneously displayed sentences are identical. The basic finding
was that number agreement and quantifier placement errors (shown in (9) and
(10), respectively) increasematching times, while Subjacency and (certain) Empty
Category Principle violations (shown in (11) and (12)) do not.
(9) *Mary were writing a letter to her husband.
(10) *Lesley’s parents are chemical engineers both.
(11) *Who do the police believe the claim that John shot?
(12) *Who did the duchess sell Turner’s portrait of?
While previous work had attributed this difference to different levels of un-
grammaticality, Crain & Fodor argue that it was due instead to the correctability
of the error: the first two types of error are easy to correct automatically, while
for the other two there is no obvious correction that can convert them directly
into grammatical sentences. Their claim is that if a correction is made, it must
be undone in order to perform the matching task,sentence matching task since
the subject must decide whether the sentences are literally identical. In cases
like (11) and (12) no correction is possible, hence the bad sentence can be com-
pared directly. Forster & Stevenson (1987) question this interpretation, suggest-
ing that the correlation with correctability is epiphenomenal and cannot be the
cause of the observed time differences. Both sets of authors acknowledge that
other factors are at work as well, but the possibility that the correctability of a
sentence could be a factor in relative ratings of acceptability should not be dis-
missed; whether it bears any relation to theories of degree of grammaticality is
a matter of debate.
3.3.4 Ratings, Rankings, and Consistency
It is a fundamental assumption throughout this book that empirical facts are use-
ful (and interesting) if they are systematic, because they must tell us something
about the minds of the subjects who produce them. It remains a matter of ana-
lytical interpretation to decide what these facts tell us. Thus, we must determine
whether graded judgments are systematic, and the results mentioned through-
out this section strongly suggest that they are. The next thing one might wish
to determine is just how many meaningful distinctions of levels of acceptability
(relative or absolute) can be made. This would provide a basis for establishing a
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procedure for eliciting such distinctions.19 Chaudron (1983) cites several psycho-
metric studies showing that rating scales generally increase in reliability with
increasing numbers of levels up to 20.20 Presumably this can be shown by giving
subjects different sizes of scale on which to rate the same stimuli: if you have
too few levels, people collapse true distinctions arbitrarily, whereas if you have
too many, people create spurious distinctions arbitrarily. Thus, the “true” num-
ber of distinctions will show the greatest consistency within (and perhaps also
between) subjects. It follows that studies that choose inappropriate numbers of
levels add spurious variation to their results, possibly concealing the effects they
are supposed to uncover. As far as I am aware, a psychometric investigation
along these lines has never been done with specific regard to grammaticality
judgments.
Even if we can find the optimal size of rating scale, there will still be problems
with this measure of grammaticality judgments. One major problem is how to
quantify inter- and intrasubject consistency, which is an important part of much
work in this field. If we use a 20-point scale, should we require two subjects to
give exactly the same rating of a sentence in order to consider them consistent?
Would plus or minus one position be sufficient? What if two subjects show ex-
actly the same distances between ratings of multiple sentences, but their absolute
ratings are offset by some constant? Can wemerely say that one is biased toward
more conservative or more liberal judgments, and consider their responses to be
fully consistent? Depending on the size of the offset constant, that might not
seem appropriate, but neither would a conclusion of total inconsistency. If we
standardize using z-scores, can we be sure we are not throwing away real dif-
ferences?21 Similar problems arise if some subjects simply fail to use the whole
range of the scale, which can easily happen unintentionally if subjects have no
idea what range of sentence types they will see. (For this reason alone, practice
trials with representative anchor sentences are a good idea) If we are attempt-
ing to compare consistency of subjects between studies that use different rating
scales, the consistency measure will have to be scaled accordingly. Such prob-
19 But see Cowart (1997: 7–12, 70–72) for the claim that the choice of response scale might not
make much difference to patterns of relative acceptability.
20 Snow (1975) points out the apparently contradictory finding that psychologists who measure
attitudes have shown that subjects find scales with more than seven points hard to use.
21 In doing so, we would be implicitly adopting the theoretical position that any such differences
simply are not part of what we are studying. For instance, the fact that Speaker A could be
consistently more conservative in grammaticality judgments than Speaker B does not tell us
anything about their grammars. I do not think we are in a position to say this with any degree
of certainty. See Cowart (1997: 13–14, 114) for more on the use of standard scores.
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lems have prompted many researchers to consider whether, instead of asking
for absolute ratings of sentences, we should instead require subjects simply to
rank order them from most to least acceptable. This approach does have certain
advantages. For one thing, psychometric research indicates that people are much
more reliable on comparative, as opposed to independent, ratings (Mohan 1977).
Rank orders also solve the problem of different baselines on a rating scale, and
there are nonparametric statistical tests for assessing the consistency or correla-
tion between sets of rank orders. Relative judgments are not without problems,
however. One problem is efficiency (Maclay & Sleator 1960): the amount of infor-
mation one can extract from a given number of relative judgments is much less
than the amount one can extract from absolute ratings. While exhaustive pair-
wise comparisons are not necessary to arrive at an ordering of a set of sentences,
there is surely a limit to how many sentences subjects can handle in one group;
intergroup orders must then somehow be elicited.
A further problem with the interpretation of relative judgments is that pair-
wise differential acceptability might not be transitive. That is, a subject who
judges sentence A better than sentence B, and also judges sentence B better than
sentence C when considering them two at a time, does not necessarily judge sen-
tence A better than sentence C when they are examined side by side.22 Hindle &
Sag (1975) cite an instance of this situation with regard to the sentences in (13),
which contain anymore, although they only present group data.
(13) a. They’ve scared us out of eating fish anymore.
b. It’s dangerous to eat fish anymore.
c. All we eat anymore is fish.
Twenty-two such sentences were presented to 36 subjects, who were asked to
compare them and then give each a grammaticality rating on a 5-point scale.23 It
was determined for each subject which of a given pair of sentences he or she had
rated more grammatical, or whether the pair had been rated equally grammati-
cal, and subjects’ ratings were tallied on this basis. Hindle & Sag found that while
more subjects preferred (13a) over (13b) than vice versa, and more preferred (13b)
over (13c), more preferred (13c) over (13a).24 They conclude that their comparison
22 A hybrid solution that solves this and some other problems is to elicit absolute ratings but
convert them to rankings. Under this solution, circularity can never arise.
23 These data are not quite equivalent to ranked comparisons, since a maximum of five distinc-
tions could be made.
24 The differences in ratings were quite small, with many subjects rating the pairs as equally




data are spurious, because they involve an apples-and-oranges comparison: the
sentences are too structurally diverse and hence their acceptability might be af-
fected by different determining factors. Danks & Glucksberg (1970) encountered
similar circular triads on an individual level, and take them as a measure of a
subject’s inconsistency. While a detailed examination of this issue would take
us too deeply into psychometric theory, my purpose is merely to point out that
such methodological problems will have to be dealt with if a paradigm involving
relative judgments is followed. (See Gardner (1974) for a discussion of nontransi-
tive paradox in various domains, and the argument that these can be rational if
the pairwise comparisons involve different criteria. This could easily happen in
the case of relative grammaticality judgments; see Watt (1975) for this view. Ein-
horn (1982) notes similar phenomena under the name of “intransitive choices”
and shows how they can easily occur in everyday situations.)
It is also an open question what to make of discrepancies between absolute
ratings and rank-orderings given by the same subjects, as have been found by
Snow & Meijer (1977) (see Section 4.2) and others. Even if we can establish that
the discrepancies are due to context or contrast effects from neighboring sen-
tences, this does not determine which kind of judgment is closer to the truth.
Greenbaum & Quirk (1970) also examined the question of intra- and intersub-
ject consistency, and this rating-ranking contrast in particular, using tests of
evaluation versus performance. Their evaluation test involved a rating on a 3-
point scale: “perfectly natural and normal,” “wholly unnatural and abnormal,” or
“somewhere between.”Their performance test involved the presentation of multi-
ple variants of a sentence together, and required subjects to rank them as well as
to rate each sentence individually (my summary is necessarily imprecise, since
these researchers describe in great detail numerous experiments with minor vari-
ations). Greenbaum & Quirk typically used groups of 20–30 subjects and found
that cross-group consistency was quite high, with very few significant differ-
ences on judgments (and other kinds of metalinguistic tasks). Also, their design
allowed for several sentences to be judged a second time. Most sentences showed
90–95 percent consistency (measured as the number of subjects giving the same
judgment both times a sentence was presented), but consistency for some sen-
tences was as low as 54%. A very few sentences were both rated and ranked. The
twomeasures generally correlated with each other, but sometimes sentences that
were rated equally grammatical were ranked differently, even though tied rank-
ings were allowed. This might mean that the 3-point scale was too limiting, not
allowing enough room for the distinctions subjects wanted to make.
Yet another study comparing rating and ranking was conducted by Mohan
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(1977). Ratings were on a scale of 1 (“completely well-formed”) to 10 (“completely
ill-formed”) that was anchored by an example sentence for each of the extremes
(probably a very good idea).There were 11 sentences to be ranked; procedure was
a within-subjects variable, the two tasks being separated by a 2-week interval.
Unfortunately, the instructions seem a bit too usage-oriented: “Consider each of
the sentences and decide if it would be possible that youwould say this in conver-
sation.”The study was actually concerned in part with establishing whether indi-
vidual speakers can do ordinal scaling of sentences, or whether such scaling only
emerges by pooling multiple speakers’ dichotomous judgments, where speakers
might have different thresholds of acceptability and no differentiations within
the good and bad sentence groups. Nonparametric statistical analysis showed
that the cross-speaker agreement in rankings was much higher than would be
expected under the latter interpretation. Mohan also found some evidence for
a yea-saying factor, a tendency to favor acquiescence, i.e., accepting some sen-
tences regardless of their grammatical status, by correlating the number accepted
by each individual on two unrelated sets of sentences; there was a small but sig-
nificant positive correlation. As for rating versus ranking, correlating the number
of acceptances under the two procedures again gave a highly significant result,25
although the correlation itself was modest (.57).
3.4 The Judgment Process
In this section I will consider what people might actually be doing when judg-
ing the grammaticality of a sentence. Just about the only thing we know for
sure is that we do not know what they are doing. What follows is some con-
sidered speculation. Many researchers want to relate this question to another
unanswered question, namely, what happens in the ordinary processing of a sen-
tence that one performs during the course of a conversation or while reading?
There are two extreme positions one can take on the relation between these two
processes: they might be identical, or they might be totally different. In the first
case, some might argue (this is perhaps the null hypothesis) that the only differ-
ence between processing for judgment and processing for conversation is that
in the former case the reply consists of a “yes” or “no” (or a numeric rating, or
whatever), instead of a pragmatically related utterance. Obviously, the decision
between the possible judgments has to come from somewhere, but on this view
the processing of the sentence itself is identical.The differences come in deciding
25 Sentences rated 1–5 were treated as acceptances; subjects drew a threshold line in their rank
orderings, which allowed the comparison.
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on a rating versus deciding what to say next, both of which are separate from the
parsing, semantic analysis, etc., that go into decoding the incoming utterance. At
the other extreme, one might say that judging is nothing at all like understand-
ing and involves none of the same cognitive mechanisms. If you are told you
will have to judge a sentence, you route it to the sentence-judging processor in
the mind, rather than the sentence-comprehending processor. These two mod-
ules are entirely separate and might differ in arbitrary ways. (If this were put
forward as a serious proposal, one would have to address the question of how
and why such a separation would come to exist in the mind.) As with most in-
teresting psychological questions, many researchers suspect that the answer lies
somewhere in the middle. We hope reality is not like the second position, but
fear it is not like the first either. Let us consider which positions the major re-
searchers in this field have espoused, the extent to which these positions have
empirical support, and what their implications are for investigating grammar. I
present my own speculation on this issue in detail in Section 6.2.
I have already reviewed one line of thinking about the judgment process in
Section 2.4, namely, that it has something in common with introspection, which
might introduce some artifactual phenomena. But grammaticality judgments
seem to have much more in common with other psychological judgments.
Graeme Hirst (personal communication) has suggested the following analogy
to food tasting. If someone asks you what you remember about last night’s din-
ner, chances are you will not have much to say. Unless there was something
strikingly good or strikingly awful about the food, you will likely have only a
general impression that it was OK, if no particular attention was drawn to it at
the time you ate it. On the other hand, if someone offers you some food and asks
you for your impressions before you taste it, you will pay particular attention to
the flavors, textures, aromas, etc.; perhaps you will chew more slowly; and you
might be able to give much more detailed comments, concerning, e.g., particular
herbs you detect, how tender the meat is, and so on. Your host could ask you
more detailed questions, too, such as whether you think there is too much garlic
in the tomato sauce. Intuitively, it seems at least plausible that the taste stimuli
are being processed in a different way, or to a different degree, than if no atten-
tion were being drawn to them, and the same might hold for sentence tasting.26
Hirst also suggests a third, hybrid scenario, in which the opinion is solicited im-
26 This argument has beenmade for othermetalinguistic tasks aswell. For instance, Kess &Hoppe
(1983) suggest that in an ambiguity detection situation, looking for ambiguity puts subjects in
a different mode from that used in a paraphrase task where the stimulus just happens to be
ambiguous, so different processing can be expected, with different results.
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mediately after the tasting. If the question is unexpected, then tasting will have
proceeded as usual (as in the first situation), but since no time has elapsed we
might have access to information that will later be lost or forgotten, impressions
that were induced by the stimulus but ignored because they were irrelevant. To
the extent that processing for prewarned judgment differs from regular process-
ing, this last scenario could provide the best of both worlds: regular processing,
but access to additional information, which Hirst refers to as the traces of pro-
cessing. (See also Section 4.4.1 on parallels to wine tasting, and Section 5.2.7 on
speed of judgment.)
If the reader has not wandered off to the fridge by now, let us apply these
ideas more directly to linguistic judgments (see also Birdsong (1989: 202–203)).
In the worst case, we could imagine that expected judgment causes people to
revert to conscious reasoning about sentences, rather than processing of them.
Consciously known rules could be applied in this way to decide grammaticality,
but the only rules about language that most nonlinguists have conscious access
to are those learned in grade school, which tend to be of the prescriptive variety.
Thus, subjects might reason that a sentence is ungrammatical because it ends
with a preposition, since they remember a rule stating that this is a bad thing.
Schmidt & McCreary (1977) showed that many people are clearly aware of pre-
scriptive standards even if these are not reflected in their spontaneous speech.
These researchers also found strong discrepancies between subjects’ production
on performance tests similar to Quirk & Svartvik’s (1966) and their choice of
which forms were correct, so it seems that, at least in some cases, subjects can
distinguish their linguistic intuitions from their prescriptive knowledge, but it
is not yet clear whether we can induce them to exclude prescriptive knowledge
from their judgments. Because prescriptive grammar does not necessarily have
any relation to descriptive reality, judgments involving prescriptive knowledge
are of no use to us. But if we avoid the generally well-circumscribed prescriptive
cases, can we not then expect to avoid conscious processing? Hirst argues in the
negative. In general, people seem to be able to invent spurious rules or principles
as post hoc rationalizations of behavior (Nisbett & Wilson 1977), including lan-
guage behavior. In Chapter 5, I report on studies in which respondents who had
to justify their grammaticality choices gave (by linguistic standards) quite out-
rageous answers. Alternatively, even if people sense their true intuitions about
a sentence, they might not express them if they cannot fabricate a justification.
Thus, conscious reasoning/parsing by subjects is most undesirable. But does con-
scious reasoning ever occur? As drastic and ad hoc as it seeminglymust be, would
it not result in judgments so far from what we know about actual usage that the
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discrepancies would be strikingly obvious? Hirst argues that such discrepancies
might well exist. Perhaps there really is a huge shift, comparable to the differ-
ence between written and spoken language, which also might not be obvious
until systematically studied. This is all the more likely, given that judgments typ-
ically involve such rarely occurring forms anyway: the usage data with which to
compare them are extremely sparse.
There is suggestive experimental evidence for differences between judgments
and usage. Nagata (1990a) wanted to examine the extent towhich ungrammatical-
ity affects our initial parsing of a sentence, as opposed to our post hoc evaluation
of it. To do this, he measured reaction times of subjects who were asked to judge
the grammaticality of sentences quickly on a good-bad scale, and plotted them
against their grammaticality rating on a scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 = grammatical
and 2–7 represent increasing degrees of ungrammaticality), which was elicited
after the initial judgment and was not speeded. To control for the length of the
sentences involved, each sentence was presented in two parts, with the subject
pressing a button to expose the second part and start the timed trial. Stimulus
sentences were paired such that the identical target strings could be used as the
second parts of two different sentences. The sentences were designed so that the
target string completed one sentence grammatically, but completed the other un-
grammatically, thus matching the length of the timed portion exactly. Nagata’s
initial hypothesis was that highly ungrammatical sentences would show longer
reaction times thanmildly bad ones, becauseminor violations could go unnoticed
whereas major ones would disrupt parsing. His findings showed something quite
different, however. When reaction time is plotted against mean grammaticality
rating, the result is an inverted U-shaped curve. Sentences of intermediate un-
grammaticality took more time to judge than very good or very bad ones. We
note that this differs from the data that Moore (1972) reported (see Section 3.3.2):
he found reaction time inversely related to severity of violation. Wemust keep in
mind, however, that Moore was looking only at three very specific types of viola-
tion, which might not have encompassed the full range of possible severity.Thus,
his results might all come from the higher end of Nagata’s spectrum, with which
they are consistent. Nagata’s data do confirm Moore’s finding that completely
grammatical sentences take somewhat longer to judge than the worst violations,
presumably because the latter do not require the whole sentence to be read.
There are many possible interpretations of such a general finding, but here are
some speculations. Judging perfectly good sentences and very bad sentences oc-
curs quickly because their status as good or bad is immediately obvious. Marginal
sentences, on the other hand, do not fall clearly into one class or the other; hence
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more time is required to make decisions about them. Severe ungrammaticality
did not slow down parsing because subjects were not trying to analyze or com-
prehend the sentence in any normal manner. As soon as a violation was detected,
the decision could be made, perhaps without even considering the remainder of
the string. If this interpretation is correct, then Nagata’s study really did not get
at the on-line nature of grammaticality as it affects normal parsing. Since sub-
jects knew they would be timed on judgments, they went into “quick judging
mode,” which might be quite different from normal parsing for comprehension.
Nagata’s purpose would be better served by not eliciting judgments at all, but
rather by assessing processing speed while subjects are engaged in reading for
comprehension, as proposed below.
One possible course of action at this stage would be to look for more evidence
of drastic differences between judgments and actual use, by employing corpus-
based analysis, for instance (but see Hirst (1981: 55), for problems with real-world
texts, such as the fact that one can generate bad sentences in writing without
realizing it). But if such differences are found, we will not be any closer to a
general method for discovering the linguistic knowledge that underlies regular
performance. So let us move on to how we would like the judgment process to
work, and see whether we can make it happen. In the abstract, it would be nice
if the language processor could run as usual, but a homunculus could be allowed
to inspect the process and then report back on what he has seen. He could then
observe not only the fact that, say, the parser had failed to parse a sentence, but
exactly where in the sentence this occurred andwhy. Unfortunately, there is little
evidence to suggest that people can introspect on the languagemechanism in this
way. If that is not possible, then at least the homunculus should be allowed to
inspect the state of the processor when it is finished, although, being a rather
robust device, it might have managed to get through the sentence somehow and
left little trace of a problem.This latter method, the interpretation of the “trace of
execution,” is what we might hope to achieve through postpresentation testing.
Speed will be of the essence, because much research in psycholinguistics has
shown that our memory for the form of an utterance decays extremely quickly
as compared to our memory for its content (see, e.g., Sachs (1967) and many
subsequent studies). Others have reasoned along similar lines:
There is very little evidence in the literature that people are conscious of many
of their own mental processes. Awareness seems to be restricted to the outcome
or results of such processes, and if people do report on processes, this is – Nisbett
& Wilson (1977) contend – usually a logical reconstruction of how such a result
might have come about (often in the form of a motivation) rather than a memory
trace of the process itself (Levelt, Sinclair & Jarvella 1978: 7).
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Thus, extreme caution in interpretation is called for. Nisbett & Wilson warn
that “people sometimes make assertions about mental events to which they may
have no access and these assertions may bear little resemblance to the actual
events” (p. 247). Thus, our hopes for the homunculus might be unattainable in
principle. Any introspective access we might have is insufficient to produce gen-
erally correct or reliable reports on how we reach decisions. People base their
reports of thought processes on their theories about what is likely to have in-
fluenced them, and thus even when they are correct, this is not due to direct
introspective awareness. Nisbett & Wilson also make the interesting point that
certain types of factor will rarely occur to us as possible influences in a judgment,
because their effects seem implausible. Among these factors are many manipula-
tions that have been clearly shown to affect grammaticality judgments, such as
serial order effects and contrast effects. Linguists beware: we might feel certain
that we are not subject to such effects, but we are.
With the above caveats, let us go on to consider how a postpresentation meth-
od could conceivably be used in linguistic judgment. The obvious problem is
going to be that before too long, the subject will be on to us, i.e., will realize that
we are going to ask for judgments, and so might revert to “judging mode” on any
sentence after the first. (It is not difficult to imagine bogus tasks that would keep
the subject in the dark until after the first sentence was presented.) This seems
to require interspersing judgment trials at a low concentration among nonjudg-
ment trials, or at the very least making the distractor task sufficiently engaging
or realistic that the subjects do not have an opportunity to reflect on the pur-
pose of the study. For instance, we might present sentences in the guise of a text
that has been translated from a foreign language (say, a play or television show),
and ask the subjects to point out places where the translation is bad English (or
whatever language) while keeping track of the plot for a later recall test, which
forces them to keep processing for content.27 The alternative is to try to deduce
judgments from some nonintrusive measure, so that the subject is never aware
that grammaticality is at issue. For instance, we can simply ask subjects to read
a passage for content while taking some standard measure of reading speed and
location (e.g., eye tracking or self-paced reading). It is reasonable to predict that
when unexpected ungrammaticality is encountered, a delay in reading will re-
sult; we might even learn something about where in the course of processing the
error was detected. (Kutas & Hillyard (1983) review some other on-line measures
of this type.) We could also use event-related brain potential ERP measurements
in this way, or look for people to balk or do a double take (Newmeyer 1983). Of
27 This idea arose from a suggestion by Bill Poser (personal communication).
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course, there are other variables that affect reading speed (and ERPs) that will
have to be factored out, the sensitivity of these measures to structural violations
might not be terribly high, and the concentration of ungrammatical sentences
should still be kept reasonably low. Any of these methods is probably best used
as corroboration for data derived by other means.
I conclude this section by briefly describing the work of Bialystok & Ryan
(1985) (see also Ryan & Ledger 1984 and Bialystok 1986), who have proposed a
high-level model of language skill that encompasses many of the metalinguis-
tic (and linguistic) tasks we have discussed so far and attempts to unify their
cognitive requirements in terms of the demands they place on two fundamental
dimensions of language proficiency. The first, which they dub analyzed knowl-
edge, consists of explicit, structured knowledge about language that is accessible
to conscious reasoning and can be manipulated in solving problems, e.g., explain-
ing errors in bad sentences. While regular language production and comprehen-
sion make relatively little use of analyzed knowledge, metalinguistic tasks like
judging grammaticality require considerably more of such knowledge. This type
of knowledge would include the prescriptive rules alluded to above. Bialystok &
Ryan’s second dimension is labeled cognitive control. This is a skill required for
focusing one’s attention on particular information and attending simultaneously
to multiple facets of a stimulus, e.g., its form, meaning, and context, and coordi-
nating them within time constraints imposed by the task. Behaviors that have
become automatic, such as attending to the meaning of a conversational utter-
ance, require very little cognitive control, whereasmoving one’s focus away from
meaning and onto form (decentering, in Piagetian terminology), as in making
judgments, requires considerably more cognitive control. This might be a large
part of what happens when we go into “judging mode.” Thus, on both counts
metalinguistic tasks are more demanding than conversation. Also, since the two
dimensions are theoretically orthogonal (although in practice there is a corre-
lation across the tasks people actually perform), we might expect that people’s
proficiency can vary along them independently and each could be subject to im-
provement through training or experience. (For instance, as will be argued in
Section 4.4, schooling and literacy might contribute to such improvement;28 ex-
perience as a newspaper editor will increase one’s ability to detect errors in writ-
ten text; linguistic training might also be expected to improve one’s abilities, but
the matter is not nearly so simple – see Section 4.4.1.) Also, particular tasks and
particular stimuli within those tasks will vary in the demands they make on the
28 Bialystok (1986) claims that schooling contributes most to development of the control dimen-
sion, whereas literacy increases analyzed linguistic knowledge.
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two dimensions. For example, more salient errors require less cognitive control
in order to be detected; more analyzed knowledge is needed in the absence of
a supporting context. Bialystok & Ryan propose that grammaticality tasks can
be ordered as follows, by increasing amount of analyzed knowledge required:
grammaticality judgment, locating ungrammaticality, correcting ungrammatical-
ity, explaining ungrammaticality, and stating a rule that is violated. The sort of
evidence they use to demonstrate such claims is that second-language learners
differ significantly on their ability to perform the various tasks even when pre-
cisely the same grammatical phenomena are involved in all of them. If it is true
that (at least) these two types of skills are involved in making judgments, we
must examine the nature of the interface between metalinguistic behaviors and
competence grammar.
3.5 The Interpretation of Judgments with Respect to
Competence
Many researchers have been convinced that there must be some differences be-
tween linguistic knowledge as revealed by judgments and that which underlies
language use (e.g., Carden & Dieterich (1981)). The question for those who accept
this assumption then becomes whether and to what extent judgment data can be
used as evidence of competence. If they are not pure reflections of that compe-
tence (as argued eloquently by Levelt (1974: vol. 3: 5–7)), if they have no special
epistemological status vis-à-vis the grammar (Levelt, Sinclair & Jarvella 1978),
then how can the impurities be removed? In this section I look at the views of
a number of researchers who have made the further argument, in various ways,
that judgments are somehow special or abnormal, unique among language be-
haviors and built on a different competence base. I examine whether there is
any evidence to support these claims, and whether they lead to any substantive
proposals on how to make the best use of judgment data.
Bever has been the most widely cited proponent of the view that many of the
properties that linguists attribute to the grammar, i.e., to a process-independent
competence, really do not belong there at all. They are in actuality properties of
the particular behavioral process through which the data were obtained, be it
intuitive judgments, production, or some other kind of data:
Even if our linguistic intuitions are consistent, there is no reason to believe
that they are direct behavioral reflections of linguistic knowledge. The be-
havior of having linguistic intuitions may introduce its own properties. …
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A linguistic grammar may have formal properties that reflect the study of
selected subparts of speech behavior (for example, having intuitions about
sentences), but which are not reflected in any other kind of speech behavior.
(Bever 1970a: 343–344)
Amajor tenet of the current investigation is that, if such properties in fact are not
part of linguistic competence, they might be part of more general nonlinguistic
cognitive systems, in which case we could expect them to be apparent in other
tasks besides evaluating sentences (this proposal was discussed in Section 1.4).
Bever goes on to make a distinction between properties of the linguistic pro-
cessing mechanism and properties of the introspective process, neither of which
should be reflected in the grammar, but both of which have played a role in gram-
mar construction in actual practice.Thus, we might be constructing two different
“contaminated” grammars.
The relationship between linguistic grammar based on intuition and that
based on the description of other kinds of explicit language performance
may not just be “abstract” … but may be nonexistent in some cases. First, ap-
parently “linguistic” intuitions about the relative acceptability of sequences
may themselves be functions of one of the systems of speech behavior (for
instance, perception) rather than of the system of structurally relevant intu-
itions. Second, the behavior of producing linguistically relevant intuitions
may introduce some properties which are sui generis and which appear in
no other kind of language behavior. (Bever 1970a: 345)
Thus, one of our general goals in this area should be to sort out which proper-
ties are attributable to which performance procedures, so that we can treat data
from each type of task most appropriately, rather than trying to identify general
performance artifacts that might actually not apply across the board.
Let us now consider some specific properties that judgment data have been
claimed to exhibit, in contrast with usage data. Several suggestions come from
work by the Gleitmans and their colleagues:
We take judgments about language to be manifestations of an executive,
or metalinguistic, skill that has psychological interest in its own right. The
metalinguistic capacity shows more individual and population differences
than the linguistic capacity; it appears relatively late in development; and
it is sensitive to linguistic levels. Specifically, the more “surface” aspects
of language are more difficult to access for the sake of giving judgments
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than are the “deeper” or more meaningful aspects. This distinction in per-
formance may reflect differences in decay rates for less and more highly
processed linguistic material. (Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitman & Gleitman 1978: 99).
[Generative] grammars reflect the judgmental (“metalinguistic”) aspects of
language knowledge more directly than they do knowledge of language it-
self. … Whatever differences exist between these organizations may derive
from the fact that the “executive” thinking capacities have properties of
their own, which enter into the form of the grammars they construct. …
Differences in tacit knowledge are small in comparison to differences in the
ability to make such knowledge explicit (Gleitman & Gleitman 1979: 121).29
Let us consider the suggested properties one at a time.30
First, it is claimed that metalinguistic abilities exhibit more individual differ-
ences than other linguistic abilities, and that different people’s grammars are
more similar than our externalizations about themwould suggest.31 (For instance,
Gleitman & Gleitman argue that there is more variation in learning to read than
in learning to talk, because the former requires additional metalinguistic skills
that the latter does not.) I suspect that this impression arises because metaling-
uistic tasks are typically used to probe areas of linguistic knowledge that rarely
occur in regular speech and that therefore likely do exhibit more interspeaker
variation than the most common sentence structures, but it remains to be shown
whether differing judgments result from grammars or from differences in the
intuitional mechanism – this must be determined empirically.
Another claim of Gleitman & Gleitman is that low-level properties are harder
to make intuitions about than high-level (i.e., meaning-related) properties and
that intuitions about the latter show less variability. They paraphrase this by
saying that “fully processed” forms of language are easier to judge than only par-
tially processed ones, such as syntactic forms without their semantics. Now, it is
certainly true that meaning is the property of language we deal with and use on
a conscious level most frequently, and so one might expect that meaning-related
tasks such as paraphrase or ambiguity judgment would come more naturally
than structural well-formedness judgments. But the actual evidence provided by
29 See Van Kleeck (1982) for a critique of this paper.
30 I defer discussion of the developmental argument until I have reviewed some of the relevant
experiments below.
31 See Van Kleeck (1982) for a review of studies that find strong correlations between primary
linguistic abilities and metalinguistic abilities, and some methodological problems that they
share with Gleitman & Gleitman’s work.
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Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitman&Gleitman is not general enough to warrant their conclu-
sion, since it all comes from the phonological domain. They show that children’s
word detection abilities are superior to their syllable identification, which in turn
is better than their segment differentiation. Since the authors consider the word
level to be “deeper” (more basic) than the syllable and segment levels, they draw
the more general conclusion, but in fact meaning versus form is not the relevant
contrast.
The actual generalization is that the difficulty of such detection or monitoring
tasks depends on the size or level of unit one is searching for relative to the level
of the units among which one is searching, with no target level being easier than
another in any absolute sense (McNeill & Lindig 1973). At another point, Gleit-
man & Gleitman argue that giving judgments is more difficult than participat-
ing in conversation, by virtue of requiring self-consciousness, i.e., taking a prior
cognitive process as the object of a higher process. Fillmore, Kempler & Wang
(1979b) agree that metalinguistic performance requires more skills than regular
language use. But while the “objectification of cognitive processing” view has a
certain analytic appeal, and might even seem intuitively right, we have no solid
evidence that anything of the kind is actually going on; our impressions might be
epiphenomenal. In all these cases, then, the claims are unsupported. This is not
to say that they are false, but one can envisage much more direct experimental
ways of verifying or falsifying them, which would be a worthwhile undertaking.
These authors also go on to make specific suggestions as to where we should
look for the source of properties that are special to metalinguistic behavior. They
propose viewing it as an instance of the class of metacognitive behaviors.
There need be no formal resemblance between metacognition and the cog-
nitive processes it sometimes guides and organizes. Rather, one might ex-
pect to find resemblances among the higher-order processes themselves. On
this view, judgments (and therefore grammars) have little direct relevance
to speech and comprehension, but rather to reasoning. Whatever resem-
blance exists between language processing strategies and grammars may
derive from the fact that the human builds his grammar out of his observa-
tion of regularities in his speech and comprehension. Whatever differences
exist between these organizations may derive from the fact that the reflec-
tive capacities have properties of their own, which enter into the form of
the grammars they construct (Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitman & Gleitman 1978: 128)
(Bialystok & Ryan derive the same prediction from their model.) For the hypoth-
esis that there are resemblances among higher-order processes to be of any use,
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we must find some other metacognitive tasks to compare grammaticality judg-
ments to. Unfortunately, very few have been studied. In the domain of memory,
recollection (i.e., knowing that you remember something) could be considered
metamemory (see Ryan & Ledger 1984 for a literature review), and as a special
case, the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon involves metamemory in the (tempo-
rary) absence of memory itself (Gleitman, Gleitman & Shipley 1972). The authors
propose that intentional learning, or learning how to learn through deliberate
memorization strategies or other means, constitutes another type of metacogni-
tive activity. But no one has yet illustrated how comparisons with such processes
can shed any light on the nature of linguistic intuitions. (See Van Kleeck 1982,
Goldman 1982, and Gombert 1992 for more on this topic.)
The arguments that we have seen so far for the secondary nature of grammati-
cal intuitions have been based on comparisons between fully developed linguistic
versus metalinguistic abilities in adults. Another major set of arguments about
the nature of linguistic intuition comes from developmental work on the acqui-
sition of metalinguistic abilities. This is a huge area in its own right, to which I
cannot hope to do justice here; see Chaudron (1983), Ryan & Ledger (1984), Bird-
song (1989), and Gombert (1992) for literature reviews. Instead, I will concentrate
mainly on one research project that makes a particularly provocative suggestion
about how metalinguistic abilities develop – the work of Hakes (1980). His the-
sis, written within a Piagetian framework, starts from the observation that judg-
ments and explanations of syntactic well-formedness emerge developmentally at
about the same time as the ability to explain judgments of space and number and
to develop intentional memorization strategies, which is considerably later than
corresponding production and comprehension abilities (which seem to appear in
the preoperational period). He suggests that these are all forms of concrete op-
erational thought, since they all involve controlled processes, whereas sentence
comprehension and casual memory are automatic processes. (See Van Kleeck
1982 and Ryan & Ledger 1984 for more on this approach.)
To test this idea, Hakes presented children aged 4 to 8with variousmetalinguis-
tic tasks (comprehension, judgments of synonymy and acceptability, phonemic
segmentation), as well as other cognitive tasks (e.g., conservation tests). His find-
ing was not only that performance on these tasks shows improvement strongly
correlated with age, but also that the nature of the improvement was similar,
in the direction of objectifying or “decentering” (using controlled processing to
stand back from and evaluate a situation), a process that Piaget attributed to the
period of middle childhood. Hakes thus argues that a general metalinguistic abil-
ity underlies successful performance in all these tasks. (Another task that fits
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this trend, according to Ryan & Ledger (1984), is reading – performance on gram-
maticality judgments correlates widely with reading ability.) For instance, Hakes
found that synonymy judgments were based on superficial form in the youngest
children, but on meaning and form together at a later stage. Acceptability for the
youngest children was determined by whether they understood the sentence.32
At a later stage acceptability was based on the truth or desirability of the sit-
uation described in the sentence, its moral correctness, etc.33 Still older children
generally based acceptability judgments on linguistic form, although even some
8-year-olds labeled sentences unacceptable due to falseness of content. (Ryan &
Ledger (1984) take their own data to show that until about the age of 8, children’s
reactions to ungrammatical sentences are just unsystematic.) Another general
trend was that fewer bad sentences were judged good as the child grew older,
which Hakes interprets as indicating that more grammatical rules were being
learned.34 (He additionally provides an interesting discussion of the methodolog-
ical problems in getting linguistic judgments from young children, which must
be much harder again than getting them from adults.)
The claim that controlled processing is a crucial developmental factor is sup-
ported by the fact that children seem to have the necessary skills to perform
concrete operations earlier than the operations actually emerge. Children have
been known to display metalinguistic behavior spontaneously in conversation,
and can make use of deliberate memorization strategies when so instructed, but
until a certain stage do not seem to be able to choose the appropriate routines
to fit a situation. To follow up a point deferred earlier, Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitman &
Gleitman use data such as that obtained by Hakes to argue that metalinguistic
ability emerges late in development, and therefore must differ in important ways
from language use. They also report that children have been known to judge bad
sentences as grammatical, even though they have demonstrably mastered the rel-
evant grammatical form in their own speech. But if Hakes is on the right track in
pointing to objectification as the crucial skill that must be added to comprehen-
32 There is obviously a great deal of variation in the ages at which particular abilities emerge.
Certainly it would be incorrect to say that children under the age of 4 cannot assess grammat-
icality. Gleitman, Gleitman & Shipley (1972) showed that 2½-year-olds can detect and correct
certain grammatical errors in simple imperatives (but see Gombert (1992) for a critique), al-
though it was rare for them to correct just syntax, and that 6-to-8-year-olds could correctly
explain a wide variety of grammatical errors.
33 Such factors are not entirely abandoned in adulthood; see several studies reported in Chapter 4,
notably Hill (1961) and Vetter, Volovecky & Howell (1979).
34 However, the procedure that Hakes used could have been subject to a response bias, since




sion processing to allow judgment, then it does not necessarily follow that this
objectification distorts the data that it provides, andwe certainly cannot conclude
on this basis that there is a separate knowledge base underlying intuitions.
It must be noted that there is a great deal of disagreement concerning how
early children can provide useful grammaticality judgments. McDaniel & Cairns
(1990) find that if one undertakes a training session first, children as young as
4 can make grammaticality judgments. They compared child judgments of sen-
tences with their responses to the same sentences in an act-out task, and found
that while there were few actual conflicts between the two measures, act-out re-
sponses failed to reveal the full range of possible readings of the sentence. For
example, a child would act out a sentence in only one particular way and yet
judge it grammatical for other meanings as well, for instance by allowing mul-
tiple possible referents for a pronoun. The reader may consult their work for
methodological details.
Besides adult native speakers and children, data from a third group, adult
second-language learners, have been used in exploring the relationship between
judgments and competence. Coppieters (1987) attempted an experimental demon-
stration that syntactic intuitions do not improve as speaking ability in the sec-
ond language increases. Specifically, he wanted to show that native and near-
native speakers could have identical linguistic performance but radically differ-
ent intuitions, and then take this to support the indirectness of the link between
language use and linguistic intuitions as “a particularly striking illustration of
the relatively independent status of two linguistic planes: language use and lan-
guage form.” He began his procedure by finding nonnative speakers of French
who could not be clearly distinguished from native speakers in interviews that
he conducted and who were considered to have native proficiency by their col-
leagues or friends; many of these subjects were linguists. He also interviewed
a group of native speakers in the same way. He then proceeded with informal
interview elicitations of judgments on a number of sentence types (requiring
judgments of subtleties of French syntax such as adjective placement, choice of
past tenses, etc., usually with two alternatives) that were rated as “correct or
good,” “uncertain or problematic,” or “incorrect or bad.” Subjects were also asked
to explain meaning differences between pairs of minimally distinct sentences.
The average ratings of the native speakers were used as a norm against which
to evaluate individuals from both groups. Native speakers differed from their
norm on 5–16% of the sentences, while near-natives disagreed on 23–49% of the
judgments.Qualitatively, Coppieters reports that near-natives had strikingly dif-
ferent feelings about how sentences differed and the contexts where they could
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be used, and showed much variation in their explanations, whereas the native
speakers where quite homogeneous in their answers. But do these results really
show intuitional differences in the face of identical performance? The fact is the
two groups were never compared on their use of the crucial constructions tested
in the judgment task (e.g., by injecting the constructions surreptitiously in ca-
sual conversation), so it is equally possible (and seemingly more likely) that the
same differences would be found in performance as well.35 There might be no
differential effect of judgment whatsoever in this case. (A related experiment by
Snow & Meijer (1977) is reported in conjunction with a discussion of their other
experiments in Section 4.4.3.) Thus, it seems that in ordinary language use the
more subtle points of grammar can be avoided or go unnoticed, a state of affairs
that many computer programs employing natural language exploit in order to
engage in reasonable dialogues with humans using only rudimentary grammars.
Other authors have followed the same approach to argue that the degree of
individual differences in metalinguistic ability implies that such ability relies on
skills beyond those required for language use. In trying to pin down these skills,
Masny & d’Anglejan (1985) looked at advanced students of English as a Second
Language for statistical relationships between second language (L2) grammati-
cality judgments and corrections and selected cognitive and linguistic variables:
L2 proficiency, first language (L1) reading competence, reasoning (nonverbal in-
telligence), field (in)dependence (a measure of cognitive style; see Section 4.3.1),
and others. Using multiple regression analysis, they found that the best predic-
tor of L2 metalinguistic ability was L2 proficiency. In apparent contradiction of
Gleitman & Gleitman’s claim, they found no correlation between metalinguis-
tic ability and reasoning ability or cognitive style. Birdsong (1989) tries to make
the same case on the basis of Scribner & Cole’s (1981) study of Vai speakers in
Liberia. Among these people, literacy and/or schooling seems to be a prerequisite
for the ability to explain grammaticality judgments, which leads to large individ-
ual differences, but not for the ability tomake them, which shows relatively little
variation. I will discuss their findings further in Section 4.4.2. Regardless of the
questionable effectiveness of this particular line of argumentation, it is hard to
dispute the general conclusion that metalinguistic behavior is not a direct re-
flection of linguistic competence. In fact, much of the remainder of this book
will lend credence to that argument. Birdsong concludes, “Inasmuch as meta-
linguistic performance reflects idiosyncratic skill parameters, which vary across
tasks and across individuals, it cannot, in any rough-and-ready manner, reflect
the grammar or linguistic competence presumably possessed by all speakers of
35 Coppieters himself admits this as a likely possibility.
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a language” (p. 61); “the inference of grammatical competence from linguistic
and metalinguistic performance requires convergent evidence from a variety of
validated sources, as well as a profound understanding of the variables that de-
termine the form of the evidence” (p. 44).
3.6 Conclusion
I began this chapter by considering various ways to elicit subjects’ impressions
regarding the grammaticality of sentences, considering the pros and cons of sev-
eral methods. These should be kept in mind when examining the studies that
are reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. Along the way, I considered how judgments
fit into the larger class of metalinguistic behaviors, a theme to which I return
in Chapter 6 in attempting to model the judgment process. I looked in detail at
one heavily explored property of judgments, their scalability, and the method-
ological problems this property raises. I examined the much broader question of
what really occurs during the judgment process and how we might manipulate
that process to keep it more in line with language use. I then reviewed several
kinds of evidence for just how different judgments seem to be from competence,
the major determination being that the evidence is inconclusive. Following from
the approach outlined thus far, the next two chapters attempt in part to show
how the general features of judgments described in this chapter are the result of
lower-level cognitive effects.
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4 Subject-Related Factors in
Grammaticality Judgments
Speakers perversely disagree among
themselves about what is grammat-
ical in their language; some of the
principal sources of suffering and
dispute within generative linguistics
have been over ways of coming to
terms with such realities.
(Fillmore 1979)
4.1 Introduction
Despite their common genetic makeup, humans exhibit individual differences in
virtually every aspect of behavior. It should not be surprising to find that lin-
guistic intuitions are no exception. The central question I address in this chap-
ter is the extent to which differences in linguistic intuitions are systematically
attributable to differences either in properties of the organism or in its life expe-
riences. In some cases, there are some features on which people differ that con-
tribute rather transparently to their grammaticality judgments, and to linguistic
behavior generally, whereas in other cases the connection is surprising and still
poorly understood. Throughout the chapter a major theme is consistency, or the
extent to which the same subject gives a sentence the same rating on different
occasions, or different subjects give a sentence the same rating. In the former
case, inconsistencies are liable to be the result of factors having nothing to do
with subjects’ linguistic representations, e.g., whether they are fresh or fatigued,
uncooperative, attentive or distracted, etc. (Bradac et al. 1980). In the latter case,
interspeaker differences might be attributable to differences in deeper proper-
ties of the minds of the people in question, in their grammars or in some other
module that affects grammaticality judgments. The implications of these various
possibilities are taken up in Chapter 6.
4 Subject-Related Factors in Grammaticality Judgments
I begin this chapter with three important studies that have looked quantita-
tively at individual differences in grammaticality judgments (Section 4.2). The
amount of variation found there motivates a search for systematic factors that
might account for some of it. In Section 4.3, I examine organismic factors in this
regard. Two such factors have been studied extensively: field dependence, a con-
cept from the personality literature (Section 4.3.1), and handedness, which seems
to be an important indicator of linguistic structures in the brain (Section 4.3.2).
Some other factors, such as age, sex, and general cognitive endowment, seem to
be obvious candidates but have been given little or no attention in the literature,
so I consider them only briefly in Section 4.3.3. Section 4.4 turns to features of the
person’s experience. The most controversial and most discussed of these is lin-
guistic training. Innumerable critics of the linguistic enterprise have made their
case on the basis of linguists being their own speaker-consultants. I look at sev-
eral studies that have tried to establish whether linguists are suitable sources of
grammaticality judgment data (Section 4.4.1). A less-studied but very intriguing
source of variation in judgment abilities might be the amount of literacy train-
ing and general schooling a person has received. Investigations with remote cul-
tures are the major source of evidence on this topic (Section 4.4.2). I conclude
the section with a discussion of a grab bag of miscellaneous experiential factors,
such as the amount of exposure one has had to a language (for instance, as a
near-native speaker versus a native speaker) and accumulated world knowledge
(Section 4.4.3). Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by summarizing the findings
and using them to motivate the investigations of Chapter 5.
4.2 Individual Differences: Three Representative Studies
Note that, as usual, a given reader is
not really expected to agree with a
givenwriter’s placement of asterisks.
(Neubauer 1976)
The term most often used for individual differences in language judgments is id-
iolectal variation, although Heringer (1970) is on the mark when he says, “This
term is chosen for want of a better one and is not intended to imply that groups
of people do not show the same patterns of variation in acceptability judgments,
at least with individual sentence types. To call this dialect variation, however,
seems not to be appropriate since there do not appear to be geographical or so-
ciological correlates to this variation” (p. 287). Carden (1973) uses the term ran-
domly distributed dialects in order to emphasize his belief that these should have
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the same theoretical status as geographically and socially defined dialects. The
first set of experiments I review concerns the single most widely studied instance
of individual differences: the interpretation of quantifier-negative combinations,
as exemplified in (1a), which might be paraphrased as (1b) or (1c):
(1) a. All the boys didn’t leave.
b. Not all the boys left.
c. None of the boys left.
(Note that the spoken intonation pattern of (1a) likely would be very different
for the two readings, although no one appears to have studied this issue system-
atically; see Section 5.2.6.) In an early study, Carden (1970b) claims that speakers
fall into three categories with regard to their interpretation of sentences like (1a):
some can only get the meaning of (1b), some can only get the meaning of (1c),
and some find the sentence ambiguous.1 He, along with many other researchers
of the day (e.g., Elliot, Legum&Thompson 1969), argued that there are important
theoretical insights to be gained by examining the full range of dialects, rather
than accounting for one and ignoring the others. Carden was particularly inter-
ested in finding implicational relations among dialect differences. In a follow-up
study that attempted to elicit judgments on these sentences, Heringer (1970) was
faced with “the problem of asking naive informants to judge the acceptability of
ambiguous sentences on specific readings,” a problem we have also encountered
with regard to adjunct wh-movement (see Section 2.3.2). When a sentence is un-
controversially good under one reading, one’s initial impression is that it sounds
fine. This undoubtedly biases ratings of other readings. Therefore, Heringer con-
structed a situational context in which only one of the readings was possible,
either in the form of a scenario of which the target sentence formed the conclu-
sion, or a prose description of the kind of situation where the sentence might
occur. These two types of context are illustrated in (2) and (3), respectively:
(2) All the students didn’t pass the test, did they? [Professor Unrat believes
he finally has succeeded in making up a midterm which every single one
of his students would fail miserably. However, he doesn’t know the test
results yet, since his poor overworked teaching assistant Stanley has just
1 While these three categories represent the major dialects, Carden admits that he found many
subdialects. He also reports anecdotally that some speakers who originally could only get the
(1b) reading started accepting both readings after repeated exposure to sentences that forced
the (1c) reading. A similar finding is reported by Neubauer (1976) regarding individual differ-
ences in uses of the word pretend: subjects moved toward a more liberal dialect when pushed.
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this moment finished grading them. Unrat asks Stanley this question in
order to confirm his belief.]
(3) All the treasure seekers didn’t find the chest of gold. [Used in the
situation where none of them found it.] (p. 294)
Heringer’s instructions stated that acceptability should only be considered in the
context of the material in square brackets. Unfortunately, acceptability was not
defined for the subjects (a complaint made by Carden (1970a) as well) and they
did not receive any training on practice sentences.
At any rate, several interesting results are found in this study. One is the
ability of context to prompt subjects to see potential acceptability where there
otherwise is none, a result that I discuss in Section 5.3.1. Another interesting
finding is that, while there were very few speakers who accepted only the (1c)
reading, there were many more who accepted neither reading. In Carden’s study
this pattern does not show up at all. In general, the results of the two studies
differ quite substantially, leading Heringer to speculate on why this should be
so. First, the mode of presentation was different in the two studies. Carden pre-
sented sentences orally in interviews, whereas Heringer used a written ques-
tionnaire. A second possibility, which I discuss more fully in Section 6.3, is that
interviews of the sort Carden conducted are more susceptible to experimenter
bias. A third potential problem, mentioned by Carden (1970a), is that Heringer
used only one stimulus sentence for each reading in most of the constructions,
so it is worth asking whether peculiarities of the sentences chosen could be re-
sponsible for some of the results. Nonetheless, Heringer’s data apparently refute
Newmeyer’s (1983) claim that people differ only on their bias of interpretation
on these quantifier-negative sentences (i.e., which reading they think of first),but
that everyone can get both readings. Even when context forced a particular read-
ing, many of Heringer’s subjects did not accept that reading, so subjects seem to
differ on something deeper than processing preferences.2 (See Labov (1972a) for
a survey of work on quantifier-negative dialects.)
2 Newmeyer cites a paper by Baltin (1977) to support his claim that everyone can get both read-
ings, but in fact Baltin found nothing of the kind. He found the three dialects that Carden
had reported, using question answering rather than judgments as his primary source. (He
also found a significant correlation between subjects’ preferences on quantifier-negative con-
structions and their interpretation of prenominalmodifiers as restrictive versus nonrestrictive.)
However, Labov (1975) does report results along the lines described by Newmeyer, where non-
linguistic tasks were used to force one reading or the other, with almost complete success
across subjects.
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Stokes (1974) performed a follow-up to Carden’s work, starting from the criti-
cism that the interview technique is subject to experimenter bias. Stokes used a
questionnaire, and determined which readings of quantifier-negative sentences
were grammatical by using judgments of synonymy rather than of grammatical-
ity, with the hope that the former would be less likely to tap prescriptive feelings.
He too found “extraordinary variation” in the results, a much wider range of re-
sponse patterns than the three dialects Carden discussed. Among his 48 subjects,
there were 17 different patterns of responses to the stimulus sentences.
The second study I review is by Snow & Meijer (1977), who performed three
experiments to substantiate their claim about the secondary nature of syntactic
intuitions and language data, which corresponds inmany respects to the position
presented in Section 3.5.3 (The second and third experiments will be discussed in
subsequent sections.) Their first experiment used as subjects native speakers of
Dutch who were studying linguistics but had not taken any courses in syntactic
theory. We might expect them to show somewhat more sophistication than truly
naive subjects. Their materials all involved issues of word order, so multiple ar-
rangements of each set of words were constructed. There were two conditions,
absolute judgments and rank-ordering. In the former condition, each of 24 sen-
tences appeared on a separate page and the instructions stated, “Will you please
read the sentence, then indicate whether you think it is a good Dutch sentence
(by ‘good’ we mean ‘acceptable in spoken language’ and not ‘grammatically cor-
rect’). Write + if the sentence is good, − if it isn’t good, and ? if it is in-between or
if you don’t know.” In the rank-ordering condition, the sentences were divided
across four pages of six sentences each, and the instructions read in part, “Will
you please rank these sentences within the groups of six by rewriting them at
the bottom of the page with those sentences which are good Dutch, or the best
Dutch, at the top and those sentences which are the worst Dutch at the bottom.
Sentences which are equally good or bad can bewritten on one line.” Immediately
we see a potential confound, since the rank-ordering subjects were not told to
rank by spoken acceptability as opposed to grammatical correctness (of course,
we do not know whether this terminology was understood in a uniform way by
the first group either). Snow & Meijer decided to make this a within-subjects
factor, administering the two kinds of tests a week apart to the same subjects,
and found no effects of the order of test types, but the instructions could still
confound any differences between the two types of task.
3 They argue that syntactic intuitions are developmentally secondary, as evidenced by stud-
ies such as Hakes (1980); pragmatically secondary, because their function is not communica-
tive; and methodologically secondary, as demonstrated by their experiments reported in this
chapter.
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The results were first analyzed for between- and within-subjects consistency
in the two conditions. The between-subjects consensus on rankings was signifi-
cant for all sets of sentences, as measured by Kendall’s coefficient of concordance,
but was not extremely high (ranging from .466 to .670 on a potential range of 0–
1). The most agreed-upon sentence, which the authors claim is perfectly normal,
showed disagreement by 3 of 25 subjects, and all other sentences showed at least
7 disagreements as compared to their mean rank. The absolute ratings similarly
showed no total unanimity, although there was one sentence type on which 24
of the 25 subjects agreed.4 On the other hand, five sentence types showed dis-
agreements, i.e., at least one subject rated them bad both times while another
rated them good both times, and two of these represented almost equal splits of
the subjects. Within-subject consistency was 70.8% for the absolute judgments,
where two identical ratings for two structurally identical variants counted as
consistent, even if they were both marked “?”. The majority of inconsistencies
involved one “?” rating rather than strictly opposed judgments. One subject out
of the 25 was consistent on all 10 sentence types, while the two least consistent
subjects were consistent on only 5. Snow & Meijer correctly advise caution in
interpreting this as a good level of consistency, however, because many of their
subjects showed strong response biases toward a “+” response or toward a “−”
response. In the extreme case, someone labeling all sentences as good would be
100% consistent. (Since we are not told the normative status of the stimulus sen-
tences, we do not know what an unbiased distribution of responses might look
like.)The authors devised a complex scoring system to assess within-subject con-
sistency between rank-orderings and absolute ratings, which ranged on average
from perfect consistency to about three out-of-sequence rankings in a set of six
sentences. There was no significant correlation between this cross-conditions
consistency score for a given subject and his or her consistency within absolute
judgments. Even when judgments are pooled across all the subjects, the abso-
lute ratings do not agree entirely with the rank-orderings. There was at least one
reversal of position for each set of six sentences. On the basis of these results,
it is hard to argue with the authors that “testing even a relatively large group
of subjects, all of them relatively intelligent and language-conscious, does not
assure internally consistent judgments concerning the relative acceptability of
sentences” (p. 172).
The third of our example studies is perhaps the most widely cited study on in-
dividual differences in grammaticality judgments, that of Ross (1979). Ross asked
4 In the absolute condition, subjects could indicate that they were unsure, which the 25th subject
did here; therefore, this constitutes only a weak disagreement.
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30 subjects to rate the grammaticality of 12 sentences on a scale from 1 to 4, and
elicited their perceptions about these judgments.5 Specifically, the subjects were
asked to state how certain they were of each judgment (pretty sure, middling, or
pretty unsure), and how they thought that judgment compared to the judgments
of most speakers (liberal, conservative, or middle-of-the-road). Since I am partic-
ularly concerned with the design of instructions for such experiments, I present
Ross’s description of the rating scale as it appeared on his questionnaire:
1. The sentence sounds perfect. You would use it without hesitation.
2. The sentence is less than perfect – something in it just doesn’t feel comfort-
able. Maybe lots of people could say it, but you never feel quite comfortable
with it.
3. Worse than 2, but not completely impossible. Maybe somebody might use
the sentence, but certainly not you. The sentence is almost beyond hope.
4. The sentence is absolutely out. Impossible to understand, nobody would
say it. Un-English. (p. 161)
Note the reference to comprehensibility in item 4. In general, the instructions are
quite explicit regarding differentiation of the levels, but give little indication of
what counts as a criterion for grammaticality.
By his own admission, Ross intended this experiment only as a pilot study.
As he acknowledges, his presentation of the results shows no knowledge of sta-
tistical whatsoever. Instead, he invents his own numerical measures to assess
variability, covariation, etc., and gives numerous large tables of raw data.6 While
these shortcomings make the paper tedious to read and the results hard to inter-
pret, at least his raw data could be used to do proper statistical analyses. I will
report only the more obvious results, with the understanding that none of them
should be taken as firm. First, I present the sentences employed in the question-
naire, with their mean ratings on the 1–4 scale. (Ross did not calculate mean rat-
ings, but computed an overall score by weighting the numbers of subjects who
gave each of the four responses, in effect treating the scale as centered about
a zero point. Since his formula is arbitrary and unjustified, I use the standard
5 Therewere actually 13 sentences in his questionnaire, one of whichwas geared to the semantics
of barely and scarcely and did not yield results comparable to those for the other sentences.
6 Another potential problem of interpretation is that 8 of his 30 subjects were nonnative speakers
of English.
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computation instead. Thus, in his ordered list, the third and fourth sentences are
transposed.)7
The doctor is sure that there will be no problems. 1.07
]
Core
Under no circumstances would I accept that offer. 1.23
We don’t believe the claim that Jimson ever had any money. 1.63

Bog
That is a frequently talked about proposal. 1.70
The fact he wasn’t in the store shouldn’t be forgotten. 1.80
The idea he wasn’t in the store is preposterous. 2.03
I urge that anything he touch be burned. 2.03
Nobody is here who I get along with who I want to talk to. 2.60
All the further we got was to Sudbury. 2.77
Nobody who I get along with is here who I want to talk to. 2.83
Such formulas should be writable down. 3.07
]
Fringe
What will the grandfather clock stand between the bed and? 3.30
The designations core, bog, and fringe are used by Ross to refer to the range
of good, marginal, and bad sentences, respectively. These divisions are made
by eyeballing, not by any formulaic procedure.8 He found three variables that
correlated with this distinction in the order core-fringe-bog (i.e., variables that
changed monotonically such that good sentences were at one extreme and mar-
ginal ones at the other): increasing variability among subjects, decreasing confi-
dence in their judgments, and increasing self-rating as conservative. The finding
about variability jibes with Barsalou’s results reported in Section 3.3.1 for concep-
tual typicality judgments. The pattern of confidence agrees with the findings of
Quirk & Svartvik (1966: 52, fig. 9), based on the number of subjects choosing the
“marginal or dubious” rating on their 3-point scale; they dub this phenomenon
the “query bulge.” At an intuitive level, these results are not surprising, but the
only explanation RossRoss, John Robert adduces, namely that “the mind sags in
the middle,” does not add much insight.9 While an additional goal of the ques-
tionnaire was to assess whether people know where their judgments stand in
relation to those of the rest of the population, the data were not interpretable
due to apparent misunderstandings of the liberality scale.10 Interestingly, Ross
7 The general problem of how to come up with a single rating for a sentence on the basis of mul-
tiple judgments on a graded scale has arisen in many other studies as well. Standard deviations
should probably be reported.
8 Ross does not commit as to exactly where the divisions should be drawn for the sentences he
studied, so I have placed the boundaries arbitrarily within his suggested ranges.
9 This quotation is attributed to George Miller.
10 Ross suggests that a better way to get at this information is simply to ask subjects directly
what ratings they think most other people would give.
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found no cases of strongly polarized judgments, i.e., sentences that some people
rated 1 and the rest rated 4, with no one in between. In all cases, the two most
frequent ratings were adjacent on the scale, that is, there were no bimodal dis-
tributions. He suggests that this might be an artifact of the particular sentences
chosen; if one deliberately chose known dialectal peculiarities, bimodality might
still appear. However, as a measure of just how different people are, no 2 of the
30 subjects agreed on their ratings for more than 7 of the 12 sentences on the
4-point scale. In fact, Ross did not try all combinations of sentences, so it might
even require fewer than 7 sentences to differentiate all of the subjects. (By way
of comparison, Quirk & Svartvik (1966) (see Section 3.2) reported that with 76
subjects judging 50 sentences on a 3-point scale, only two sentences were unani-
mously rejected, and only two accepted.) These sorts of striking results lead Ross
to ask, “Where’s English?” (his proposed answer is discussed below). One ex-
periential factor that contributed to variability among Ross’s subjects was that
some of his subjects were linguists while others were not. He found systematic
differences between the two groups, which I discuss in Section 4.4.1.
Most linguists acknowledge that no two people will agree on even binary judg-
ments of a large collection of sentences, let alone ordinal rankings.11 What, if
anything, does this tell us about people’s grammars? Ross’s data prompted him
to take a very pessimistic view. He proposed in dismay that a language might be
defined only as an n-dimensional space for some n in the thousands, where each
point is a sentence and each dimension an implicationally ordered axis such that
acceptance of a sentence on a given axis implies acceptance of all sentences closer
to the origin along that axis. Then each person’s idiolect is an n-dimensional vec-
tor specifying that person’s acceptance threshold for each axis. Most linguists
find this an appallingly messy and uninteresting view of language.12 I discuss
11 Newmeyer appears to be the exception, claiming that “there is good reason to think that id-
iosyncratic (i.e., nongeographical and nonsocial) dialects are nothing but artifacts of the now-
abandoned view that grammaticality is dependent on context” (Newmeyer 1983: 57). However,
he only cites one case as evidence for this very broad generalization, that of quantifier-negative
sentences, and the facts there are still controversial, as discussed above.
12 This view seems to have originated in Ross’s earlier proposal of the concept of a squish (see
Section 3.3.1). A squish is a two-dimensional matrix where the cells represent judgments. On
one axis are forms graded by some property, e.g., increasing volitionality. On the other are
environments where the forms might occur, graded by the extent to which they demand that
property. One can make claims about how orderly the implicational pattern in the matrix
should be across speakers. Unfortunately, after some research in this paradigm it started to
look like both hierarchies could vary across speakers, or even that this pattern could be vio-
lated by a single speaker through the syntactic analog of statistical interactions: the effect of
one dimension on grammaticality depended on the level of the other.
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some alternative positions in Chapter 6. The reader is referred to Fillmore, Kem-
pler & Wang (1979a) for a very wide-ranging discussion of individual differences




Field dependence/independence is a concept that originated in the personality as-
sessment literature in psychology. It is meant to diagnose how people perceive
and think, specifically the extent to which they perform cognitive differentiation,
the process of distinguishing stimuli along different dimensions. Nagata (1989b)
investigated whether field (in)dependence would influence grammaticality judg-
ments. A field dependent (FD) person fuses aspects of the world and experiences
it globally, whereas a field independent (FI) person is analytical, differentiating
information and experiences into components.These are seen asmore or less per-
manent traits of individuals (Weiner et al. 1977).There are a number of diagnostic
tests for field (in)dependence that have been shown by psychologists to be very
well correlated. One of these is the tilting-room-tilting-chair test, which involves
an apparatus consisting of a small box-shaped room containing a chair, mounted
onmechanical devices such that each can be rotated independently in two dimen-
sions. Subjects seated on the chair cannot see outside the room, and are required
to judge whether they are seated upright or on a tilt relative to the outside world.
FD individuals tend to believe that they are on a tilt if the orientation of the room
makes it appear so, i.e., they have trouble distinguishing visual cues from kines-
thetic/vestibular ones, whereas FI individuals have less trouble. A simpler test to
perform, used by Nagata to divide up his subjects, is the embedded figures test.
In this test subjects must rapidly pick out simple geometric figures embedded in
larger, more complex ones. FDs have more difficulty with this than FIs. Wemight
expect that these differences in cognitive style could show linguistic side effects.
FI individuals show an impersonal orientation and havewell-developed cognitive
restructuring skills, while FD individuals showmore interpersonal competencies.
For example, they recall social words better than FIs and use them more often in
free association tasks.Thus, we could anticipate that FDs would use strategies in-
volving the enrichment of stimulus sentences with context when judging them,
while FIs would be more prone to employ structural differentiation. (The nature
of these strategies is described in more detail in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, in con-
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junction with discussion of Nagata’s other experiments.) However, as reported
in Section 3.5, Masny & d’Anglejan (1985) found field dependence had no dis-
cernible effect on L2 judgment ability. They also review numerous other studies
attempting to relate it to language ability, the results of which were mixed. An
additional facet of this distinction is that FDs are more prone to changing their
opinions under external influence, since they pay greater heed to others, so we
should look for differential reactions to knowledge of other people’s judgments.
Nagata’s experiment involved repeated presentation of sentences. After rating
the grammaticality of a number of sentences (on a scale of 1 to 7), subjects were
exposed to each sentence 10 times for 3 seconds per repetition, duringwhich time
they were told to think of the grammaticality of the sentence. After the tenth rep-
etition, they rated each sentence a second time. Then they were told that their
judgments differed from those of the average college student (which Nagata con-
sidered negative reinforcement), and were asked to think about the grammati-
cality of each sentence again and rate it a third time. Other experiments have
shown that for a general population, the repetition treatment makes judgments
significantly more stringent (i.e., sentences are rated less grammatical after rep-
etition); see Section 5.2.3 for details. In Nagata’s experiments, the judgments of
FIs did become more stringent after repetition, but those of FDs showed no sig-
nificant change. After the negative reinforcement, both groups’ ratings became
more lenient (the FDs’ nonsignificantly more so). Nagata concludes that FDs ap-
proach the task of judging grammaticality differently from FIs, since they resist
the usual repetition effect. One might have expected their judgments to become
more lenient with repetition, as they considered more potential contexts for the
sentences, but this trend was not found either. Apparently it is much harder to
make sentences get better than to make them get worse (again, see Chapter 5
for more on this point). The idea that FDs would be more responsive to negative
reinforcement was not substantiated. In summary, we can say that field depen-
dence is a factor that can induce variability among subjects on grammaticality
judgment tasks, just as it does in other domains. For instance, Lefever & Ehri
(1976) found a moderately positive correlation between field independence and
the ability to detect several kinds of ambiguity in sentences. They propose that
the common features among the various tasks involve restructuring a stimulus
pattern, overcoming the influence of context, and shifting mental set.
4.3.2 Handedness
There is already considerable evidence that handedness correlates with differ-
ences in language processing, for instance in the review by Hardyck, Naylor &
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Smith (1979). Recently, some preliminary studies have been done on possible cor-
relations between handedness and grammaticality judgment strategies. Work by
Bever, Carrithers & Townsend (1987) was the first to suggest that such differences
might be found. The purpose of their study was to show that the assumption
that the basic mechanisms of sentence processing are the same for everyone is
a severe oversimplification. Specifically, they demonstrated how right-handers
from families with at least one closely related left-hander (“mixed background
right-handers”) show different processing patterns from right-handers with no
familial history of left-handedness (“pure background right-handers”). The for-
mer group tend to process in a more structure-independent way than the latter,
that is, they attend less to syntactic and semantic structures of language and
more to conceptual and lexico-pragmatic features. These differences were found
despite the matching of subject groups on several other variables, including age,
sex, native language (English), and verbal SAT score.13 In one study the authors
used the classic tone location paradigm, wherein a subject hears a tone while
listening to a sentence and must subsequently identify at which point in the
sentence it occurred. They demonstrated that mixed-background subjects did
not show a superiority effect for clause boundary location of the tone, that is,
they did not locate the tone more accurately when it occurred exactly between
two clauses, while pure-background subjects did. A second experiment showed
thatmixed-background subjects respondmore quickly in aword recognition task
(supposedly because they “make more use of the reference of individual words
in their processing”) and are insensitive to the position of the target word in the
clause, unlike their structure-dependent counterparts, who showed serial order
effects. Pure-background righthanders also performed more slowly on word-by-
word reading tasks. These results support the authors’ general conclusion that
pure-background people depend more on aspects of sentence structure, mixed-
backgrounders more on lexical and conceptual knowledge.14 There is some neu-
rological evidence to corroborate this proposal. Familial sinistrality seems to be
correlated with a less localized, more widespread language module in the brain,
which Bever, Carrithers & Townsend (1987) suggest leads to more contact be-
tween language and other kinds of knowledge. Whatever the eventual explana-
tions of these differences, it would not be surprising to find that the different
processing strategies are also reflected in different judgment strategies between
13 These studies do not use left-handed subjects because they are harder to find and to match on
these dimensions.
14 It is important to note that there were no instances in which the two groups showed reverse




such groups. In fact, the two types of strategies proposed by Bever et al. are not
so dissimilar from those proposed by Nagata for field dependents versus inde-
pendents. A replication of his procedure with mixed-background subjects could
prove fruitful. See Bever et al. (1989) and Bever (1992) for more studies of lan-
guage differences correlated with familial handedness.
Cowart (1989) conducted the first study to look explicitly for the effects of fa-
milial sinistrality differences in a judgment task. The experiment involved a writ-
ten questionnaire using a 4-point scale, the extremes of which were designated
“OK” and “odd” (since the details of the procedure are not reported, we cannot
assess the extent to which subjects were instructed on how to evaluate sentences
in terms of these labels). The sentences in question followed the paradigm in (4):
(4) a. What did the scientist criticize Max’s proof of?
b. What did the scientist criticize a proof of?
c. What did the scientist criticize the proof of?
d. Why did the scientist criticize Max’s proof of the theorem?
Example (4a) has traditionally been called a violation of the Specified Subject
Condition, while (4b) and (4c) are considered good in some theories and claimed
to violate only the lesser constraint of Subjacency by others; (4d) is an uncontro-
versial control sentence. It was hypothesized that since the violations in (4a–c)
are all of a purely structural nature, mixed-background subjects would be less
sensitive to them and therefore rate them more grammatical than their pure-
background counterparts. This prediction was borne out. For cases like (4a–c)
the ratings of the latter subjects were significantly lower than those of the for-
mer, but no difference was found for grammatical control sentences like (4d).15 If
this insensitivity to structural violations is found throughout the syntax, it could
constitute an explanation for a significant amount of intersubject variation in
judgments. (See Section 7.2 for the possibility that Subjacency is really a parsing
constraint and not a grammatical constraint.)
4.3.3 Other Organismic Factors
In this subsection I suggest some other organismic factors that might induce sys-
tematic differences in grammaticality judgments. First, let us consider two of the
most obvious factors: age and sex. Ross (1979) suggests that, in general, more
15 Another result was that cases like (4b) and (4c) were rated significantly worse than (4d), sug-
gesting that they might indeed constitute Subjacency violations (but see the caveats in Sec-
tion 2.3).
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contact with a language leads to higher grammaticality ratings for it, an idea in-
spired by the fact (reported in Section 4.4.1) that linguists rated sentences higher
on average than nonlinguists in his questionnaire experiment, which obviously
has other possible explanations. If Ross is right, we would expect increasing age
to be correlated with increasing tolerance in judgments. His own data do not bear
this out, but they were not even based on accurate ages, just his guesses, so there
is certainly room for more investigation here. Greenbaum’s (1977c) review of the
literature cites age as a factor that correlates with difference in acceptability judg-
ments, but he does not provide details. As for sex differences, Chaudron (1983)
states in his wide-ranging survey of metalinguistic research that sex has rarely
been experimentally analyzed and “does not appear to be a relevant factor,” but
if the former is true then how do we know the latter for certain? R. Lakoff (1977),
while dealing with what she calls acceptability differences between men’s and
women’s speech, makes it clear that such differences are conditioned by situa-
tional and social factors (i.e., when a particular kind of utterance is appropriate),
and not differences in grammars. For instance, she has found no instances of syn-
tactic rules that only one sex possesses, at least not in English. However, Bever
(1992) has found preliminary evidence for sex differences in methods of language
processing, which presumably could be reflected in judgments as well. He argues
that there is a spectrum of “abduction strategies” or possible ways one can de-
velop abstract representations (linguistic or otherwise), whose extremes are hy-
pothesis refinement (using new data to refine an existing hypothesis) and hypoth-
esis competition (using it to choose between alternative hypotheses). In one of
Bever’s experiments, the tasks involved producing, comprehending, and judging
sentences in an artificial language. Under learning conditions that are supposed
to support hypothesis competition, men do significantly better than women on
the judgment task, while the opposite is true with hypothesis refinement. While
there is as yet no conclusive basis for deciding whether these differences are bio-
logically or socially caused, it is intriguing that similar sex differences surface in
spatial learning tasks, which leads Bever to suggest that there might be a general
abduction mechanism implicated in both activities. However, it does not neces-
sarily follow that any sex differences we might find in judgments of one’s native
language would be attributable to the same mechanism. One can imagine that
differences in conversational strategy could lead, say, to women judging fewer
sentences ungrammatical than men because they are more supportive in conver-
sation. (See Wardhaugh (1988: ch. 13) for a brief review of the literature on sex
differences in language and their social correlates.) The attribution of sex differ-
ences to biological versus psychological causes is notoriously tricky, and is the
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subject of much ongoing research; see Halpern (1992) for an excellent review,
and Philips, Steele & Tanz (1987) on the possible relevance of sex differences in
the brain to language. It appears that no one has yet looked for sex differences in
the processing of individual sentences, as opposed to overall skill level on verbal
tasks.
The second direction we might explore while looking for organismic factors
involves general cognitive differences that we suspect are implicated in the task
of judging grammaticality. For instance, we will see evidence in Section 5.3.5 that
part of this process involves imagining a situation to which a sentence could be
applied. Therefore, the ability to imagine situations, i.e., some form of creativity,
is a dimension on which people undoubtedly vary and one that could correlate
with judgments. Various perceptual strategies have been implicated in language
processing, and hence also (somewhat controversially) in the generation of judg-
ments. Subjects might differ in their ability to use these strategies (Botha 1973).
Similarly, a number of extragrammatical factors often implicated in acceptability
(as distinct from grammaticality) might be subject to inherent differences, such as
working memory capacity, ability to reason by analogy, and so on. At a more gen-
eral level, intelligence and cognitive development might be pertinent, at least up
to a certain ceiling. Hakes (1980) (reported in Section 3.5) attempts to show that
qualitative changes in children’s ability to make grammaticality judgments are
correlated with Piagetian stages of development, and Masny & d’Anglejan (1985),
mentioned in Section 3.5, looked for correlations between IQ and judgments of
second-language learners, although they failed to find any significant patterns.
Finally, Bialystok & Ryan (1985) propose a model of (meta)linguistic ability as
factored into two major dimensions, analyzed knowledge and cognitive control
(see Section 3.4). Each is the product of underlying cognitive abilities on which
people might differ. Analyzed knowledge is related to intelligence and logical
deduction abilities, while cognitive control depends on reflective and impulsive
tendencies, as well as field dependence, discussed in Section 4.3.1. The authors do
not provide specific evidence for these interdependencies, however. In general,
demographic variables are hard to study rigorously in this context, because their
effects seem to be small relative to stimulus factors and can often interact, which
demands large samples of subjects in order to detect the effects reliably.
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4.4 Experiential Factors
4.4.1 Linguistic Training
It is well-known among linguists
that intuitions about the acceptabil-
ity of utterances tend to be vague
and inconsistent, depending on what
you had for breakfast16and which
judgment would best suit your own
pet theory.17
(Dahl 1979)
Only themost sophisticated speakers
can supply the exquisite judgments
required for writing a grammar.
(Gleitman & Gleitman 1970)
One of the most frequent criticisms of generative grammar has been the fact that,
to paraphrase Labov, the theories that linguists develop are based on data that
they themselves create, a situation that constitutes an intolerable conflict of in-
terest and seriously undermines the external validity of the findings. In this sub-
section I enumerate some of the specific reasons why it has been suggested that
linguists’ intuitions differ from those of naive native speakers and thus should
not be used as linguistic data. I then turn to experimental attempts to establish
whether such differences actually exist, of which there have been surprisingly
few. It must be kept in mind throughout that finding differences in the way lin-
guists and nonlinguists judge sentences does not inherently count as a strike
against using data from the former group. We must examine each difference to
see what the potential benefits and drawbacks are for linguistic investigation.
The following passage from Bradac et al. (1980: 968) is typical of the views
expressed by many outside the generative enterprise: “as a result of their spe-
cial training, linguists may tend to judge strings differently from nonlinguists.
Training in linguistics may produce beliefs or attitudes which are not shared by
16 Since it is not clear whether what one had for breakfast should be treated as a between- or a
within-subjects factor, it will not be discussed further.
17 Jim McCawley (personal communication) points out that the relevant factor is actually which
judgment linguists believe would suit their theories, because their beliefs about the conse-
quences of their own theories may turn out to be erroneous.
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those who have not received such training.This suggests that the knowledge pro-
duced by linguists may become increasingly artifactual; it may fail increasingly
to model natural language.” While the authors’ premise of differing beliefs is al-
most certainly true, it does not follow that linguists’ judgments are artifactual in
the sense that they are influenced by factors that are not relevant to the gram-
mars of naive speakers. A priori it is equally possible that their training allows
them to factor out various irrelevant factors that do influence naive judgments,
but actually reflect cognitive factors other than the grammar that is the object
of study (Levelt 1974). However, there are legitimate reasons to suggest that this
ability of linguists might have come at the price of a loss of objectivity. Labov
(1972a) argues that linguists have become removed from everyday language ex-
perience. Greenbaum (1976a; 1977c) believes that linguists are bound to be un-
reliable subjects, for at least three reasons. First, after long exposure to closely
related sentences their judgments tend to become blurred. A famous quotation
from Fraser (1971: 178), exemplifies the point: “I think this issue is fairly clear. It
will be resolved by speakers whose intuitions about the sentences in question are
sharper than mine, which have been blunted by frequent worrying about these
cases.” Even Chomsky himself has experienced this phenomenon: “I had worried
so much over whether very could occur with surprised, that I no longer had a
firm opinion about it” (Chomsky 1962: 172). Haj Ross coined the term scanted
out in the early 1970s to describe this state.18 Second, linguists are liable to be
unconsciously prejudiced by their own theoretical positions, tending to judge in
accordance with the predictions of their particular version of grammar.19 Botha
(1973), Derwing (1973), Sampson (1975) and Ringen (1979), among many other
critics, also express this view. Additionally, Levelt (1974) suggests that hypercrit-
ical linguists might be biased away from the judgments predicted by the theory
they are working on. Carden & Dieterich (1981) speculate on the subconscious
process by which this could arise in a particular case. Greenbaum’s third source
18 The term apparently originates from Ross’s feeling that just trying to produce any judgments
on sentences containing the word scant was sufficient to induce a loss of intuitions in short
order.
19 Elan Dresher (personal communication) suggests that the reputed argumentativeness of lin-
guists and the existence of multiple competing theories would guard against such bias. How-
ever, in the first place, Wayne Cowart (personal communication) points out that it is almost
impossible to get an article published if all one has to offer is disagreement with some other
linguist’s judgments. Furthermore, even if one has a theory to go with new judgments, this
will only help the field if one’s theory is of interest to the linguist in question. If the source
of bias is an uncontroversial assumption within GB, say, but that assumption is disputed by
proponents of Lexical-Functional Grammar, the bias will be difficult to discover, because the
two camps rarely interact.
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of linguists’ unreliability is that they look for reasons behind their acceptance or
rejection of a sentence, which takes away spontaneity and makes their judgment
processes different from those of naive subjects, who presumably have neither
the inclination nor the knowledge necessary to perform this analysis. On the is-
sue of whether this is actually less desirable, see the discussion in Section 5.2.7
on the relative merits of spontaneous versus reasoned judgments. Nonetheless,
I agree with Greenbaum that this constitutes an additional difference between
the two groups. Let us now see whether any of the above hypotheses have been
borne out empirically.
I begin with a summary of differences found by Ross in the studymentioned in
Section 4.2. The summary is brief because the study’s methodological shortcom-
ings make its results suspect at best. On average, his linguists were more unsure
than his nonlinguists (i.e., they had less confidence in their ratings), perhaps be-
cause thinking about language makes you realize how little you know about it
and shatters your confidence in your own judgments – “Doing syntax rots the
brain.”20 Nonlinguists rated themselves more conservative, were tougher graders
(i.e., they rated sentences less grammatical overall), and made fewer distinctions
between levels of grammaticality (i.e., they tended not to use thewhole scale).We
will find a counterexample to the relative stringency finding in another study.
The most widely cited work on linguist/nonlinguist differences is that of Spen-
cer (1973).The paper is perhaps more important for the many issues it raises than
for Spencer’s experimental results. She starts from the position that:
it is possible that the behavior of producing linguistically relevant intuitions
has developed into a specialized skill, no longer directly related to the lan-
guage behavior of the speech community (Bever [1970a]).The linguist views
language in a highly specialized way, and perhaps is influenced by a per-
ceptual set. The resulting description may not be an ideal representation
of linguistic structure. It may be an artifactual system which reflects the
accretion of conceptual organization by linguists. (p. 87)
Spencer’s experiment used two groups of subjects: the naive subjects were stu-
dents of introductory psychology, while the nonnaive subjects were graduate
students who had taken at least one course in generative grammar.21 She states
20 Ross attributes this adage to John Lawler without providing a reference.
21 Apparently the nonnaive subjects did not possess a uniform amount of linguistic background,
however, since some were graduate students in linguistics, while others were psychology or




that Chomsky’s (1961) definition of grammaticality and examples were used as
the basis for the instructions in her experiment, but all she actually tells us about
these instructions is the following: “Each [subject] was read the same instruc-
tions – he would be asked to make a decision on each statement as to whether
it was complete and well-formed or not. There were a series of guidelines and
examples as to what the [experimenter] meant. … After the instructions had
been read, the [subject] was asked to tell the [experimenter] what he had un-
derstood his instructions to be, and any confusions or omissions were corrected”
(p. 91). Apparently Spencer (or her editors) did not consider it important to de-
scribe the details of these instructions, but they are crucial for interpreting the
results. If they did not correspond to the concept of grammaticality that linguists
use, then we have a confounding variable.22 The stimulus sentences were drawn
from six linguistic articles, and had all been labeled unequivocally good or bad
by the original author. Unfortunately, none of the sentences are reported in the
paper. Newmeyer (1983) surmises, on the basis of the source articles, that many
of them were pragmatically very odd and required an unusual context to sound
acceptable. Spencer’s design was intended to draw out two possible results that
would undermine linguists’ use of their own intuitions: intersubject variation
by naive subjects on allegedly clear cases, and naive subject consensus that con-
flicted with a linguist’s judgment. There was also a check for consistency: six
randomly chosen sentences were resubmitted for judgment at the end of the ex-
perimental session, and subjects who contradicted themselves on three or more
of these had all their results discarded.
The first result was that an average of 81.4% of the 150 sentences were consid-
ered clear cases, as defined by the degree of consensus among subjects. At least
65% in each group gave the same rating (either good or bad, there were no other
available answers). That is, the division between accepters and rejecters had to
be at least 15% from an even split. But this is not a particularly strong consen-
sus; 35% of the subjects could still have disagreed. If a 75% criterion had been
set, the percentage of clear cases would have been lower. Spencer does not pro-
vide figures from which we can calculate it exactly. She acknowledges that her
choice of cut-off is arbitrary. (For comparison, Snow & Meijer (1977) report 20%
of their sentences as unclear cases among naive native speakers. Their definition
of unclear is that a sentence received approximately equal numbers of accep-
tances and rejections.) As for whether naive and nonnaive subjects differed in
their responses, it is impossible to be certain on the basis of Spencer’s reported
figures, for two reasons. First, while she shows that the proportion of sentences
22 Newmeyer (1983) makes this criticism as well.
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accepted by the two groups differs by 6%, she reports no statistical test of signif-
icance for this difference. Second, this comparison would not reveal a situation
where the groups differed on which sentences were accepted, but total numbers
of acceptances happened to come out roughly the same. Spencer merely states
that there were “no noticeable differences in the distribution of exemplars found
unacceptable, unclear, and acceptable.”23
As for comparing the subjects to the linguist authors, 73 of the 150 sentences
showed disagreement, defined by the subjects’ pooled rating being either unclear
or opposite to that of the linguist. Table 4.1 (from Spencer (1973)) gives a break-
down of the results. Of the disagreements, 81%were unanimous across the subject
groups, and in the majority of the remaining cases it was the naive subjects who
disagreed with the linguists while the nonnaive subjects agreed, but again this
difference is not analyzed for significance. We must keep in mind, however, that
this 50% disagreement rate is made up by comparing the pooled judgments of 65
subjects with that of an individual linguist, a point that many subsequent articles
have emphasized. Thus, while we can certainly conclude that the published judg-
ments did not show a good correspondence with the population as a whole, we
crucially cannot conclude that linguists as a group have systematically different
judgments from nonlinguists. A comparison with any single randomly chosen
naive subject could well have shown just as much disagreement. Nevertheless,
Spencer concludes that linguists should not trust their intuitions: “It is reason-
able to state that the judgments of the linguists used are representative of many
linguists as a group,” since there had not been any published rebuttals in the 4–5
years since the original articles appeared. But there are many possible alternative
explanations for that state of affairs. As for the direction of the disagreements,
the table shows that on 42 sentences nonlinguists were more accepting, while
on 17 they were more stringent and on 14 they were mixed. This pattern, though
not overwhelming, contradicts Ross’s findings that linguists are more accepting
on average.24 Thus, the only firm recommendation we can draw from this study
is that a reasonable sample size be used in determining the representativeness of
judgments; we cannot conclude that this sample should not consist of linguists.
Despite the less-than-convincing nature of her findings, Spencer goes on to
make the familiar point that linguists who use only their own intuitions as data
are really no different from trained introspectionists, whose intuitions ended up
23 For Spencer, an unclear sentence is one on which the subjects did not show consensus by the
measure defined above.
24 If we expect that linguists should be more aware of their actual speech tendencies than un-
trained speakers, then this result also contradicts the general recommendation of Hindle &
Sag (1975) to trust “OK” judgments more than stars.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Linguists’ and Nonlinguists’ Acceptability Judgments
(Spencer 1973)
Judgment (+ = acceptable; − = unacceptable; ± = unclear case)
Number of sentences
Linguist
(as published) Naive group Nonnaive group Total
Consensual Agreement
51 + + +
26 − − − 77
Consensual Disagreement
17 + − or ± − or ±
42 − + or ± + or ± 59
Judgments Mixed
3 + + − or ± 3
4 + − or ± +
7 − + or ± − 11
being totally removed from the layman’s experiences (see Section 2.4 for a dis-
cussion of of introspectionism in psychology). In addition to the possibility that
linguists’ theoretical perspectives influence their judgments, she suggests that
working with many sentences revolving around a given issue might also con-
tribute to context biases in their judgments. That is, satiation first leads to a loss
of symbol meaning, then illusory changes occur in the form and meaning of the
sentences, constrained by the context (e.g., one’s theory).25 Thus, the linguist can
reperceive and reorganize a sentence after repeated consideration, taking into ac-
count the theoretical constructs that it bears on. Finally, Spencer addresses the
question of whether linguist/nonlinguist differences might not in fact be a good
thing:
It might be claimed that any difference between linguists and naive speakers
found in this experiment is due to the increased awareness and sophistica-
tion in language that linguists have developed through their study. Perhaps
linguists are simply more sensitive to language and therefore are able to
25 This notion of the effects of satiation derives from experiments such as those of Taylor &
Henning (1963). They used a tape loop of a short phrase or sentence repeated for 15 minutes.
When the instructions suggested that the stimulus would change, subjects perceived illusory
changes. Furthermore, the number of non-English forms they perceived among these changes
was heavily increased when they were told to expect non-English forms. Thus, the context
constrained illusory variation.
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detect finer differentiations than naive speakers in intuitions concerning
natural language, rather than creating differentiations which do not exist
within the natural language. If linguists are dealing with artifacts, however,
nonnaive speakers, who have studied modern linguistics, should perform in
a manner similar to naive speakers. Thus, to anticipate this criticism, non-
naive speakers also participated in the experiment. (p. 90)
Of course there is a certain Catch-22 quality to this last point. One could always
counter that, however much linguistic training these nonnaive subjects had, it
did not raise them to the same level of linguistic sophistication as practicing
linguists, and so the latter’s judgments might still be valid. Conversely, if the
nonnaive subjects behave more like linguists than like naive subjects, one could
maintain that linguists’ judgments were artifactual and that the nonnaive sub-
jects had too much linguistic training, such that they were exhibiting the same
biases as linguists. Thus, subjects with some knowledge of linguistics can never
be used to decide this issue definitively. What is needed is truly naive subjects
who nonetheless have been given a very good understanding of what is meant by
grammaticality.26 (One might, however, question whether this is possible even
in principle.)
At least three other studies have compared linguist and nonlinguist judgments
directly.27 One of these was an informal experiment conducted by Greenbaum
(1988: 93, fn. 4) that was similar to Spencer’s and found similar results. Another,
reported in a very brief article, is by Rose (1973). Rose also took his stimulus
items from linguistic articles, asking subjects to classify them as acceptable or
unacceptable (details of the method are not given). Half of the subjects were told
to play the role of an editorial assistant working for a strict editor, while the other
half had to play the role of a person attempting to help a foreign friend speak
properly. Rose states that, overall, subjects agreed with the linguist authors 89%
of the time. I assume this is a percentage of the total individual judgments, rather
26 I am aware of only two paradigms that have systematically addressed the issue of training
naive subjects. Ryan & Ledger (1984) found that explicit training on how to perform a gram-
maticality judgment task did not improve the performance of their kindergarten-age subjects,
while McDaniel & Cairns (1990) found that training did help even their 4-year-old subjects.
27 The only other empirical basis we have for comparing linguists and nonlinguists would have
to come from separate studies that use the same procedure but with different kinds of sub-
jects. For example, a study by Elliot, Legum &Thompson (1969) used mostly linguists, whereas
Greenbaum’s (1973) replication, described in Section 5.2.2, used all nonlinguists and got differ-
ent results, but Greenbaum tried to eliminate other procedural problems with the design of
Elliot, Legum & Thompson (1969), so the studies are no longer directly comparable. This is the
only such instance I am aware of.
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than a pooled scheme like Spencer used. This number is not nearly as informa-
tive as Spencer’s, since it could represent a variety of scenarios, such as each
sentence showing strong agreement, or most showing uniform agreement and
some showing uniform disagreement. A chi-square analysis showed that linguist
judgments and subject judgments were significantly related, but we have no in-
dication as to which direction the disagreements took. There was no difference
between the two roles played by subjects.
Snow &Meijer’s (1977) second experiment repeated the procedures of the first,
as reported in Section 4.2, but used eight linguists as subjects, allowing direct
comparison with the results of their nonlinguist group. The linguists showed sig-
nificantly greater within-subject consistency than the nonlinguists in the first
experiment: 94.3% on the absolute judgments. In part this might be attributable
to a bias towards “−” responses, which exceeded that of nonlinguists. (The au-
thors do not report sentence-by-sentence comparisons, so we cannot say with
certainty how often linguists were more stringent than nonlinguists; there is no
basis for comparison with Ross or Spencer on this issue.) Linguists’ consistency
between absolute ratings and rank-orderings was also significantly higher, and
they showed greater between-subjects agreement, with Kendall coefficients of be-
tween .581 and .844. As for whether the linguists’ judgments differed from those
of the nonlinguists, the mean rankings of sentences by the two groups showed a
high correlation (Spearman ρ = .89), as did the absolute ratings (ρ = .84). While
this is a higher rate of agreement than Spencer found, we must consider that
Snow & Meijer use the mean ratings of a group of linguists, rather than a sin-
gle linguist’s judgments. Also, as they themselves point out, Spencer counted as
disagreements any cases where nonlinguists showed disagreement among them-
selves; this was not taken account of in Snow &Meijer’s study. Thus, the two rat-
ings are not directly comparable. The authors draw a number of methodological
conclusions, including the interesting suggestion that while comparing absolute
judgments with rank-orderings provides a useful check of judgmental consis-
tency, the fact that a sentence is judged inconsistently might say more about
the sentence than about the quality of the judges, for instance that it has some
shifty properties. With regard to the implications of linguists’ higher consistency
of judgment, they suggest two alternative interpretations. Either linguists have
learned to ignore minor irrelevant differences among sentences, such as their se-
mantic plausibility, or they have learned to apply their theory to unclear cases.
The extent to which each of these turns out to be right will obviously determine
whether this improved consistency is a desirable property.
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Valian (1982) has explored in some detail the parallels between linguists’ use
of their own judgments and expert judgment in other fields. She argues that lin-
guists giving judgments are in relevant respects just like experts judging wine,
tea, or cheese, so to the extent that the latter have proven to be useful, in fact
essential (e.g., in maintaining uniform taste of a product year after year), the
former could also. It is instructive to enumerate these parallels. Tasters, like lin-
guists, are fallible, but their errors are within acceptable limits, and they know
their task well enough to be able to take systematic steps to reduce the likelihood
of error. For example, they arrange their samples in a particular order, not tasting
a heavy-bodied wine before a light-bodied one. Linguists are similarly aware that
order of judgment can affect their intuitions. Tasters have a priori biases, e.g., by
being Bordeaux lovers rather than burgundy lovers, which makes them differen-
tially sensitive to certain tastes. Similarly, linguists clearly have a priori biases.
Tasters also come at their task with prior information about the samples they are
tasting, e.g., what region a wine is from. Linguists’ theories similarly provide a
classification of sentences that are judged. In both cases, this additional informa-
tion can allow finer judgments to be made and can focus attention on particular
aspects of a sample. Valian argues that to have a completely open mind about the
material at hand is to lack any experience with it, which results in the inability to
make consistent or fine discriminations. In the case of wine, things may all taste
the same. Some people excel at different kinds of judgments than others do. In
general, while all kinds of judgments are in some sense subjective, this does not
mean they cannot be reliable and valid, especially when we acknowledge that
there are strategies we can adopt for making them so.
4.4.2 Literacy and Education
Birdsong (1989: 31–44), Bialystok & Ryan (1985), and Masny & d’Anglejan (1985)
provide extensive reviews of research examining the relationship between lit-
eracy, education, and metalinguistic skills, including grammaticality judgments,
and comment on the debate over which one(s) might be prerequisite(s) for the
other(s). Bialystok (1986) suggests that schooling contributes to her dimension
of linguistic control, implicated in the ability to objectify language for judging
purposes, while literacy adds to one’s analyzed knowledge. (See Section 6.2.1 for
more discussion of this model.) I present here a few studies from this field.
The largest and most fascinating project on this topic was conducted by Scrib-
ner & Cole (1981), who did several years of field work among the Vai people of
Liberia. These people have invented their own syllabic writing system, which is
taught to some children in the home. Formal schooling, for those who manage
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to get it, is conducted in English; some Vai also know Arabic. Scribner & Cole
were interested in teasing apart the effects of schooling and literacy, and so the
fact that there were Vai monoliterates who had no formal schooling was cru-
cial.28 It was their hypothesis that writing contributes to the objectification of
language, independent of any general cognitive advantages it might entail. (In
fact, they found very little evidence that literacy in either Vai or Arabic produces
advantages for problem solving or other cognitive tasks.) More specifically, they
believed that deliberate written composition in one’s native language increases
one’s understanding of its formal properties, an idea that dates back to Vygotsky.
Scribner & Cole used three kinds of metalinguistic task to test this theory. The
first involved orally presenting paired sentences, one good and one bad, and ask-
ing subjects to choose the good one and explain why the other one was bad. Ex-
amples (5) and (6) below give rough English equivalents of the type of structures
involved:
(5) a. He shot me at the gun.
b. He shot the gun at me.
(6) a. These children, what is its name?
b. These children, what are their names?
The second task called for subjects to explicitly identify some grammatical prin-
ciple of Vai. This is illustrated in (7), where the relevant distinction is alienable
versus inalienable possession.
(7) People say “my (ŋ) father,” but “my (na) book”; they say “my (ŋ) sibling,”
but “my (na) wife.” Why do people sometimes say ŋ and sometimes say
na?
(Apparently a wife is viewed as an acquired possession rather than a relative.)
Subjects’ explanations on these two tasks were scored on a scale of 0–7. Zero de-
noted irrelevant answers, such as “The old people say it like that,” “Bad Vai,” and
“Not a good Vai speaker.” A score of 1 was given to responses that claimed the
sentence was semantically inappropriate, and higher scores denoted increasing
degrees of grammatical relevance. While all groups were able to identify the bad
sentence in the first task, their explanation abilities on the two tasks differed ac-
cording to literacy and education. On one survey, the average explanation scores
28 I should point out that theirs was a huge anthropological and psychological study, of which
the metalinguistic tasks reported here constituted a tiny part.
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were 3.9 for illiterate speakers, 4.6 for Vai literate speakers, and 5.6 for Vai-Arabic
biliterate speakers. A replication found scores of 2.3, 2.9, and 3.2, respectively.
Multiple regression analysis showed that, of all the demographic data that were
available about the subjects, Vai literacy was the only factor that predicted these
differences.29
The third task involved correcting errors of various types (shown in (8)) and
explaining what was wrong with an ungrammatical sentence.
(8) a. My child is crying yesterday.
b. This house is fine very.
c. I don’t want to bother you (plural) because you (singular) are
working.
d. This is the chief’s child first.
e. These men, where is he going?
f. They have planting the oranges.
On this task explanations were scored on a scale of 0–5. The authors provide
Table 4.2, summarizing the number of errors fixed correctly and the total of the
explanation scores on the six sentences. Here the regression analysis showed
that schooling was the biggest contributor to explanation scores, and Vai liter-
acy was also a factor. It is important to note that literate and performed equally
well on other tasks examining their ability to explain things, so the effect seen in
this experiment is specific to the linguistic content of the problem. We can con-
clude from this work that literacy and schooling have little effect on the ability to
identify ungrammaticality, and hence to make grammaticality judgments in the
narrow sense, but both factors appear to affect explicit grammatical knowledge,
and hence will confound many other metalinguistic tasks.30
29 Interestingly, similar differences were found by Liles, Shulman & Bartlett (1977) when com-
paring the judgments of children with language disorders versus unaffected children. They
found that children with language disorders not only make fewer accurate judgments on cer-
tain types of syntactic errors, but they can recognize some errors without being able to cor-
rect them, whereas unaffected children have almost no trouble correcting detected errors. In
this case, however, the authors suggest that inferior production skills might be responsible,
although their reasoning is quite speculative.
30 A similar result in another domain is reported by Reed & Lave (1979), also based on work
in Liberia. These authors examined the arithmetic abilities of Vai and Gola tailors to assess
the contribution of formal Western education as compared to traditional apprenticeship. Their
findings suggest that these abilities can be very domain-specific: the same problem framed
in terms of monetary units may be more difficult than when framed in terms of numbers of
buttons to be sewn on pants, for instance. They also found that the types of errors made differ
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Vai Error Correction and Explanation as a Function of
Literacy (Scribner & Cole 1981)
Maximum Arabic Vai Schooled
possible score Nonliterate monoliterate monoliterate literate
Number correct 6 5.1 4.5 5.0 5.6
Explanation score 30 6.9 8.1 9.9 15.7
Other researchers of literacy effects include Scholes & Willis (1987), who stud-
ied 10 English-speaking illiterate adults and found that they seem to process sen-
tences withoutmaking use of all the syntactic information available. For instance,
they report anecdotally that a spoken sentence like The window in the room with
the chair was broken is taken to mean that the chair got broken.31 Birdsong (1989)
cites other work by these authors suggesting that illiterate speakers are insen-
sitive to passive morphology, and that they judge grammaticality according to
pragmatic validity and moral correctness or desirability. Scholes & Willis con-
clude that illiterate speakers have vastly different grammars from literate speak-
ers, but Birdsong counters that their judgments might be based on different crite-
ria, without the underlying grammars necessarily differing. Heeschen (1978) had
similar experiences with the Eipo, an illiterate, neolithic horticultural people of
West New Guinea. He states that they are “uneasy and unsuccessful” in trying
to objectify language, and concludes that 90% of their grammaticality judgments
of possible but rarely occurring verbal affix combinations were simply wrong.32
However, their judgments on word order were “absolutely correct.” Heeschen
suggests why this difference should be found: some affix combinations are rare
and hence hard to see as correct out of context, whereas word order is a feature
of every utterance that cannot be avoided. This hypothesis is supported by the
fact that in natural situations (e.g., when native speakers corrected him in con-
versation), as opposed to structured judgment tasks, “their judgments as native
speakers proved to be perfectly reliable” (p. 177). Thus, at least for this culture,
systematically between the two groups with different types of education, and seem to reflect
the different ways in which arithmetic is taught in school versus on the job. The general result
is that skill in applying knowledge to a particular domain does not always imply the ability to
use that knowledge in the abstract.
31 One might suspect the presence of some third, pathological factor affecting both ability to
acquire literacy skills and ability to comprehend sentences, but Scholes & Willis’s very brief
description gives no indication of such a factor.
32 Heeschen does not explain how he determined what the correct forms actually were.
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it seems that illiteracy does not imply the inability to make accurate judgments,
but just makes it hard to do so in an abstract context.
4.4.3 Other Experiential Factors
As in the previous section, I conclude with a collection of remarks on other types
of experience that might systematically affect judgments of grammaticality. The
most obvious would be the amount of experience with the language in question.
There have been numerous studies of metalinguistic skill in nonnative learners
of a second language, as part of the second-language teaching literature, which
is beyond the scope of this investigation (see Ellis (1991) for a review). Clearly,
one would expect nonnative speakers to differ from their native counterparts in
judgments as well as in language use, but the results of a third experiment in
Snow & Meijer’s (1977) study (see also Sections 4.2 and 4.4.1) suggest that native
intuitions may be acquired independently of native skill in language use.
This experiment involved the same procedure as was used in Snow & Meijer’s
first and second studies, this time with nonnative speakers of Dutch as subjects.
Their within-subject consistency was at least as good as that of native speakers,
but predictably they showed more between-subject disagreements, since their
degree of familiarity with Dutch was not matched. Nonetheless, their pooled
judgments agreed somewhat better with the native speaker group than those
of the linguists did. And, surprisingly, the three virtually bilingual non-natives
did not match the native group better than the remaining poorer Dutch speak-
ers (as measured by correlations in rank-ordering). The authors interpret this to
mean that one’s skill in speaking a language can improve without one’s syntac-
tic intuitions becoming more nativelike.33 Conversely, they suggest that classics
scholars, for instance, show the opposite: they develop strong intuitions without
being able to speak the language. Together with the large amount of variation in
judgments among native speakers found in the first two experiments, Snow &
Meijer’s results lead them to conclude that speaking and understanding involve
a different language faculty from judging, since skill in one is not a good pre-
dictor of skill in the other. On the other hand, Coppieters (1987) claims that his
subjects appeared to have achieved native levels of production and comprehen-
sion, and yet their judgments were significantly different from those of native
speakers. But, as discussed in Section 3.5, Coppieters’s study had not actually
shown that the two groups were identical in their use of the crucial forms, but
33 Chaudron (1983) points out that there were only eight nonnative subjects in this experiment
altogether, so due caution is advised in interpreting the results.
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only on unrelated general measures of fluency, mastery of various constructions,
and so forth. Thus, we have no basis for concluding that nonnative speakers dis-
play differences unique to their judgments. More likely, their grammars simply
differ from those of natives on the points investigated, and this would show up in
everyday use as well if these constructions occurred. It has also been proposed
that experience in another language (e.g., bilingualism) leads to differences in
metalinguistic ability (Van Kleeck 1982; Bialystok 1986; see Section 5.3.2).
One would expect certain types of nonlinguistic experience to influence judg-
ments as well, for example, factual world knowledge, and cultural and social
experiences and beliefs. Greenbaum’s (1977c) review cites correlations between
judgments and occupation or socioeconomic class, without elaborating. Svartvik
& Wright (1977) found differences on judgments by 14-to-17-year-olds concern-
ing the use of ought correlated with the different academic standing of three
groups of English schools they attended. I am not aware of any studies show-
ing that these variables can affect structural judgments. A purported example of
howworld knowledge is relevant to grammaticality is provided by Belletti (1988).
According to her, the following two sentences involving subject postposing con-





























The crucial difference here is claimed to be that we can assume people normally
own only one wallet, but the same is not true for a plant. If this is true, some-
one from a different culture presumably would not show this distinction. Un-
fortunately, according to one native speaker I consulted (Mirco Ghini, personal
communication), while (9b) does require the presupposition of a unique plant
that the speaker is referring to, it is structurally fine. In fact, it represents the
unmarked word order for expressing this idea, and is clearly better than other
starred examples given by Belletti that do seem to violate structural constraints.
Evidently, a systematic investigation of this point is called for. G. Lakoff (1971)
has argued that the well-formedness of a sentence can never be assessed without
reference to a set of presuppositions about the nature of the world, and cites nu-
merous sentences where people differ in this regard. For example, whether My
cat enjoys tormenting me is grammatical depends on whether one believes cats
to have minds. In cultures where events are believed to have this property, the
equivalent ofMy birth enjoys tormenting me is perfectly normal. Similarly, Lakoff
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has argued that grammaticality judgments of John called Mary a Republican and
then she insulted him depend on the speaker’s beliefs, and perhaps even on John’s
and Mary’s. Chomsky (1972) argues instead that such sentences should be con-
sidered grammatical regardless of anyone’s beliefs, and that it should be left to
the semantic component of the grammar to specify the presuppositions they re-
quire. (See also Bar-Hillel (1971), who argues against those who feel “obliged to
force a clearly pragmatic matter into a syntactico-semantic straitjacket.”)
4.5 Conclusion
The studies reviewed in this chapter show that a considerable proportion of indi-
vidual differences in grammaticality judgments can be attributed to specific lin-
guistically relevant features of the person, be they inborn or the result of experi-
ence. Nonetheless, we can be fairly certain that there remainsmuch variation that
we cannot factor out in this way. In this regard grammaticality judgments are like
most other forms of behavior, including other metalinguistic tasks such as am-
biguity detection (Kess & Hoppe 1983). A common genetic endowment provides
for a certain degree of commonality, and certain gross parameters of variation,
but beyond that differences abound. This state of affairs, however immutable,
presents frustrating problems once we acknowledge that the study of grammar,
while in principle a study of each individual’s mental structures, must appeal to
the judgments of many individuals. However, before we resign ourselves com-
pletely, we should consider that not all the variation that shows up within and
across experiments is attributable to real differences between subjects. Subtle dif-
ferences in procedures or in the sentences themselves can add error to the actual
variation. In the next chapter I turn my attention to such confounding sources.
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Meander (a linguist): I have a theory that everybody’s eyes are colourless.
Simplon (a psychologist): But, Meander, everybody’s eyes look brown, blue or
green to me.
Meander: That’s because they are actually wearing contact lenses to color their
eyes.
Simplon: But, Meander, I know that I don’t wear contact lenses, and when I look
in the mirror my eyes look blue to me.
Meander: Ah: but then, there’s a lot we don’t know about mirrors.
(Bever 1974)1
5.1 Introduction
By now it should not be a surprise to find that grammaticality judgments may
vary depending upon the procedure by which they are obtained and properties
of the stimulus items that are presented. In fact, the latter assertion might seem
tautologous. Obviously, if judgments are to be of any value they must vary de-
pending on the sentences being judged. My focus here, therefore, will be on vari-
ation caused by factors that are irrelevant to the concept that we are trying to
access through grammaticality judgments, namely grammaticality. Clearly there
is room for disagreement here, since what should count towards grammaticality
is a matter of theoretical assumption or fiat. Similarly, whether an experimental
procedure interferes with grammaticality judgments depends on one’s view of
how best to obtain them. For themost part, the variables I examine in this chapter
would be uncontroversially labeled as confounds by the majority of linguists.
Even where there is disagreement, for instance, as to whether context is a nui-
sance or an integral part of the grammaticality of a sentence, systematic study
1 Tom Bever (personal communication) states that this is a dialogue version of a joke attributed
to Haj Ross.
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should lead to a better understanding of the phenomenon, and thus improve the
linguist’s chances of designing effective elicitation procedures. The recommen-
dations I make on the basis of the research reviewed here reflect my own point
of view on the nature of grammaticality.
This chapter is essentially a top-down survey of the experimental literature.
Section 5.2 covers features of the elicitation process as a whole, beginning with
what subjects are asked to do, that is, how the procedure of judging grammat-
icality is explained to them (Section 5.2.1).2 This issue will pervade the entire
chapter, since differences in instructions could be largely to blame for the stag-
gering discrepancies among experiments, and much of the existing literature is
undermined because vague instructions make many of the results virtually un-
interpretable. 3 Then I examine the effects of the order in which sentences are
presented for judgment (Section 5.2.2). The next three subsections largely follow
the research program of one experimenter, Hiroshi Nagata, whose initial work
looked at the effects of repeated exposure to the same sentences (Section 5.2.3).
This also raises the issue of intrasubject consistency, which was a subsidiary
concern of several other experimenters mentioned in this chapter. Later work
by Nagata and others brought in mental state manipulations and their interac-
tion with repetition (Section 5.2.4), and sought support for his hypothesized ex-
planations by correlation with subjects who were explicitly told to use certain
judgment strategies (Section 5.2.5). The subsequent subsection explores the least-
studied procedural variable, which nonetheless could arguably have the great-
est impact on judgments – namely, the presentation modality (spoken versus
written). Closely tied up with this is the matter of register, since together these
two factors define to a large degree the nature of the discourse situation, and
hence how grammatically strict or permissive we are liable to be as listeners
(Section 5.2.6). Finally, I take a brief look at speed of judgment (Section 5.2.7).
Section 5.3 takes a closer look at the properties of stimulus materials them-
selves. I begin with the role of the context in which the sentence is situated. I
restrict the term context to the purely linguistic context, ignoring social factors
2 I do not concern myself here with the much larger question of the range of tasks one might
use to elicit information about acceptability. This was discussed to some degree in Section 3.2;
further exploration is beyond the scope of this book, since my focus is on judgments.
3 One feature of the task instructions not covered explicitly in this chapter is the type of judg-
ment required: good/bad or numeric rating or relative ranking. This issue is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.4. I also omit mention of certain standard confounding effects that psychologists typi-
cally seek to avoid but that do not seem to have any special impact in the domain of language




that obviously influence acceptability in the broader sense (see van Dijk (1977)
for a discussion of social factors). Nevertheless, the term context is used in at
least four different ways (Section 5.3.1). My next concern is the extent to which
the meaning of a sentence, or the apparent lack of meaning, affects people’s
judgments of grammaticality, in cases where (we assume) it is an orthogonal is-
sue (Section 5.3.2). I then ask the same question about how easily a sentence is
parsed (Section 5.3.3) and the (perceived) frequency of occurrence of sentences of
the same type (Section 5.3.4). The final two subsections concern the level of indi-
vidual words: what happens when one word is replaced by another that is gram-
matically equivalent (Section 5.3.5), or with one that is grammatically identical
(Section 5.3.6). Some potential stimulus variables do not have separate headings
devoted to them in this chapter. Intonation is mentioned briefly in conjunction
with modality in Section 5.2.6. Its written counterpart, punctuation, does not ap-
pear to have been studied for its effects on grammaticality judgments in general
(but see Levelt (1974) for some discussion of its possible effects), although it is
occasionally mentioned anecdotally in other types of psycholinguistic studies.
The most detailed work I am aware of on the linguistic significance of punctua-
tion is by Steegar (1975), who analyzes its relation to prosody. Finally, Section 5.4
summarizes the major implications of the reviewed research.
5.2 Procedural Factors
5.2.1 Instructions
Hill (1961) performed some of the earliest investigations into the nature of gram-
maticality judgments. He used 10 subjects, of which 3 were linguists and sev-
eral others were English professors, which should immediately lead us to sus-
pect that his results will not generalize to the population at large. They were
instructed to “reject any sentences which were ungrammatical, and to accept
those which were grammatical,” but there was apparently no definition or expla-
nation of these terms given, nor any examples of their application. The results
and anecdotal comments he reports show that subjects had no clear notion of
the concept of grammaticality. For instance, while all 10 subjects rejected Those
man left early, 6 of them accepted The child seems sleeping. Even more troubling
is the fact that two rejecters of the sentence I never heard a green horse smoke
a dozen oranges changed their judgments to accept it once it was pointed out
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to them that the sentence was true.4 Other subjects explained their acceptance
of a sentence by saying that “it sounds like poetry”5 or rejected a sentence be-
cause it did not start with a capital letter. The conclusion to be drawn from all
this should be obvious: even subjects who are supposedly experts on language
cannot be expected to know what linguists mean by grammatical (or acceptable,
for that matter).6 If you do not explain to subjects what you want, each one
takes his or her own interpretation and the results are meaningless. This criti-
cism was made in the same journal volume by Chomsky (1961); see Lees (1976)
for another response to Hill, including an enlightening analogy to a chemistry
experiment in which most informants fail to report that iron rusts in water, for
various irrelevant reasons – a demonstration of the pitfalls of a naive research
strategy. We will see in Section 5.3.2 that Maclay & Sleator (1960) encountered
the same problem with linguistically naive subjects. Carden (1976a) was able to
avoid contaminating his data with such cases because he used face-to-face inter-
views. He discovered that one of his subjects rejected all imperative sentences
because he would have added please to them! In a very widely cited passage,
Carden (1970a) states, “You must define ‘grammatical’ or ‘acceptable,’ words that
naive informants use in widely varying ways. It is of no value to know that 13
informants consider a sentence acceptable unless you know that they mean the
same thing by ‘acceptable’.” Bley-Vroman, Felix & Ioup (1988) found that mini-
mal instructions led to highly inconsistent responses in their pilot studies, while
more detailed instructions with examples led to 90% agreement among their ex-
perimental subjects. Coleman (1965), Quirk & Svartvik (1966), Schnitser (1973),
Cohen (1981), Greenbaum (1977c), Newmeyer (1983), and Botha (1973) make sim-
ilar points. Birdsong (1989) suggests that the problem is particularly acute when
the forms in question occur in speech but are proscribed in writing.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in previous chapters andwill continue to see in
this one, many studies have fallen into exactly the same trap. In fact, if we were
to ignore all studies in which we believe the instructions to subjects were inade-
4 Quirk & Svartvik (1966) respond to this particular finding by disparaging the whole paradigm:
“When the notion of what is grammatical is confounded with eternal verities, it is time to look
for other techniques of investigation” (p. 12).
5 This and other irrelevant reactions are taken by Lees (1976) as evidence that, contrary to Hill’s
conclusion, his subjects in fact demonstrated even greater knowledge of language than was
attributed to them by Chomsky’s claims, which Hill believed he had refuted.
6 Actually, it is not even clear that linguists agree among themselves as to what exactly is sup-
posed to count towards grammaticality. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the concept changes as
the theory evolves. At the very least, researchers must clarify this point in their own minds
before trying to design a set of instructions.
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quate to convey the subtlety of a linguistic definition, the remaining studies could
likely be counted on one hand.Thus, I will continue my practice of describing the
experimenter’s instructions in considerable detail, in order that the usefulness of
the results can be assessed. But in order to make any progress, we will have to
assume that the major findings would hold up under more careful procedures.
(Therefore, some of Hill’s other results will be reported in subsequent sections.)
This is not meant to condone the existing practice or deny the need for repli-
cation, but merely to accept the fact that somewhat confounded data are better
than none at all. By way of ending on a positive note, I also occasionally report
instances of very well designed instructions, and proposals for how to test their
effectiveness. For instance, Chaudron (1983) suggests asking subjects what they
consider to be valid judgment criteria, and how they make use of these criteria
in particular sentences. See Greenbaum &Quirk (1970) for an examination of the
instructions surrounding performance tasks.
A recent experiment by (Cowart 1997: 55–59) suggests that as long as subjects
are given some explicit set of instructions, the exact contents of those instructions
might not matter a great deal, at least for some classes of sentence types. He
contrasted the same judgment experiment (which involved that-trace effects) run
with two different sets of directions regarding how subjects were to decide on
their responses. One set appealed to their prescriptive sense by invoking English
professors marking term papers, the other emphasized the absence of right or
wrong answers and appealed to personal reactions. This manipulation turned
out to have almost no effect on the pattern of responses. While such negative
findings are notoriously hard to interpret, this may be an indication that when
other factors are suitably controlled, instructions turn out to be fairly benign,
perhaps because subjects really do not have multiple judgment routines they
can invoke in such an experiment; regardless of the instructions, they will do the
only kind of judging they know how to do. It is up to the experimenter to design
stimuli that will not mislead them. My feeling is that due care is still advised in
handling instructions, because Cowart’s finding does not rule out the possibility
that instructions could interact with the type of sentence being judged.
Another important factor, arguably part of the instructions of a judgment task,
is the response scale required (Van Kleeck 1982), i.e., how many choices the sub-
jects have and how those choices are described. The former issue is addressed
at length in Section 3.3, where I show that little experimental work has looked
directly at the differences induced by changes of response scale (but see Cow-
art (1997: 67–77) for a relevant experiment), and that graded behavior could be
an artifact of the testing procedure. The issue of labeling the scale has received
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even less attention, so I attempt to bring it to the reader’s attention whenever
the details of an experimental response scale are published. Although some re-
searchers have given advice on this topic (see Section 6.3.2), I am not aware of
any research directed specifically at it. Bialystok (1979) did find that response
bias among her subjects differed depending on the amount of detail required.
When she asked for yes/no responses, subjects were biased toward saying “yes,”
but when she asked for specific kinds of errors to be identified, they were biased
toward finding some error, i.e., toward judging a sentence ungrammatical. Such
differences are expected under her theory since the various types of response
place different demands on the subjects’ analyzed knowledge and cognitive con-
trol (see Section 3.4).
5.2.2 Order of Presentation
Greenbaum (1973; 1976a) describes an experiment that looked at the effects of
order of presentation of sentences on judgments. It required nonlinguist subjects
to rate sentences containing participial while phrases attached in various places
in a sentence:
(1) a. Sophia Loren was seen by the people while enjoying herself.
b. The people saw Sophia Loren while enjoying themselves.
c. Judy was seen by the people while enjoying themselves.
d. The people saw Karen while enjoying herself.
Subjects had a choice of four responses to each sentence: “acceptable,” “uncertain,
but probably acceptable,” “uncertain, but probably unacceptable,” and “unaccept-
able.” Two subjects were assigned to each possible ordering of the four sentences,
and statistical analysis showed that the first sentence for each group was rated
significantly lower than the others. No significant effect was associated with
any other position in the list. Clearly, then, sentence order should be controlled
for, either by randomization or counterbalancing. The study was essentially a
replication of one by Elliot, Legum & Thompson (1969), who apparently used the
same order for all subjects, thus severely confounding their results. Problems re-
main with Greenbaum’s procedure as well, however. First, he apparently gave
his subjects no explanation of the term acceptable. Second, he ignored the stan-
dard psychological practice of using warm-up trials to get subjects comfortable
with the procedure. If he had done so, the effect of first position might have
been removed rather than just counterbalanced, thus reducing the amount of
variability in the scores. See Labov (1975: 21) for a review of these two studies
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and ensuing work. Greenbaum &Quirk (1970) also reported order effects in their
test batteries, both for judgment and performance tasks. In one case they found
a significant difference between the two orders (between-subjects groups) in the
number of subjects giving “grammatical” ratings for 5 out of 51 sentences tested.
Interestingly, relative rankings showed almost no changes as a result of varied
orders.
Certain effects of presentation order that arise due to relationships among
stimulus sentences will be treated as context effects in Section 5.3.1.
5.2.3 Repetition
Nagata has performed a number of experiments investigating the effect of re-
peated exposure to sentences on judgments of their grammaticality, and the in-
teraction of repetition with other manipulations. According to him, no previous
experiments had examined this variable systematically (and I am not aware of
any either), but it has important implications, because linguists, the most com-
mon producers of judgment data, often consider the grammaticality of sentences
many times over the course of investigating some theoretical issue. (Spencer
(1973) also speculates on the effects of repeated exposure to sentences on lin-
guists.) Thus, if we have reason to suspect that their judgments are not stable,
by the time they draw their conclusions their judgments might be quite differ-
ent from their first impressions. (This issue comes up again in Section 5.2.7.)
Nagata suggests a priori two possible outcomes of a repetition treatment, to
which I will add a third. He proposes that judgments might become more le-
nient (sentences might be considered more grammatical) because subjects would
construct additional linguistic or situational contexts for sentences, eventually
finding cases where even fairly bad sentences would be reasonably acceptable.
This would accord with the general psychological phenomenon of habituation,
whereby repeated exposure to the same stimulus has diminishing effect (e.g.,
the same painful prod will evoke less and less reaction). On the other hand, Na-
gata postulates, we might expect judgments to become more stringent as people
differentiate more syntactic or semantic properties of the sentence. That is, the
more they look at a sentence, the more things they might find wrong with it.
Graeme Hirst (personal communication) has suggested a third possible outcome,
namely that repetition might just increase subjects’ confidence in their original
judgments. In that case, we would expect a polarization of judgments, i.e., good
sentences would get better and bad sentences would get worse.
In his first study, Nagata (1988) performed three experiments to examine the
basic effect of repetition and its interaction with the presence of context. The
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procedure was essentially the same for many subsequent experiments as well.
His stimulus materials were pairs of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences
drawn from the Japanese linguistics literature, matched as closely as possible,
plus pairs of filler sentences. Whether the target sentences were considered good
or bad was determined on the basis of whether or not they received any question
marks or stars in the original source articles. Thus, the number of good and bad
sentences would be roughly equal; the total number of sentences was 48. Sub-
jects were asked to rate the extent to which the sentences were grammatical; i.e.,
“correctly expressed in Japanese,” on a scale from 1 to 20. They were told that
correct sentences should be rated as 1, while 2–20 indicated increasing degrees
of badness. Subjects were also told to make use of the full scale.7 First, the sen-
tences were presented one at a time in random order on a CRT and the subjects
were asked to give their numeric judgments of each, to be used as the baseline
measure. In the second part of the procedure, each sentence in turn was pre-
sented in a repetition phase, followed immediately by another judgment. In the
repetition phase, the sentence was displayed nine times in a row for 3 seconds
each time, with a 1-second pause between presentations. During these repeti-
tions, the subject was told to think of the grammaticality of the sentence. Then,
upon the tenth presentation the subject was asked once again to rate the sen-
tence. (The order of sentences in this part of the procedure was again random.)
The first, unsurprising, result was that the supposedly good sentences received
significantly better ratings than the bad ones both before and after repetition,
confirming that the a priori division was reasonable. Wayne Cowart (personal
communication) points out that this means the pattern of results, in terms of rel-
ative acceptability of sentences, was not affected by this manipulation. As for the
effects of repetition itself, the grammaticality ratings of both kinds of sentence
decreased significantly after repetition (i.e., the rating numbers were higher), as
compared to before. Nagata concludes that subjects were engaged in differentia-
tion rather than enrichment during the repetition phase. If this result is general,
we must reexamine why the theory of mere exposure has been widely accepted
in accounting for language change. It holds that as people hear a form more and
7 The only justification given by Nagata for the unusually large rating scale and its asymmetric
division (as opposed to making the best sentences 1, the worst 20, and the remainder evenly
spread in between) is that the same scheme was used byMoore (1972). But Moore himself gives
no justification for these choices. I can only speculate that theymight have been inspired by the
psychometric results mentioned in Section 3.3. I suggest that Nagata’s results might profitably
be replicated using a smaller, symmetrical rating scale, but it does not seem to me that his
scale would have biased the results. If anything, the large scale should increase variability in
the results and make it harder to find significant effects.
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more, they like it more, deem it more acceptable, etc.: “familiarity breeds con-
tent.”8 To the extent that this is true in language change, why is it not true in
Nagata’s repetition paradigm? Is the time span involved too short, i.e., is repeti-
tion in quick succession different from repetition over a long period of time? Is
the problem that all the repetitions come from the same source?
In the first follow-up experiment, the same sentences were used but the final
judgments were made with the sentence preceded by a context string.9 As com-
pared to postrepetition ratings in the first experiment, thewith-context condition
showed that ungrammatical sentences were judged significantly more grammat-
ical; they showed no significant change from the prerepetition ratings. Ratings
for the grammatical sentences did not differ significantly from either the postrep-
etition ratings in Experiment 1 or the prerepetition ratings in Experiment 2. Na-
gata believes that this points to a change in encoding or organization of the bad
sentences when embedded in context, somehow undoing the change induced
by repetition. Apparently, context had some mitigating effect for the good sen-
tences as well, since they failed to show the decrease in grammaticality found in
the first experiment. A second follow-up, in which context preceded the target
sentences before, during, and after repetition, confirmed the basic finding that
context blocks the repetition effect, supposedly because it provides a stabilizing
base for judgments.10 The prerepetition ratings were also compared with those
of the first experiment, allowing a direct analysis of the effect of context alone.
No significant differences were found, apparently contradicting numerous other
studies that found that context raises grammaticality ratings. Nagata suggests
that the effect of context was somewhat masked by a ceiling effect, i.e., the sen-
tences were already rated about as high as they could get. See Section 5.3.1 for
further discussion of this point.
In two subsequent studies (Nagata 1987a; 1987b), two alternative accounts of
the basic repetition findingwere ruled out. First, onemust consider the possibility
that the subjects’ use of the rating scale had changed, independent of repetition,
8 Attributed in Bradac et al. (1980) to Walker (1973). Of course, in everyday situations, repeated
exposure to a form is not accompanied by an instruction to ponder its grammaticality.
9 Nagata provides translations of his target and context strings only for the grammatical sen-
tences, of which I give two examples; the targets are italicized: (i) Look out of the window. It
is raining. (ii) What’s the matter with you? If you don’t eat, you’ll be hungry. Apparently the
nature of the bad sentences was such that reasonable contexts could still be provided for them.
10 Spencer (1973) cites several relevant background studies on repetition effects in word recog-
nition, among them one by Taylor & Henning (1963) that reportedly shows a similar type of
stabilizing effect: if subjects are told that they will hear only actual words, they do not re-
port that some of the repetitions sound like nonsense syllables, whereas subjects who expect
nonsense forms claim to hear them.
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because the first set of ratings were made before all the sentences had been seen.
Since subjects were told to use the full range of 20 values, and since they would
only know which were the best and worst sentences after the first round of rat-
ings, this is a distinct possibility. Thus, a new experiment was designed to seek
out such a trend. Sentences were all judged once, then all judged a second time
(in a different random order). Since no changes were found between first and sec-
ond ratings, a “change in the modulus of judgmental scale” account, as Nagata
calls it, is ruled out.11 This result appears to contradict Carden’s (1976b) survey
of a number of studies that examined the internal consistency of their data by
seeking a second rating from subjects some time after the initial data collection.
Many of these studies found the second rating to be highly inconsistent with the
first. However, Nagata was comparing mean ratings of all the good sentences
pooled and all the bad sentences pooled, not ratings for individual sentences –
a change could have been washed out by intersentence variability. A second po-
tential confound is satiation: prolonged repetition of symbols (e.g., words) has
been shown to lead to temporary loss of their meanings and concomitant illu-
sory changes in their perception (see Pynte (1991) for some recent work and a
review of the semantic satiation literature, and Section 7.2 on recent satiation
research by Snyder). If Nagata’s subjects reached satiation for the stimulus mate-
rials, the results do not necessarily bear on normal judgments. Since satiation is
a short-term phenomenon, this possibility was tested by looking for long-term
maintenance of the changes induced by repetition. The subjects from the orig-
inal experiment were retested on the same sentences 4 months later. Their re-
sults were not significantly different from the original postrepetition judgments,
and in most cases their ratings were still significantly higher than their origi-
nal prerepetition judgments. That is, whatever had changed in their approach to
these sentences still held long after any satiation effect would have worn off. But
had they encoded something specific to these 48 sentences, something that was
maintained in their minds for 4 months without reinforcement, or was it that
their judgment process in general had changed as a result of greater experience
with the task? Nagata does not consider the latter possibility, yet it strikes me
as somewhat more plausible, and could be easily tested. For instance, 4 months
after the repetition treatment one could give the same subjects novel sentences,
11 Nagata does not discuss the possibility that subjects could have remembered their initial rat-
ings and tried to be consistent by duplicating them the second time around. Since much less
time intervened between first and second ratings as compared to conditions in the repetition
experiment, the possibility is worth considering. However, given that there were 48 sentences
and 20 possible scores for each, and the two presentations were in different orders, I doubt
that accurate memory for one’s ratings would be possible.
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and compare their ratings to those of subjects who had never undergone repeti-
tion. If my interpretation is correct, the former group should show significantly
more stringent ratings.
A fourth study (Nagata 1989d) was designed to assess the extent to which the
repetition effect applies generally to sentence types other than those used ear-
lier. Its first experiment factored out the differential effects of repetition on sen-
tences marked with a question mark as opposed to a star in the original sources.
Nagata’s hypothesis was that the truly bad sentences could not get any worse
through repetition, but in fact both groups of sentences were rated worse in
postrepetition judgments. The second experiment used new stimulus materials
altogether, instances of the three types of violation identified by Chomsky (see
Section 3.3): incorrect lexical category, subcategorization violation, or selectional
restriction violation. Here he found that repetition had no significant effect on
any of the three types of badness. The latter two, in fact, did not show signifi-
cant differences between them. His explanation is that these violations were all
more blatant than those used in the earlier studies, which involved subtle uses
of particles, reflexives, and honorifics. A more blatant violation might be easier
for subjects to detect and explain, so they might tend to anchor more on ini-
tial judgments and resist change. Thus, at least for ungrammatical sentences, the
repetition effect has limited external validity.
The only other study I am aware of that has involved repeated judgments of
the same stimuli is one by Carroll (1979). The issue for Carroll was the extent to
which complex compound nouns such as girl that irons her clothes doll (referring
to a doll that looks like a girl and that irons her clothes) are judged acceptable in a
sentential context as a function of the syntactic structure of the elements making
up the compound. He was cognizant of the potential for a change in use of the
(5-point) rating scale on the basis of the range of stimuli he was presenting, espe-
cially since subjects might never have seen such complex compounds before, and
so he asked his subjects to make a second pass through the sentences, judging
them again. While the mean ratings of several sentences did increase from the
first to the second judgment, Carroll does not analyze the differences for statisti-
cal significance, so we cannot compare his results to those of Nagata. However,
the statistical tests that were performed show that there were fewer significant
differences among the 10 sentence types in the second set of judgments than in
the first. Apparently, subjects see the range of sentences as more homogeneous
the second time around. This study can also be held up as a rare example of one
that took care to ensure that subjects had a strong understanding of the basis
on which they were to make their judgments. Carroll gave example sentences
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with their ratings, discussed why the ratings had been chosen, and encouraged
questions about the rating system (see Carroll 1979: 874–875).
5.2.4 Mental State
The next step in Nagata’s project was to investigate the interaction of repeti-
tion with mental state, specifically the effect of objective versus subjective self-
awareness. Before describing his study, I digress briefly to explore the nature and
history of this manipulation and its application to language. There is a standard
operational technique from social psychology that is used to manipulate the in-
trospective set of subjects, inspired by the social facilitation effect: observation
of yourself or others engaged in the same activity makes you do that activity
more intensely. For example, people will ride a bike faster if they see other peo-
ple riding bikes. Duval & Wicklund (1972) brought together a large number of
findings in this area and unified them under the theoretical distinction of sub-
jective versus objective self-awareness, states of consciousness directed at the
external environment or at oneself, respectively. By their definitions, subjective
self-awareness (SSA) is a state of consciousness in which attention is focused on
events external to the individual’s consciousness, personal history, or body; you
are the subject of consciousness directed outward, the source of perception and
action, but are not aware of yourself as experiencer. Objective self-awareness
(OSA) is exactly the opposite state: your consciousness is focused on yourself,
your own conscious state, personal history, or body: you are the object of your
own consciousness, a state that often leads to self-evaluation and negative affect,
by inducing self-comparison with external standards. SSA is humans’ primary
or default state; the environment normally draws your attention. OSA requires
a reminder of your status as object in the world – stimuli that cause a shift of
attention to yourself, such as looking in a mirror, hearing your voice on tape,
seeing a photograph of yourself, or having a TV camera pointed at you. Once
you are in the OSA state, attention shifts to your relevant features, regardless of
which sort of stimulus induced the state.
One experiment that Duval & Wicklund used to demonstrate this manipula-
tion went as follows. The experimenter described to the subject a hypothetical
scenario involving him or her, such as a traffic accident. For each situation, sub-
jects were asked to rate how responsible they were for the outcome, that is, how
much of the causalitywas attributable to them.Therewere two conditions: the ex-
perimental room may have had a mirror in it, positioned so that subjects would
see themselves in it (the OSA condition), or it may have had the nonreflective
back of the mirror facing them (the SSA condition). The result was that OSA
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subjects attributed significantly more causality to themselves than SSA subjects.
In another experiment, subjects were given an intelligence test. They were then
told that they scored below average on it, left alone in a room with a clock, and
instructed that if no one returned, they could leave after a certain number of
minutes had passed. Again, self-awareness was manipulated by the presence or
absence of a mirror. The OSA subjects tended to leave the room significantly
sooner than the SSA subjects, supposedly because the mirror leads to negative
feelings: subjects were constantly reminded of their “below-average intelligence.”
Note that in this case, unlike the previous experiment, there was no reporting in-
volved. The manipulation affected the subjects’ actions, not just their statements.
Carroll, Bever & Pollack (1981) conducted the first study I am aware of that
applied self-awareness manipulations to linguistic intuitions. Their premise was
quite similar to mine: since intuitions are produced by performance mechanisms,
theywanted to control and study thesemechanisms, specifically bymanipulating
mental state. They had a quasi-theoretical goal as well, which was to show that
different mental states could produce intuitions that correspond to two compet-
ing theories of the relation between syntax and semantics, namely autonomous
syntax and abstract syntax. Therefore, it was not a case of choosing one theory
over another. Rather, both theories were correct, and they simply accounted for
different kinds of intuitions.
Table 5.1: Mean Truth Ratings of Sentences as a Function of Self-Awareness
(Carroll, Bever & Pollack 1981).
Sentence Type SSA Condition OSA Condition
A house is a building 9.55 9.60
A garage is a building. 7.60 8.60
A lean-to is a building. 5.40 7.35
A tent is a building. 3.25 4.50
overall 6.45 7.51
Since this theoretical issue is not of concern to us here, and in fact is no longer
much discussed, I will ignore the potential theoretical implications of the results
and merely concern myself with the effects produced on judgments themselves.
Carroll, Bever & Pollack suggested that linguists rendering intuitions need to be
in something like the OSA state. Unlike a regular speaker, who is subjectively pre-
occupied and will tend to produce speech errors and ambiguities without notic-
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ing them (as Duval & Wicklund themselves suggest), linguists must cease being
speaker-hearers to pause and reflect on the linguistic signal, to “objectify the sen-
tence from all the specific potential functional contexts of its utterance.” In a pilot
study, they had subjects rate the truth of categorical statements like those listed
in Table 5.1 on a scale of 1 (least true) to 10 (most true). In one condition, subjects
had to use an answer key that was stuck to a mirror to fill out the questionnaire,
but were not otherwise instructed to look at the mirror; the other condition had
no mirror. The mean ratings for the two conditions are shown in Table 5.1 (from
Carroll, Bever & Pollack 1981: 372). Overall, subjects in the OSA condition gave
higher truth ratings. Furthermore, the greatest difference between the groups
occurred on sentences like the one highlighted in the table – sentences that are
technically true but pragmatically unlikely. The authors propose the explanation
that OSA subjects consider more potential communicative situations than SSA
subjects, and this is most important for the marginal cases. The false sentences
are pragmatically appropriate in very few situations, and the paradigmatic ones
require no contextualization to establish their truth. The more general conclu-
sion is that self-awareness manipulation does make itself felt in linguistic tasks,
although it is worth noting that the relative truth ratings were the same for both
groups.
Thus, Carroll, Bever & Pollack proceeded to their central investigation. Since
it does not concern grammaticality judgments, my summary will be rather brief,
focusing on those aspects that are relevant to Nagata’s study. The task was to
rate the pair-wise similarity of sentences from the following sort of paradigm:12
Active: The morning sun dried the sweet raisins.
Passive: The sweet raisins were dried by the morning sun.
Inchoate: The sweet raisins dried in the morning sun.
Were-Inchoate: The sweet raisins were dried in the morning sun.
Cause: The morning sun caused the sweet raisins to dry.
Because: The sweet raisins dried because of the morning sun.
The relevant feature of this group of sentences is that they are semantically very
close but syntactically quite different.The prediction was that OSA subjects, who
are more aware of social interaction, would be more sensitive to communicative
similarity, since they consider a wider range of potential situations for the utter-
ances, and would thus differ from SSA subjects, who would focus on the surface
form of sentences. This prediction was borne out. OSA subjects gave higher sim-
12 Subjects were not told what to use as a basis for measuring similarity, so once again we have
the potential for widely varying interpretations.
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ilarity ratings overall; in addition, the multidimensional scaling plots come out
quite different for the two groups. Carroll, Bever & Pollack take their results to
show that people might use different strategies for interpreting intuitions, depend-
ing on the situation. Extrapolating from their statement, one could imagine that
people have intuitions about both the structural and communicative properties
of sentences, but how these are weighted in coming to an overall similarity mea-
sure would depend on whether the situation prompted communicative versus
sentential assessment.13
Let us now return to the realm of grammaticality judgments, and specifically
to the experiments reported by Nagata (1989a), which investigated the effects of
self-awareness and its interaction with the repetition manipulation previously
described. Nagata started from the assumption that in his earlier repetition stud-
ies, subjects were in an SSA state (since there was nothing to trigger OSA), and
hence used sentential strategies like Carroll, Bever & Pollack’s SSA subjects. Per-
haps repetition would have a different effect on OSA subjects: over multiple rep-
etitions they might consider more potential situations or contexts for the sen-
tences and thus rate them more grammatical (recall this idea from Nagata’s orig-
inal experiment). The first test of this hypothesis involved the same repetition
paradigm as before, except that in the OSA condition there were mirrors on ei-
ther side of the CRTwhere sentences appeared, and the subjects were told to look
at themselves in the mirror while making judgments and while thinking of the
grammaticality of sentences during repetition. The SSA subjects showed a wors-
ening of ratings, as in previous studies, but OSA subjects showed no change of
ratings after repetition. Thus, it seems that the mirror manipulation did negate
the effects of repetition, although it failed to induce greater leniency in judg-
ments. Nagata was convinced that such a leniency effect should be demonstrable,
and suggested that it was undermined by possible ceiling effects, unclear instruc-
tions, and overexposure to the mirror (that is, it might have begun to induce the
communicative strategy on initial judgments, leaving less room for measurable
change after repetition). A follow-up experiment tried to solve these problems
by using only intermediately rated sentences (to avoid the ceiling, but in the
process limiting the generality of the result), omitting mirrors from the initial
judgment phase, and explicitly telling subjects to simultaneously look at them-
selves in the mirror and think about the sentences’ grammaticality. Note that this
13 If all that is involved is a communicative orientation, as opposed to seeing oneself objectified,
one might expect other procedures to have the same effect, e.g., showing someone a photo-
graph of another person instead of the mirror. To my knowledge, such an experiment has not
been done.
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is a much more explicit and forceful use of the mirror manipulation than the one
used by Duval & Wicklund or Carroll, Bever & Pollack. Furthermore, no signifi-
cant effect of self-awareness had been found for the before-repetition judgments
in the first experiment. Apparently this particular procedure is not as susceptible
to self-awareness manipulations as those others. This might be because judging
grammaticality is more inherently a structural task, as compared to judging sen-
tence similarity or truth. Despite all this emphasis, the OSA judgments came out
only marginally more lenient after repetition. A second follow-up experiment
was done to rule out a potential confounding variable: it is possible that the di-
vision of subjects’ attention between mirror watching and sentence pondering
could have created ratings different from those of the SSA subjects, independent
of the fact that the competing activity was related to self-awareness. Thus, Na-
gata gave subjects a simple arithmetic problem to solve as a distractor during the
repetition phase, instead of mirror gazing, to see whether division of processing
resources could account for the previous finding. In this condition, there was
no change in judgments after repetition as compared to before, so division of
attention can nullify the repetition effect. However, there was no trend toward
increasing ratings, so to the extent that such an effect is reliable, it cannot be
explained by processing load alone: self-awareness must be considered.14
5.2.5 Judgment Strategy
Nagata concludes from the preceding three experiments that, in judging gram-
maticality, SSA subjects focus on syntactic and semantic structure, while OSA
subjects look at pragmatic use. If this is so, then Carroll, Bever & Pollack’s sug-
gestion that linguists need to be in the OSA state seemsmisguided, at least for the
purposes of judging grammaticality. But note that so far we have only circum-
stantial evidence concerning the actual strategies used. Nagata (1989c) wanted to
explore this by explicitly telling subjects what sort of strategy to use in making
their judgments, rather than inducing a strategy indirectly withmirrors and such.
If the two explicit strategies show the same respective effects as the mirror ver-
sus no-mirror conditions, we have suggestive (though not conclusive) evidence
that the interpretation of those effects is on the right track.This experiment again
used sentences of intermediate grammaticality, where the leniency effect of OSA
had shown up. One group of subjects was told to “analyze each sentential struc-
ture independently of sentential and/or situational contexts,” and consider the
14 This is not an airtight argument. Perhaps the arithmetic task, which involved subtracting 2
from an integer, was not as demanding as mirror gazing.
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parts of speech involved, during the repetition phase. The other group had to
“[supply] sentential and/or situational contexts to each sentence such that each
sentence could be used in such contexts.”15 The standard repetition paradigm
was used, except that after the repetition phase subjects had to describe what
they had been thinking, so the experimenter could be sure they followed the
desired strategy. Those who did not had their results discarded. While the dif-
ferentiation condition produced significantly more ungrammatical ratings after
repetition, the enrichment group showed only a nonsignificant tendency toward
leniency. Again, Nagata tries to explain why the expected trend did not reach
significance: apparently the enrichment strategy is hard to use, and even the
subjects who seemed to describe the appropriate thoughts might not have used
it as intended. But it is hard to see why subjects should use less of a strategy
when explicitly told how to follow it than when it is induced indirectly by the
mirror manipulation. This question casts some doubt on Nagata’s interpretation
of the OSA leniency effect. Perhaps the possibility that OSA affects reporting
more than linguistic analysis is worth investigating further after all, if a more
convincing demonstration of the change in judgment strategy cannot be made.
As Bever’s epigraph at the beginning of this chapter suggests, there certainly is
a lot we don’t know about mirrors.
Nonetheless, somemore general conclusions can be unequivocally drawn from
Nagata’s studies. First, it is clear that the details of the process of intuitive judg-
ment cannot be ignored when using intuitions for theoretical purposes. On that
point, I agree with Carroll, Bever & Pollack as well as with Nagata. More specifi-
cally, we can conclude that it is easy tomake sentences get worse in people’s judg-
ments, but hard to make them get better. Given the stringency effect of repetition,
we should expect linguists’ judgments to be more stringent than those of non-
linguists, at least on sentences that they have studied in detail. I am not aware
of any studies that have been done specifically on sentences that linguists have
worked on extensively (but see Snyder (1994), discussed in Section 7.2). More gen-
eral studies have differed as to whether linguists are more or less lenient than
normals (see Section 4.4.1). I would still maintain that the influence of repetition
is another valid reason why linguists’ judgments should not be used as crucial
theoretical evidence. With regard to where the effects of self-awareness come
from, they seem to transcend language and thus fit the general description of a
cognitive manipulation whose effects carry over into linguistic judgments. The
15 It is not evident from Nagata’s description whether these are exact translations of the instruc-
tions, or whether subjects were given more explanation. Even knowing the purpose of the
experiment, I do not find this wording particularly clear.
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repetition effect is more problematic in this regard, however. It runs contrary to
basic habituation effects. In fact, I have not been able to find any parallel ma-
nipulations in other cognitive domains. If Nagata’s suggestion is right, then the
effects stem essentially from discerning more fine-grained properties of the stim-
ulus through repeated considerations. If the effects are limited to the particular
sentences used rather than to overall ratings, then this is not a case of develop-
ing expertise, i.e., of increasing the ability to discriminate. Rather, a parallel effect
would have to involve complex stimuli whose properties are not all apparent on
first exposure, e.g., a complex geometric figure containing multiple subfigures
that must be picked out. Finally, it is evident that psychological effects can inter-
act in unpredictable ways, so that a complete understanding cannot be achieved
merely by identifying each effect in isolation.
5.2.6 Modality and Register
Vetter, Volovecky & Howell (1979) were interested in the potential effects of
modality of presentation and intonation on grammaticality judgments, although
their main interest was with meaningfulness (see Section 5.3.2). They used five
conditions for sentence presentation: visual presentation only, auditory presen-
tation only, both presentations simultaneously, and the latter two modes with
normal or monotone intonation. Interestingly, they found no overall effect of
mode of presentation, although 16 of 60 particular conditions did show signifi-
cant differences, which suggests to me that this variable is worth investigating
more closely. But the basic result that intonation is not a factor echoes similar
results in the domain of spoken surface-structure ambiguity resolution. Studies
by Berkovits (1981; 1982) have shown that intonation plays a very limited role
in disambiguating such sentences, being easily overridden by the inherent bias
of the sentence or the surrounding context unless a subject’s attention is explic-
itly drawn to prosodic cues. (On the other hand, Hill (1961) describes some cases
where reading a sentence with normal intonation, as opposed to presenting it
in written form, increased the number of acceptances. For reasons discussed in
Section 5.2.1, his results should be taken very cautiously, however.)
The absence of any modality effect is at odds with the widely held belief that
our judgment criteria are much stricter for written materials than for speech.
(In line with this intuition, Bialystok & Ryan (1985) argue that oral presentation
stresses meaning, whereas written presentation more naturally elicits attention
to structure.) However, the issue of register is tied up in this as well. A formal
speech would have to meet higher standards of grammaticality than a casual
conversation. Greenbaum (1977b) suggests that written questionnaires present
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a fairly formal context for subjects, which might show up in sentence ratings
as a preference for the more formal of two alternatives if they are compared
side by side. He also suggests (Greenbaum 1977c) that the content of sentences
could itself imply stylistic differences, e.g., scientific versus literary, which could
evoke differential treatment from subjects. Yet another confounding factor could
be the degree of preparation. Prepared text, whether spoken or written, can be
freed of errors, whereas in spontaneous production speakers (or writers in cer-
tain circumstances) must be allowed some leeway in extricating themselves from
grammatical culs-de-sac. Biber (1986) has done an extensive factor analysis of di-
mensions along which various kinds of written and spoken language differ, by
analyzing 545 text samples of 16 different types, ranging from telephone con-
versations to government documents. He arrives at three major factors that ac-
count for much of the variation on 41 linguistic features that have been sug-
gested to reflect spoken/written differences. None of these factors correlates en-
tirely with speech versus writing. The first factor, interactive versus edited text,
separates texts with high personal involvement and real-time constraints from
those that have highly explicit lexical content andwheremuch editing is possible.
The second factor, abstract versus situated content, reflects the degree to which
the style is detached and formal or concrete and colloquial. The third factor, re-
ported versus immediate style, differentiates narrative about removed situations
from present-tense description. Biber successfully uses these dimensions to rec-
oncile the findings of numerous previous studies concerning spoken/written dif-
ferences. One might approach the unraveling of these factors experimentally by
using linked computer terminals that allow written communication with various
speeds of transmission: instantaneous letter-by-letter, line-by-line, or complete
messages (Graeme Hirst, personal communication). Whichever factor or factors
determine one’s degree of tolerance, we are then left with explaining how these
various levels of grammaticality criteria are encoded in the mind: different gram-
mars, different parsing rules, a reduced threshold on the same parsing rules, etc.
I return to these issues in Chapter 6.
There are additional features of language that are related to register to some
extent and that Ross (1979) speculates might have systematic effects on gram-
maticality judgments. These include clarity, awkwardness, slanginess, and flow-
eriness. While these have likely been examined in a sociolinguistic context, I am
not aware of any research looking for them as confounds where grammaticality
was the property subjects were targeting. One might also expect that the modal-
ity of the subjects’ response could show some effect of register. This idea was
tested by Davy & Quirk (1969), replicating some of Quirk & Svartvik’s (1966)
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testscompliance tests but using oral responses: subjects had to say the new ver-
sion of the sentence, or answer judgment questions with “yes,” “no,” or “can’t
decide.” The results of the judgment tests closely paralleled those of Quirk &
Svartvik, with one notable exception. Davy & Quirk’s subjects gave many fewer
middle responses. The authors suspect that this is not a register effect, but rather
is due to the fact that “can’t decide” has negative connotations, suggesting indeci-
sion on the subject’s part, which the corresponding written response “?” lacked.
Thus, it seems that response modality does not much influence judgments. How-
ever, a positive conclusion to come out of this study is that much information
can be gained from verbal responses. For instance, from the performance tasks
the authors were able to gather data on subjects’ hesitations, drawled segments,
tempo, volume, pitch, and rhythm, which were useful in the analysis (although
the interpretation is somewhat subjective), for instance, in finding the location
of ungrammaticality within a sentence.
5.2.7 Speed of Judgment
Studies differ as to the amount of time subjects are given tomake their judgments.
In most cases, written questionnaires are self-paced, although they may also be
speeded, i.e., subjects may be told to work quickly. Experiments using computer
control (usually also measuring reaction time) may limit the amount of time a
sentence is visible, and also limit the time available for judgment before the next
sentence appears. This raises the issue of whether we want a subject’s initial
reactions to a sentence, or a carefully reasoned decision resulting from some
amount of deliberation. Presumably these two kinds of judgments would differ,
although the matter has not been much studied directly. Bialystok (1979) found
that changing the response time in a yes/no grammaticality judgment task from
3 seconds to 15 seconds did not affect the accuracy of responses by her nonnative
learners of French. Greenbaum (1977c) cites unpublishedwork by Legum, Elliot &
Thompson (1974) as finding that different judgments resulted from timed versus
self-paced tasks, but gives no further details. A study by Warner & Glass (1987),
detailed in Section 5.3.1, found that context effects were attenuated by the delay
in self-paced as opposed to on-line judgments. Also, I suggest in Section 5.2.3
that prolonged consideration of a sentence might induce effects similar to those
found in Nagata’s repetition treatment.
Obviously, if our goal is to examine the on-line processing of grammaticality,
its effects on parsing, and so forth, then first reactions will be most useful. But if
it is the status of sentences that concerns us, it is not clear which should be pre-
ferred. One advantage to first impressions is that there is little time for the subject
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to consider (potentially irrelevant) extrasentential factors. In fact, subjects might
be able to go into a mode in which they ignore such factors. Mistler-Lachman
(1972) found this to be the case in judgments of meaningfulness. Specifically, she
argues that subjects can reach a kind of understanding that falls short of full inter-
pretation, involving only “awareness of the potential for interpretation.” In this
mode, the time it takes subjects to give yes/no meaningfulness judgments does
not increase with ambiguous sentences, and is not reduced by supporting con-
text, although these factors are known to affect the time subjects take when read-
ing for comprehension. Quick judgments are also useful because, given enough
time, subjects might find structural analyses that we would not want them to
find. Gleitman & Gleitman (1970) suggest an interpretation that someone with
ingenuity could find for Maclay & Sleator’s (1960) sentence Label break to be
calmed about and (see Section 5.3.2), which leads them to make a distinction be-
tween “blithely accepts as grammatical” versus “after deep thought accepts as
grammatical.” In cases where initial reactions are desired, we need a methodol-
ogy for getting them. The cost of computer-controlled experimentation can be
prohibitive as compared to the cost of administering questionnaires, so some au-
thors have tried to use the latter.16 (In fact, Greenbaum (1977c) argues against the
use of time-limited judgments anyway, since they fail to take account of individ-
ual differences in judgment speed.) For instance, the instructions in Heringer’s
(1970) study (discussed in Section 4.2) told subjects to refrain from changing their
response after the initial judgment or rereading sentences that had already been
judged; Greenbaum (1977b) told subjects not to turn back to previous pages in
the questionnaire booklet, and to work as quickly as they could without being
careless.
16 Jim McCawley (personal communication) suggests that interesting effects might show up by
using the inexpensive technology of videotape. His experience is that the discrepancies in time
taken by different subjects to raise their hands in response to a sentence they are judging is
large enough that frame-by-frame viewing would show clear differences.
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5.3 Stimulus Factors
5.3.1 Context
Unhappily, the recurrent embarrass-
ment of the generative grammarian
is that his students and his critics
are forever contriving situations in
which the sentences he had needed to
believe were ungrammatical turned
out to be completely appropriate.
(Fillmore 1973)
I agree wholeheartedly with Bever (1970a) on the issue of context: “A science of
the influence of context on acceptability judgements is as necessary in linguis-
tic research as in every other area of psychology” (p. 347). First, however, we
must set straight exactly what is meant by the term context, which tends to be
bandied about rather casually. While the common folklore holds that sentences
usually sound better in context, we shall see that this really only applies to one of
the possible kinds of context. In this subsection I report on four types of context
manipulation. First, I look at a few studies dealing with a context consisting of se-
mantically or pragmatically related content. This is the most extensively studied
of the four types, and I cannot hope to cover the entire literature here. One large
subdomain that I systematically exclude is the area of discourse-dependent utter-
ance forms such as ellipses, cross-sentential anaphora, etc. (see vanDijk (1977) for
discussion). This seems a reasonable omission, because there do not appear to be
too many interesting issues that bear on elicitation methodology. Obviously, if a
sentence is dependent on prior sentences for coherence, they must be included
when the sentence is judged. The second type of context I consider consists of
paradigmatically related sentences; very little work has been done in this area.
The same is true for the third type, which consists of the theoretical context un-
der which linguists consider data. The fourth type of context, which seems to
have the most insidious implications for grammaticality judging, is made up of
structurally related sentences that can set up extraordinary contrasts or prepare
us for later sentences.
Bolinger (1968) prefaces his discussion of context effects by saying, “it is worth
a moment to consider how a normal sentence can come to be thought abnormal”
(p. 35; see also Bolinger (1971)). By this he means that disembodying a sentence
from its (semantico-pragmatic) context canmake it appear unacceptable when in
its original setting it was unexceptional. For the most part, the type of judgment
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he is concerned with is of semantic rather than syntactic well-formedness. For
example, he assumes that I’m the soup is ungrammatical in isolation. Nonetheless,
some of his observations have implications for our study as well. For instance, a
sentence heard out of context will tend to trigger dominant senses of the words
it contains. Once a situation for the sentence as a whole is derived from these
meanings, secondary senses are not likely to come to mind, even if they would
make the sentence grammatical.17 Situating sentences within a larger discourse
(possibly by expanding a single sentence) also improves their acceptability by
providing the motivation for marked constructions, such as the clefts in the fol-
lowing examples:
(2) ? It’s a lawyer that he is.
(3) It wasn’t a lawyer that he wanted to be but a doctor.
The low-bias reading of an ambiguous word or phrase can sound bad out of con-
text, as in the following sentence when spoken:
(4) ? Never have too close friends.
Along similar lines, Bever, Carroll & Hurtig (1976) give the following example:
(5) a. ? The owner of the horse’s steps were rapid.
b. Because he was in a hurry to place a bet, the owner of the horse’s
steps were rapid.
See Section 4.2 for the effect of this kind of context on quantifier-negative sen-
tences.
This was the kind of context that Nagata (1988) looked at as well (see Sec-
tion 5.2.3). Recall that while it did cancel the effects of repetition, it made no
significant difference to prerepetition judgments. He points out that, unlike his
own materials, experimenters often specifically design their stimuli to be good
only under a fairly obscure interpretation, which the context is then designed
to bring out (see also Gleitman & Gleitman (1970)). This assessment applies to
some of the contexts used in Heringer’s (1970) study. For instance, he compared
reactions to sentences like (6) with and without the bracketed context:
(6) John left until 6 pm. [John left earlier and is going to come back at 6.]
17 The example Bolinger gives is not a particularly good one. He claims that The girl was turned
to tends to be considered ungrammatical in isolation because the extended meaning of turn to
does not come to mind, but I do not have any trouble with this sentence.
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While none of Heringer’s 20 subjects accepted (6) without the context, 15 of 39 ac-
cepted it with context.18 It should not be surprising that context improves gram-
maticality under such conditions, but we cannot conclude from this that any
semantically coherent context will improve ratings. This was certainly not true
for Nagata’s contexts, which were appropriate to the target sentence but did not
bring out any abnormal readings. Under these conditions, context apparently has
no effect, perhaps because some default context is assumed when none is directly
supplied (Danks & Glucksberg 1971).
Snow (1975) refers to this type of context as paralinguistic context and sug-
gests that it should always be supplied by the experimenter. We can reasonably
expect that when subjects are asked to judge sentences in isolation, they might
attempt to call up a suitable linguistic context. If we provide them with such a
context instead of leaving them to their own devices, we will most likely find less
variation in the resulting judgments. If we further assume that context cannot
make a truly ungrammatical sentence seem acceptable (which is likely true for
the vast majority of sentences), we are not biasing the outcome of the experiment
by giving the sentence its best shot in this way (Householder (1973) concurs). Fur-
thermore, by testing the same sentence in multiple contexts, we can examine the
grammatical and discourse factors that distinguish various readings.
Along the same lines, Crain & Steedman (1985) make the important point that
a null context is not the same as a neutral context. Rather, the effect of not pre-
senting subjects with an explicit context is that the actual context envisioned by
them is not under the experimenter’s control. They go on to argue that certain
grammatical constructions, notably restrictive modification, are infelicitous in
the absence of context, and hence force subjects to do the work of constructing
an appropriate context by adding necessary presuppositions to their discourse
model in order to interpret the sentence. Their experiments involved a speeded
grammaticality judgment task. One showed that reduced-relative garden path
sentences are judged more grammatical when the subject is indefinite and hence
(they argue) does not presuppose an already mentioned set from which certain
members are being singled out. Sentences like (7b) below were judged grammat-
ical significantly more often than their counterparts like (7a) in a yes/no task.
18 These numbers represent a pooling of subjects who answered “acceptable” or “uncertain, but
probably acceptable” on the four-choice questionnaire. In explaining this analysis, Heringer
acknowledges that “some people apparently use a stricter interpretation of acceptability than
others, while what is of interest here is not absolute acceptability but relative acceptability
with respect to other sentences” (p. 291, fn. 5). There is also variability in the relative certainty
of subjects, i.e., some will give many more “uncertain” responses than others. We must be
extremely careful thinking about what information we are trying to extract from judgments,
in choosing what to do with raw ratings.
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(7) a. The teachers taught by the Berlitz method passed the test.
b. Teachers taught by the Berlitz method passed the test.
Crain & Steedman also showed that the grammaticality rating of a particular sen-
tence varied dramatically depending on whether a preceding context supported
the presuppositions of the correct versus the incorrect parse. Either completion
of a temporarily ambiguous sentence could be judged ungrammatical by at least
half the subjects if the context favored the wrong reading. Example (8) illustrates
the possible contexts and target sentences.
(8) a. Complement-inducing context
A psychologist was counseling a married couple. One member of the
pair was fighting with him but the other one was nice to him.
b. Relative-inducing context
A psychologist was counseling two married couples. One of the
couples was fighting with him but the other one was nice to him.
c. Complement target
The psychologist told the wife that he was having trouble with her
husband.
d. Relative target
The psychologist told the wife that he was having trouble with to
leave her husband.
Pesetsky (1981) demonstrates how context can interact with grammar in espe-
cially intricate and insidious ways. In particular, he shows that Superiority viola-
tions can be made to go away, or at least become less severe, if they are presented
in a context that encourages the reader to interpretwh-words as discourse-linked
(D-linked), that is, constrained by some previously established set of alternatives.
Thus, although where usually cannot follow what in a double question, the fol-
lowing setup makes that possible:
(9) I know that we need to install transistor A, transistor B, and transistor C,
and I know that these three holes are for transistors, but I’ll be damned if
I can figure out from the instructions where what goes!
In Pesetsky’s account, D-linked wh-words have different LF movement require-
ments than non-D-linked ones have. The relevant point for us is that the gram-
mar is (argued to be) sensitive to a distinction in interpretation that can only be
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made relative to surrounding context, so getting judgments to reflect the gram-
mar in this respect requires careful control of context. Here, as with Crain &
Steedman’s examples, it is insufficient to control for or eliminate context effects
on judgments. We must consider the effects of particular types of context that
the grammar is sensitive to.
Let us turn now to paradigmatically related contexts, by which I mean sen-
tences that fill a parallel role in a paradigm. This can best be seen with an exam-
ple. One finding of Hill (1961) that probably would hold up under more controlled
conditions is that a more structured design (as compared to individual sentence
judgments) produces a reduction in interspeaker variation. Hill’s experiment in-
volved presenting several sentence groups following the same paradigm, as in
(10) and (11):
(10) The plate is hot. The plate seems hot. The plate seems very hot.
(11) The child is sleeping. The child seems sleeping. The child seems very
sleeping.
In this example, The child seems sleeping would presumably be the target sen-
tence of interest. It is surrounded in (11) by two sentences that are related to it
in a way that is parallel to the relations among the sentences in (10). This allows
subjects to see where the sentence came from by analogy to an unequivocally
good sentence. Apparently this procedure helps them to focus on the relevant
features of the sentence. This type of parallel analysis is certainly common in
linguistic argumentation, but no one else seems to have used it in studying the
judgment process itself. In cases where it is feasible, it might prove to be a useful
tool. (Recall a related finding by Scott & Mills (1973), reported in Section 3.3.3:
viewing all the rearrangements of a sentence together increases grammaticality
ratings.)
Spencer (1973) mentions a type of context made up of “the set of rules for
which [a] sentence is an exemplar.” Snow (1975) seems to mean something sim-
ilar by the “context of discourse,” which she defines as the linguistic issue on
which a sentence bears. In both cases, such context is relevant only to linguists,
and might actually be entirely implicit, without mention in the materials them-
selves. For instance, certain examples become closely associated with particular
theoretical proposals or disputes by virtue of repeated discussion or published
citations, e.g., Chomsky’s Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. Spencer seems to
suggest that when a linguist’s initial intuitions about a sentence fail to conform
to the context (presumably this means they contradict the theory), the sentence
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is reorganized to bring the intuition in line (see Section 4.4.1). Unfortunately, her
experimental results do not show this in any direct way, and it is in fact hard to
imagine a conclusive demonstration of this effect, so it must remain as intriguing
speculation for the time being.
Now let us focus on the effects of the fourth kind of context, namely the neigh-
boring stimulus sentences displayed for judgment. It has been common folklore
among linguists that marginal sentences can be made to seem more acceptable
when preceded by much worse examples and less acceptable when preceded by
much better ones (see, e.g., Snow (1975), who calls this the context of judgment,
and Levelt (1974: vol. 3)). Bever (1970a; 1974) might have been the first to make
this explicit, in connection with the law of contrast from psychology:
One’s “absolute” judgement of a stimulus can be exaggerated by the differ-
ence between the stimulus and its context.This influence by contrast clearly
can occur in “intuitions” about grammaticality. For example, [(12b)] pre-
ceded by [(12a)] may be judged ungrammatical, but contrasted with [(12c)]
it will probably be judged as grammatical. (Bever 1970a: 346–47)
(12) a. Who must telephone her?
b. Who need telephone her?
c. Who want telephone her?
Bever describes an analogous effect in color perception: a pale green spot might
appear blue when surrounded by a yellow field, but appears green if surrounded
by a red field. (Although the examples in (12) are very closed related, contrast
effects can be found with unrelated stimuli; see the discussion of Snow (1975)
below.) To test the hypothesis for linguistic context, Bever proposes taking a
number of sentences from linguistics articles and presenting them in two dif-
ferent orders to two groups for judgment. One group would see them in their
original order as they appeared in the source publications, while the other group
w.ould see them in random order. Bever predicts that the former group would
come much closer to the published judgments than would the latter group. Spen-
cer (1973), as part of the study described in Section 4.4.1, did exactly that. In one
condition the order of sentences was completely randomized, while in the other
they appeared in their originally published order (the order of the articles was
randomized). Unfortunately, the results are reported in the same vague manner
as her comparison of naive and nonnaive subjects. We can see that the mean
number of sentences accepted by the two groups differed by almost 6%, but we
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know nothing of the significance of this difference or to what extent the distri-
bution of good and bad ratings differed for the two groups.
Greenbaum (1976a) performed an experiment that made the same point. The
crucial sentences exemplified various uses of the verb dare:
(13) We didn’t dare answer him back.
(14) We dared not answer him back.
(15) We didn’t dare to answer him back.
Two of the three sentences appeared together on one page of the experimental
booklet, and subjects were implicitly encouraged to compare the two by having
to rank which was better, in addition to rendering absolute judgments on the fol-
lowing scale: “perfectly natural and normal”; “wholly unnatural and abnormal”;
“somewhere between”; and “not sure.” Sentence (15) showed a significant change
in absolute rating depending on which of the other two sentences it was paired
with: it was judged much better alongside (14) than (13). Among the latter two
sentences, (13) was rated significantly better overall. That is, greater contrast pro-
duced polarization of the results. Seeing the better alternative, subjects judged
(15) even worse.This confirms the predictionmade by Bever (1970a), although the
results would be more convincing if they could be replicated without any explicit
suggestion that subjects should compare the adjacent sentences. Greenbaum’s
conclusion is that closely related sentences should be presented for judgment as
a group, with ordering counterbalanced across subjects, because he believes that
in the absence of comparable sentences provided by the experimenter, subjects
might try to think up their own related items, so that intersubject differences in
ratings could be related to differences in their ability to make such inventions.
(This parallels Bolinger’s point for semantic contexts.)
Snow (1975) conducted an experiment that demonstrated contrast effects with
unrelated sentences. Her test consisted of alternating target and filler sentences.
In one condition all the fillers were clearly grammatical, in the other they were
clearly awful. Subjects judged acceptability on a yes/no basis. Although no statis-
tical analysis of the raw data is reported, there was clearly a substantial shift in
judgments between the two groups: 18 of the 20 target sentences were accepted
by more subjects when surrounded by bad fillers, showing a mean increase of
11.7% in the number of subjects who accepted them. The most dramatic exam-
ple showed a 32% increase. Nagata (1992) reports a similar finding. As Carden &
Dieterich (1981) put it, “‘ungrammatical’ often should be interpreted as ‘clearly
worse than the “good” examples [a sentence] is being compared to’” (p. 589).They
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describe a data disagreement over backwards coreference constructions such as
I knew him when Harvey was a little boy, where him and Harvey are taken as
coreferential (see Section 1.3). A linguist who claims the sentence is bad pairs it
with a clearly good example, and vice versa. Carden & Dieterich argue that both
good and bad related sentences should be presented for subjects’ consideration.
Beyond an absolute shift in assigned grammaticality, Cowart (1994, 1997: 22–27)
designed a set of experiments to explore the question of whether this kind of
context manipulation would affect the relative status of sentences. His two con-
ditions involved interspersing among actual linguistically interesting examples
a group of filler sentences that were either all quite good or in which one-third
of the sentences were awful. As in the previous studies, with bad fillers around
subjects gave significantly higher ratings overall to the experimental sentences.
However, the pattern of results among these sentences was not affected at all by
this manipulation. In particular, it was not true, as one might have expected, that
thosewho saw very bad fillers would be less sensitive to subtle differences among
the experimental sentences. Thus, if we limit ourselves to relative comparisons,
the goodness or badness of filler sentences might not be very important.
The results of some experiments by Warner & Glass (1987) bear on the effects
of context by both structural and semantic relatedness. Their main goal was to
examine the processing of garden path sentences,19 but what surfaces as well is
a striking case of judgments not reflecting the underlying grammar, because a
majority of subjects judged sentences bad that are uncontroversially grammat-
ical. The authors’ design allowed them to measure the effects of two kinds of
context sentence: those that were structurally similar to the target garden paths
and those that were semantically related. Since garden path sentences can mis-
lead the reader by virtue of temporary ambiguities, context sentences could ei-
ther help or hinder their parsing, by priming either the correct or the misleading
choice at the point of ambiguity. Where positive bias was induced, we find ex-
amples of the type Nagata mentioned: sentences that would probably be judged
bad unless subjects were directed toward the necessary situation or structural
analysis. Below are examples of the four possible relations between context and
target. In each pair, the first (context) sentence is unambiguously parsable and
grammatical, while the second (target) sentence is a garden path:
(16) Syntactically related, positive bias:
a. When the girl sleeps the cat eats.
b. When the boys strike the dog kills.
19 The authors use the term garden path to refer to all sentences with temporary ambiguities,
regardless of whether people actually tend to fail on their first parse of them.
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(17) Syntactically related, negative bias:
a. If the girl pets the cat she sings.
b. When the boys strike the dog kills.
(18) Semantically related, positive bias:
a. The cat attacks because the boy harms the man.
b. While the boy kills the man the cat strikes.
(19) Semantically related, negative bias:
a. The boy attacks when the man is hurt by the cat.
b. While the boy kills the man the cat strikes.
Their first experiment elicited speeded grammaticality judgments and found
there was a significant main effect of context. Sentences preceded by positive-
bias context received an average 87% rating, while those with negative-bias con-
text received only a 65% grammaticality rating. There was no significant differ-
ence between syntactic and semantic contexts. However, a subsequent self-paced
judgment task showed no context effects in most cases. The authors suggest that
this change is attributable to the relative speed of judging. At their own pace,
subjects would not be reaching final judgment decisions until much longer after
reading the context sentences. Thus it appears that context-induced priming is
a fleeting phenomenon, which might account for some of the discrepancies in
the literature. Interestingly, in the absence of any biasing context, the class of
garden paths that are hardest to process (namely, those requiring an intransitive
reading of a transitive verb and with a delayed resolution of the ambiguity, such
as Before the boy kills the man the dog bites strikes, were judged grammatical 25%
of the time, or only as often as ungrammatical control sentences (e.g., Who is
strong killed that strike men).20 Apparently, people either are not very persistent
or not very creative in looking for alternative parses, because this result held up
in the self-paced experiment as well.
Milne (1982) presents both anecdotal and quantitative evidence corroborating
this finding for other kinds of garden paths. For instance, when asked to judge
20 Many of these potential garden path sentences normally require additional punctuation.
Nonetheless, Warner & Glass did not include it in their materials. See Frazier & Rayner (1982)
for an attempt to justify this common methodology. See Mitchell & Holmes (1985) for evi-
dence that adding the appropriate punctuation significantly changes the processing of such
sentences. The latter result does not invalidate the conclusion that context can affect parsing
(interacting with other cues), but we must be cautious in our conclusions about the status of
an incorrectly punctuated sentence.
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whether The prime number few was a complete sentence or only a fragment, all
47 of his subjects thought it was a fragment. In a timed comprehension task, The
horse raced past the barn fell took an average of 10.13 seconds to read, with many
subjects still reporting they had not understood it after that period. Bever (1970b)
hypothesizes that such reduced-relative sentences would be parsed much more
readily if an example pair consisting of full and reduced versions of a sentence
were presented first, and Matthews (1979) reports such a result on a judgment
task, although he gives no quantitative data. Thus, methodological caution is ad-
vised. If we suspect that the specific reading of a sentence that we want to test is
hard for human parsers to arrive at, independent of whether it is grammatical, we
should make every effort to ensure that subjects think of the right reading. Oth-
erwise, rejections on the basis of ungrammaticality are confounded with those
based on never having “found” the sentence in question.
The main conclusion from these studies of context is that it does not make
sense to speak of the effect of context on judgments, because the type of context
and its relation to the sentences in question must be considered. Context can
be used to make sentences look better or worse than they appear in isolation;
whether this is desirable will depend on the goals of particular investigations.
5.3.2 Meaning
The earliest study that I am aware of that looked specifically at the nature of lin-
guistic intuitions as expressed in judgments about sentences was done byMaclay
& Sleator (1960).They were specifically interested in the extent to which subjects
could judge grammaticality independent of meaningful content and likelihood of
occurrence, so they asked subjects whether each stimulus sentencewas grammat-
ical, meaningful, and ordinary. (By the latter term they meant “occurring with
high frequency,” so that this portion of the study might belong in Section 5.3.4,
which deals with frequency; but since it is not clear whether their subjects in-
terpreted it this way, I keep the main discussion together.) Unfortunately, they
apparently did not give subjects any further explanation as to the intendedmean-
ings of these terms, and some of their results clearly show that at least some sub-
jects did not take the desired interpretation. One good feature of this procedure,
however, is that it allows subjects to voice opinions on these issues separately.
If people feel a sentence is meaningless or has no chance of occurring in natural
speech, they will want to convey this opinion. If they are not asked specifically
for the information, theywill likely allow it to affect their responses on othermat-
ters, such as grammaticality (Elizabeth Cowper, personal communication). The
experimenters had designed the sentences to represent various combinations of
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the three dimensions, e.g., grammatical but not meaningful and not ordinary.
In addition, one group of grammatical sentences contained deliberate violations
of “grammar school” rules, e.g., incorrect uses of I/me, that do occur in casual
speech and ought (according to Maclay & Sleator) to be generated by a linguistic
grammar.
Sentences were presented orally with normal intonation.21 For sentences that
were intended to be grammatical but not meaningful or ordinary (e.g., Colorless
green ideas sleep furiously), significantly more subjects said “yes” to the grammat-
icality question than to the other two questions. Maclay & Sleator take this as
evidence that subjects were making the intended distinctions and judging gram-
maticality independent of the other two variables (but see below). Across all the
sentence types and all three rating criteria, the relative ratings conformed to prior
classifications. Positive instances got a greater percentage of “yes” responses than
noninstances. However, the absolute numbers were less convincing. The afore-
mentioned grammatical-nonmeaningful-nonordinary sentences received only a
50% grammatical rating, as did those that violated only the prescriptive rules.22
The other absolute numbers were similarly disappointing, often indicating ap-
proximately neutral ratings on average for all three criteria. From their lack
of clear-cut outcomes, the authors conclude that there is no empirical basis on
which to classify sentences as grammatical versus ungrammatical, or even into
multiple discrete levels of grammaticality, and that we must be content with
comparative rankings only. Why they discount the latter possibility without at-
tempting to elicit multivalued ratings is not clear to me. But perhaps the most
telling part of their conclusion is the admission that 3 of their 21 subjects said
that Label break to calmed about and was grammatical. Furthermore, Quirk &
Svartvik (1966) point out that this 14% acceptance rate compares with 19% accep-
tance for Nor if I have anything to do with it. Since these were all native speakers
of English, they clearly were not applying grammaticality in the intended way,
and so the experimental results do not represent a unitary phenomenon.
Vetter, Volovecky&Howell (1979) performed a follow-up toMaclay& Sleator’s
experiment, because they felt that the latter authors did not have statistical justi-
fication for the claim that grammaticality was being judged independently of the
other two variables. Their new experimental design allowed for the direct assess-
ment of such claims. They used the same 36 stimulus sentences as Maclay and
21 It is not clear to me how the strings of word salad could be read with normal intonation; a
standard contour would have to be placed arbitrarily over the words.




Sleator, but made a small attempt to improve the instructions. For instance, in
one condition subjects were asked, “Is this word sequence grammatical? In other
words, is it acceptable English?” These instructions still leave a lot of room for
interpretation and in this experiment we have direct evidence concerning how
the subjects tried to perform the various discriminations. But first, let us look
at their results. As in the previous study, an ANOVA showed a significant effect
of type of sentence – grammatical versus meaningful versus ordinary – but Vet-
ter, Volovecky & Howell correctly point out that such a finding is difficult to
interpret because these do not represent values on a single dimension. Pair-wise
chi-square tests of independence showed that in some of the conditions grammat-
icality and ordinariness were significantly related, whereas in other conditions
meaningfulness and ordinariness were related. Thus, this study contradicts the
earlier claim and suggests that these factors do influence each other. Other results
largely replicated those ofMaclay & Sleator. Sentence groups that were supposed
to differ only on grammaticality did show a significant difference on that param-
eter, and similarly for the other variables. Once again, however, the most defi-
nite conclusion we can draw from this study is that much more work is needed
on conveying to all subjects the same notion of grammaticality, as evidenced
by the following remarks from the study’s high-school-aged subjects regarding
how they decided whether a sentence fit the criteria. For grammaticality, they
considered punctuation, making sense, whether the sentence was “smooth,” and
“what I learned in elementary school about correct grammar”; for meaningful-
ness, they considered “pausing and verbalization,” “if words could be rearranged
to make sense,” whether the “order of words seemed similar to reverse order in
German,” and whether it was “true or something that could happen”; for ordinar-
iness, they considered that “word order inverted was ordinary, since it’s natural
in French,” answered “yes” if the sentence “didn’t make sense but had normal
subject and verb order,” and factored in “the way the words were typed.”23 From
these reports it is clear that the ratings could not represent anything approach-
ing a unitary phenomenon, a fact that might invalidate all the other conclusions
of the experiment anyway.
Letme briefly review some other experiments onmeaning and grammaticality.
Danks & Glucksberg (1970) looked at grammaticality, meaningfulness, and ordi-
nariness, plus familiarity, in conjunction with data used by Coleman (1965); see
Section 3.3.3. They asked subjects to rate sentences on one of these dimensions
using a 10-point scale; none of the termswas defined for them.They found that fa-
23 There were also a few responses that seemed to bear some resemblance to the desired inter-
pretation of the terms.
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miliar and ordinary were treated the same by subjects. By principal components
analysis, meaningfulness and familiarity were not independent, but meaningful-
ness and grammaticality were. Coleman (1965) performed a statistical analysis on
Hill’s (1961) data and found that 86.6% of his meaningless sentences were judged
grammatical (significantly more than chance), from which Coleman infers that
Hill’s subjects were able to distinguish these two dimensions. Moore (1972) (see
Section 3.3.2) reports a case where the existence of a metonymic or metaphoric
reading of a literally ungrammatical sentence might have contributed to its be-
ing rated significantly higher than other structurally identical ones, which could
be viewed as a meaning confound. The sentence in question was College students
read many professors, which supposedly violates selectional restrictions on the
verb read. But, as Moore correctly and humorously points out, “A college profes-
sor may be read in the sense that Plato is read; alternatively, professors may have
such transparent neuroses that they are easily ‘read’ by their students” (p. 558).
It might also be true that meaning and meaningfulness affect the difficulty of
performing grammaticality-related tasks. For instance, Ryan & Ledger (1984) sug-
gest that more cognitive control is required to correct a grammatical error in a
false sentence than in a true one, in order to ignore its falsity. Bialystok (1986)
claims that judging an ungrammatical meaningful sentence takes more analyzed
knowledge, whereas judging a grammatical anomalous one takes more cogni-
tive control. As evidence for the latter claim, she shows that bilingual children
(who are claimed to have superior cognitive control skills) perform better than
monolinguals on this kind of item.
5.3.3 Parsability
To the extent that the human parsing mechanism does not accept precisely the
same set of sentences as the grammar, we should expect that cases where the
parser fails might be taken as unacceptable, even if upon further consideration
we feel that they are grammatical (Clark & Haviland 1974).24 This is perhaps the
most obvious case where speed of judgment would be expected to make a large
difference in judgments, since the parser might take a while to process a difficult
sentence, e.g., the garden paths used by Warner & Glass (1987); see Section 5.3.1.
Once we discover their intended structure, we agree that they must be gram-
matical, but due to parsing failure our initial judgments tend to be negative. Van
Kleeck (1982) suggests that sentence length and complexity will affect judgments.
24 The reverse does not strike me as very likely, i.e., just because a string is easy to parse does not
make us consider it grammatical; but see Section 2.2 for some pathological cases.
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To this I would add any other factors that might make a sentence hard to parse,
such as multiple center-embedding or the serial position of an error; on the latter,
see Section 3.3.3 for a relevant experiment by Marks (1967). Finally, parsability is
closely related to correctability, also discussed in Section 3.3.3: the closer a bad
sentence is to satisfying all the parser’s constraints, the easier it will generally
be to correct.
5.3.4 Frequency
Another possible factor in judgments is the frequency of occurrence of the stim-
ulus materials. This could be taken in at least two ways, to refer to the frequency
of the lexical items in the sentences, or of the sentence structures themselves. I
am not aware of the former having been studied, but Greenbaum (1976b; 1977b)
looked at the latter.25 His experiments involved judgments on closely related
sentence pairs such as active/passive and dative movement contrasts. In the first
phase, subjects (who were linguistically naive) had to judge the sentences’ “over-
all frequency in the English Language” on a 5-tiered scale from “very rare” to
“very frequent.” In the second phase, which occurred a week later, the same
subjects were asked to rate the acceptability of the same sentences, again on
a 5-tiered scale, from “completely unacceptable” to “perfectly OK.” Greenbaum
compared mean numeric scores across 87 subjects and found that, for each sen-
tence, the acceptability rating was within one point of the frequency rating. (In
most cases, acceptability was rated higher than frequency.) On the surface, this
suggests that the two ratings are highly correlated, but no statistical tests were
carried out and there is a potential confound in the experimental procedure. We
do not know if subjects were aware that they were supposed to be judging some-
thing completely different the second time. They might have taken the instruc-
tions as merely a variation in wording of the original procedure. (This possibility
could easily be tested using a between-subjects design.) To the extent that the
aforementioned results of Vetter, Volovecky & Howell (1979) have any validity,
their finding that grammaticality was not independent of ordinariness points in
the same direction. Greenbaum also examined the data on a subject-by-subject
basis, finding that while identical ratings on the two scales were relatively rare,
ratings within one point of each other occurred for 88% of the sentences among
65% of the subjects. By this measure there was also reasonable consistency in the
relationships between the ratings for the members of a related pair of sentences.
25 Note that his measure of frequency was subjective (i.e., people’s judgments of it) rather than
objective, as might be obtained by corpus analysis.
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Whichever of the two was rated more frequent (e.g., the active version) would be
rated more acceptable by half of the subjects in 64% of the cases. If Greenbaum’s
interpretation is correct, we must be wary of grammaticality judgments on very
obscure types of sentence constructions, which might reflect their infrequent na-
ture despite their grammaticality. Following one of my earlier suggestions, a way
to reduce this effect might be to allow subjects a separate frequency rating when
judging acceptability, so that they can express this intuition and perhaps factor
it out of the other judgment. This is presumably what Maclay & Sleator were
trying to do with their ordinariness scale, although the meaning of the term was
probably obscure to most subjects. We must also keep in mind, however, that
Greenbaum has only shown a correlation between perceived frequency and ac-
ceptability, with no evidence about causality.
Some other interesting results were by-products of the fact that sentenceswere
presented in related pairs such as active/passive. In general, across various other
constructions, actives are judged more acceptable than passives (no analysis of
significance was done by Greenbaum). Such a bias must be taken into account
in other analyses. In Chapter 2, for example, I cited an instance where the fact
that the active and passive versions of a sentence were equally marginal formed
part of a theoretical argument (example (8), Section 2.3.3). Of course, no exper-
imental data had been used, but if they were, the general bias against passives
would probably cause the result not to hold up, and yet this differencewould have
nothing to do with the particular theoretical issue involved. Other general biases
were found as well, e.g., favoring present perfects over simple past tenses with
both durative and iterative events, and subjunctives over indicatives and modals
in subordinate clauses of demand or persuasion. The lesson for linguists is that
whenever we rely on a nonminimal contrast, we should separately test each of
the component minimal contrasts as well, to determine which one is responsible
for the difference in acceptability.
5.3.5 Lexical Content
Levelt et al. (1977) wanted to bring home the point that the particular lexical items
chosen to make up an example sentence could affect grammaticality ratings even
when, from a normative point of view, the full range of words should all result
in a grammatical utterance. The particular feature of lexical items they inves-
tigated was the imagery content of compound words in Dutch, by which they
meant the extent to which they were concrete as opposed to abstract, and hence
more easily imaginable. (This idea was inspired by phenomenological reports of
subjects performing judgment tasks by trying to imagine a situation in which the
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phrase in question could be said.) Reaction time was measured as grammatical-
ity ratings and paraphrases of novel Dutch compounds (not complete sentences)
were elicited. The purpose of avoiding lexicalized compounds was to encourage
computation of a rating, rather than the use of lexical look-up. The basic pre-
diction of Levelt et al., that the facilitation effect of imagery would show up in
these judgments, was confirmed. More easily imaginable compounds were rated
significantly more grammatical and judged and paraphrased faster than ones
that were harder to imagine,26 supporting the notion of search for interpreta-
tion as (part of) the decision procedure. (The results for speed of judgment are
confirmed by results in Grant et al. (1977).) The additional twist, however, was
that imagery showed a much greater effect on reaction time for paraphrasing
than for judging grammaticality. Levelt et al. considered two explanations. First,
perhaps imagery is involved in the task of generating a paraphrase, as well as
in comprehending the original sentence. They consider this unlikely, for reasons
not given. Second, perhaps it is the grammaticality judgments that do not require
full imagistic search. That is, once a preliminary check (involving some imagis-
tic component) succeeds, the compound does not need to be fully processed or
understood before being judged as good (see the discussion in Section 5.2.7). As
the authors suggest, this could be tested by timing a task that requires full inter-
pretation but does not involve paraphrase, such as verification (truth judgment).
Whichever explanation is correct, we have another case of a supposedly irrele-
vant variable influencing judgments of grammaticality. McCawley (1985) views
this as an instance of inaccurate reporting of judgments, i.e., the subjects think
they are reporting on grammaticality, but really they are reporting their (degree
of) success in imagining a context.
Another of Greenbaum’s (1977b) experiments examined the effects of lexical
substitution by comparing acceptability ratings between two instances of the
same sentence structure that differed only on certain lexical items. (He does not
give a large range of examples, but the intent seems to have been that these
substitutions could reasonably be expected to have no grammatical implications.)
Again, judgments were on a 5-point scale. For 27 of 50 sentences at least half of
the subjects gave identical ratings to the two variant sentences, and on 47 out of
50, 70% of subjects were within one position on the scale of their initial judgment.
Variants were presented in separate parts of the questionnaire so that memory
for the previous rating would be extremely unlikely, and subjects were explicitly
told not to try to remember their earlier ratings. Thus, this effect seems to be
fairly small.
26 The imagery content of compounds was assessed in a pretest where other subjects reported
how easily the expression lead to mental images of things or events.
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5.3.6 Morphology and Spelling
Langendoen& Bever (1973: 407) claim that there are acceptability differences that
depend on the transparency of morphology in cases where a pronoun later in the
sentence refers to an implicit morphologically related word, e.g., in the contrast
between (20) and (21):
(20) ?Flutists are strange: it doesn’t sound shrill to them.
(21) *Flautists are strange: it doesn’t sound shrill to them.
They claim that (20) is more acceptable than (21) because flute, the implicit an-
tecedent of it, is more obviously part of flutists than of flautists. Unfortunately,
they do not cite actual data on this point; they might simply be expressing their
own intuitions. To my ear, both sentences are equally (quite) bad, but if such a
result should be found systematically, it would constitute another factor to be
taken into consideration. (See Smith 1981 for the argument that the pragmatic
principles that Langendoen & Bever propose should not be able to save truly un-
grammatical sentences from unacceptability.) Some researchers (e.g., Birdsong
1989) have cited this paper as showing that variant spellings cause changes in ac-
ceptability ratings, but Langendoen & Bever make no mention of spelling, which
is confounded with pronunciation in this case. Still, it would not be surprising
to find acceptability differences between alternate spellings of identically pro-
nounced variants, e.g., night versus nite, triggered by relative frequency in the
dialect of the subject. I am not aware of this issue ever having been studied. A
complementary point is made by Hill (1961): before people can judge a sentence,
they must first identify all the morphemes in it, but the presence of a normal into-
nation contour can lead one to interpret apparently familiar morphemes as novel
ones. For instance, the sentence I saw a fragile of, read with declarative intona-
tion, leads speakers to think that there is a novel noun of, rather than identifying
of as the familiar preposition. This can lead them to judge bad sentences good
unless they are informed that “all the words will be familiar,” or some equivalent
statement.
5.3.7 Rhetorical Structure
Langendoen (1972) claims that some apparent cases of ungrammaticality may




(22) a. Mary takes Nancy seriously, but Ollie lightly.
b. Mary takes Nancy seriously, but Ollie takes Nancy lightly.
(23) a. Mary takes life seriously, but Ollie lightly.
b. Mary takes life seriously, but Ollie takes life lightly.
According to Langendoen, people judge that (22a) cannot have the meaning of
(22b), while (23a) can have the meaning of (23b). If this judgment reflects speak-
ers’ grammars, one would have to find a grammatical difference to account for
the asymmetry between the two (b) examples. However, Langendoen argues that
there is a rhetorical principle at work that makes certain readings of grammati-
cally ambiguous sentences more salient than others, to the point where the less
salient reading cannot even be forced. The specific factors behind salience in this
case are not particularly important, but Langendoen speculates that some par-
allelism preference is at work. An object interpretation of Ollie in (23a) would
contrast him with life, so we prefer the subject interpretation in which he is
contrasted with the human Mary, whereas in (22a) the object reading creates a
comparison with Nancy that is more strictly parallel in some sense. What is rele-
vant to us is that a grammatical reading might be judged ungrammatical due to a
competing reading. The lesson to be drawn is that if one must work with poten-
tially ambiguous structures, one had better consider a wide range of exemplars
in order to rule out such possible confounds.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen at least suggestive evidence for effects on gram-
maticality judgments of just about every stimulus and procedure variable one
can think of. Serial order, repeated presentation, deliberate judgment strategies,
modality, register, preparation, and judgment speed are all features of the elic-
itation task that might contribute systematically to variation in judgments. So
might stimulus features, including the various types of contextual material, the
meaningfulness of the sentence, the perceived frequency of the sentence struc-
ture, and idiosyncratic properties of its lexical items. We have also seen some
unpredictable interactions between variables, such as context with repetition,
and mental state with repetition. Interestingly, there has been relatively little
work showing that these variables affect the overall pattern of acceptability re-
sults, e.g., by reversing the relative status of two classes of sentences. It would
be encouraging for the field if this turned out not to happen in general. But per-
haps the biggest lesson is the importance of the instructions we give to subjects.
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In the face of all the disparity in subject interpretations of the intended tasks,
there is a strong temptation to propose that the first order of business should
be to replicate all these studies with much more carefully designed instructional
procedures. There can no longer be any doubt of the importance of this exper-
imental design feature with regard to the elusive definitions of grammaticality
and acceptability, and until this knowledge is acted upon we cannot say much
about the other experimental factors with any certainty. Nevertheless, I attempt
to derive some methodological recommendations from the findings of this and
the preceding chapters. These are presented in Section 6.3, following a specula-
tive discussion of the kind of model one might use to account for them.
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Implications
What sort of process underlies the
formation of a grammaticality
judgment? The only way to ap-
proach this question is to ignore all
a priori linguistic restrictions and
to regard it as a problem in human
information processing.
(Levelt et al. 1977)
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together many of the issues raised and
results reviewed in the preceding chapters to consider what we can learn from
them. I entertain two particular angles on that question, namely, what we can
learn about what goes on in the mind to allow grammaticality judgments to be
made, and what should go on in linguistic experimentation in order for those
judgments to be useful.
In Section 6.2, I take up the idea proposed in Chapter 1 that a useful way to
make sense of a large collection of diverse experimental results is to try to fit
them into a single coherent model of the mental structures that underlie the be-
havior. That is, following the advice of the epigraph above, we should treat this
like any other problem in human information processing. In Section 6.2.1, I re-
view what very little previous work of this sort has been done. In Section 6.2.2,
I propose a preliminary model that provides a way of picturing how the many
mental components discussed so far might be brought together in the judgment
process. Section 6.2.3 presents some examples of ways in which such a model, in
conjunction with specific assumptions about how the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses work, could account for some major findings. In Section 6.3, I move on to
the applied issues. In light of the demonstration in Section 2.3 of the apparent
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necessity of using complex and fine-grained judgments in current theoretical ar-
gumentation, and the dismal record of “insufficient reporting of results or data,
poorly elaborated stimulus materials, or … lack of adequate controls” (Chaudron
1983: 367) evinced in experimental work to date, it should be obvious that con-
siderable care and effort must be put into the elicitation of grammaticality judg-
ments if we are to stand a chance of getting consistent, meaningful, and accurate
results. This is not being done. I therefore make specific recommendations on
how to improve almost every phase of the experimental process. I first examine
the stimulus materials (Section 6.3.1), then the elicitation procedures themselves
(Section 6.3.2), and finally the statistical analysis and interpretation of the results
(Section 6.3.3). I conclude in Section 6.4 by exploring the potential benefits of the
theoretical hypotheses and methodological proposals put forth in the chapter.
6.2 Modeling Grammaticality Judgments
6.2.1 Previous Work
Almost no work has been done to date by way of modeling the psychological
representations and processes involved in making grammaticality judgments, de-
spite the proliferation of models of other language behaviors, most notably sen-
tence processing. The first attempt in this area that I am aware of was the work
of Bialystok & Ryan (1985), described in Section 3.4. From my earlier description,
it should be clear that this is a very high-level model, whose constructs are so
abstract as to have almost no concrete content. This is not to say that they do not
exhibit useful insights, but the details are left for others to work out. While the
authors claim that the dimensions of analyzed knowledge and cognitive control
underlie many of the more specific properties on which people differ (e.g., field
dependence) nothing more specific is said. At the level of detail I wish to work at,
they do not have much to offer. The same is unfortunately true of Van Kleeck’s
(1982) proposed model. Gombert (1992) proposes a model of metalinguistic devel-
opment whose goals are rather different from mine.
Another line of work that could be considered a model of certain aspects of
the grammaticality judgment process is that of Catt (1988; Catt & Hirst 1990),
although this was not his main goal. Catt created a computer program for com-
puter-assisted language instruction that was designed to perform automatic er-
ror diagnosis and correction of ungrammaticalities produced by second-language
learners. In effect, the system was a model of a foreign-language instructor. It
would classify the errors in a sentence as being due to phrase structure, transfor-
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mations, morphology, verb subcategorization, or certain direct translations from
the learner’s native language. The heart of the system was a parser made up of
constraints that could be selectively relaxed when an initial parse failed. Once a
parse was eventually found in this way, the constraint(s) that had been relaxed
indicated the nature and location of the ungrammaticality. (I will return to the
idea of constraint relaxation in Section 6.2.3.) It is possible that people do some-
thing similar when they encounter ungrammaticality, and, if so, the nature and
degree of constraint relaxation might be reflected in their grammaticality ratings.
There is some evidence that people behave systematically and quite uniformly in
interpreting and correcting ungrammatical sentences, e.g., Shanon’s (1973) work
on agreement rules in Hebrew. Unfortunately for us, Catt was not concerned
with extragrammatical factors that could enter into this process, and Shanon’s
scope was very limited, so we shall have to go the rest of the way alone.
6.2.2 The Outlines of a Preliminary Model
If we take just a moment to reflect
just a bit on our own linguistic
performance, how implausible
this whole “underlying generative
grammar” concept seems in the first
place. (Surely nobody but a linguist
would ever have dreamed of such a
thing!)
(Derwing 1979)
In this subsection I propose some high-level accounts of the phenomena dis-
cussed so far in this work, culminating in suggestions for what the relevant cogni-
tive representations might be and what the steps in the grammaticality judgment
process might be. The motivations for modeling this process are given in Chap-
ters 1 and 2 andwill not be repeated here. At this point it is important to stress the
preliminary and speculative nature of these proposals. Much more experimental
work is needed before we can begin to have any real confidence in our knowledge
about the way the mind works in this regard. In addition, what the model should
look like will depend in large measure on many larger unanswered questions in
language processing that also display a lack of well-articulated, well-motivated
models, since a major issue of interest to me is the interface between metaling-
uistic components and those related to regular processing. In these cases I can
only adopt some fairly well-accepted assumptions and proceed.
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To begin, I ask whether there is in fact a static representation of grammatical
knowledge independent of production and comprehension mechanisms. Bever
(Bever (1975b); Lachter &Bever (1988)), amongmany others, has argued for such a
psychogrammar, “an internalized representation of the language, that is not nec-
essarily a model of such behaviors as speech perception or production, but a rep-
resentation of the structure used in those and other language behaviors” (p. 221).
Bever’s strongest argument for his position is based on the existence of two types
of sentence that seem to presuppose mismatches between (psycho)grammatical
status and processing status. Some sentences are unusable yet intuitively well-
formed (e.g., multiply center-embedded ones), while others are usable or compre-
hensible but intuitively ill-formed. While acknowledging that psychogrammar
is redundant for adults, since the production and perception mechanisms are
fully capable of performing the mapping between ideas and utterances, Bever ar-
gues that the psychogrammar plays an important role in acquisition, namely to
bootstrap the two performance systems, to keep them roughly consistent, and to
record accumulated knowledge until it is incorporated in the processing proce-
dures.When acquisition is far enough advanced, the psychogrammarmay uncou-
ple from everyday linguistic performance altogether, leading to the mismatches
mentioned above. Although I do not find the arguments particularly convincing,
I will adopt this assumption, in part for clarity of exposition, in part because it
is such a deep-seated feature of the generative approach. At the same time we
should accept that our concept of the grammar as a separable black box of static
knowledge might eventually have to change. The next question is, what does the
grammar look like? Here I assume a principles-and-parameters model of Univer-
sal Grammar (UG), only because it is the theory I am most familiar with. Now,
what is the relationship between the principles and parameters, the grammar as
a whole (including areas not covered by UG), and the parsing and processing
mechanisms? Again mostly for expository ease, I shall assume that UG is part of
the grammar that is separate from processing mechanisms, which are based on it
in some unspecified way, but function independently. (See Gerken & Bever (1986)
for discussion of the possible relations between linguistic universals, language-
specific structures, and perceptual mechanisms.)
The major question we are attempting to answer by way of a psychological
model is summed up by Klein (1979): “Howmuch of acceptability, or what kind of
acceptability, falls within the scope of grammar, and howmuch is to be accounted
for by other parts of the linguistic description or by disciplines outside linguistics”
(p. 8). This brings us back to two major issues touched on in Chapter 3: how does
linguistic judgment differ from language use, and are any of the manipulations
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to which judgment is susceptible particular to language? In Section 3.4, I discuss
the conceivable extremes in response to the first question: judgment involves all
of the same components as conversation, or the two processes are entirely sepa-
rate. Under either of these scenarios, the answer to the second question would be
fairly uninteresting. If the mechanisms are identical, the only possible source of
influence on judgments is the comprehension mechanism, so whatever we can-
not attribute to that (linguistic) faculty cannot be accounted for. On that basis, we
can probably rule out this model immediately. If the mechanisms are completely
separate, there is no potential for normal language mechanisms to contribute to
linguistic judgments, but since no other process relies on the judgment module,
it can be a black box with arbitrary properties. Whatever effects we find can be
dumped in there. However, if we make the reasonable assumption that reality
lies somewhere between these extremes, then the question of how the various
components contribute to the total process becomes more interesting. Figure 6.1
represents a first attempt at modeling this scenario. I explain below what I have
in mind with the various pieces of the picture, but owing to its speculative nature
I cannot justify the details in any rigorous way. (With reference to the discussion
in Section 1.4 of whether nonlinguistic properties should be attributed to sepa-
rate modules of the mind or to the underlying substrate, I have taken the former
interpretation here mainly for diagrammatic convenience.)
The basic computational metaphor used in Figure 6.1 is that a program, proce-
dure, or strategy uses static data or knowledge to process incoming information
and yield information as output. The entire process is viewed as a computation.
Thus, each computation symbol is connected by dashed lines to the program(s)
that execute in order to perform that computation and to the data source(s) that
must be referenced; the solid lines represent the processing flow. Let us first ex-
amine the upper portion of the diagram, implicated in the comprehension and
production of language. Working from left to right, we see that the input to the
system is a linguistic signal (in whatever modality), which undergoes a com-
prehension process to yield an understanding of the sentence (whatever that
means). I take this understanding to be a temporary product of the computa-
tion, comprising information that might or might not subsequently be stored as
part of one’s long-term knowledge. Comprehension involves the use of parsing
strategies, which I construe quite broadly here to include heuristics that do not
involve assigning any hierarchical structure to the sentence string, such as inter-
preting a Noun-Verb-Noun sequence as Agent-Action-Patient. I certainly do not
wish to claim that every sentence is assigned a complete constituent structure
by the parser. Additionally, comprehension draws on information from compe-
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tence (taken broadly here to include the lexicon); it also makes reference to gen-
eral knowledge and specific memories to resolve ambiguities, etc. (See Berwick &
Weinberg (1984) for a particular view of the interaction between the parser and
the grammar.) On the production side, an utterance begins with the intention
to communicate something. That message is used in the process of generation,
which employs production strategies (whatever it takes to produce a sentence
word by word) that also make use of linguistic competence and world knowl-
edge (e.g., to decide which referential expressions are appropriate) and yields
language output (in whatever modality).
Now let us examine the lower portion of Figure 6.1, which illustrates the gram-
maticality judgment process. The input to this process is the same sort of input
as to the comprehension process, namely, utterances. The output will consist of
judgments themselves, plus other related information that might be elicited in re-
sponse to presentation of an utterance (for more examples, see Section 3.2). Since
these need not be expressed through language (they could involve circling num-
bers on a questionnaire, for instance), no connection to the generation process is
shown, although language generation will incidentally be required in some cases.
The central question is, what processes or strategies are operative in generating
these judgments, and what sources of knowledge do they draw upon? The an-
swer provided in the diagram is in some sense a maximal one. I have included
all the major components that might be involved. Perhaps not all of them are,
and certainly they need not all be implicated in judging a particular sentence.
The inherent danger here is that we will accomplish nothing in modeling if we
merely supply a new component for each new experimental result we wish to
account for. Therefore, we must hypothesize the minimal set of components that
could reasonably capture the range of facts we are concerned with. (I do not
claim to have struck the perfect balance between these criteria.) Let us consider
these components in turn. On the assumption that one of the first things one
does when processing a sentence for judgment is to simply try to understand it,
the usual parsing strategies (in my broad sense) will be involved, and therefore
by assumption so will the linguistic competence that they may draw on and the
general cognitive resources they may use (e.g., short-term memory), with their
incumbent limitations. “It is obvious that the processes of perception are involved
to some extent in rendering acceptability intuitions, since a sentence must be ap-
prehended in some sense in order to be adjudged acceptable, ambiguous, etc. We
can expect there to be cases in which the perceptual processes themselves mod-
ify our apparent intuitions” (Bever & Carroll 1981: 229). If this step is exactly like
normal comprehension, then general knowledge must also be involved, probably
173
6 Theoretical and Methodological Implications
including strategies for handling conversational implicature. In reality, I suspect
its role is somewhat smaller in the case of judgment, if concerns about plausibil-
ity, truth, etc., might be suspended. (See Bever, Carroll & Hurtig 1976 for a review
of work on the components discussed so far.) An interesting question arises if
the perception and production processes themselves encode grammatical infor-
mation, rather than merely referring to the competence module. Bever, Carroll
& Hurtig (1976) propose that these systems are substantially independent of the
grammar (in adults), so that they may parse or generate sequences that the gram-
mar does not include, e.g., by creative analogy. My model would allow for such
sequences to be judged good or bad, depending on howmuch weight the various
judgment sources carry.
The remaining influences are likely to be more controversial. The diagram sug-
gests that production strategies might be involved, in two distinct ways. First, a
yes/no judgment might be arrived at by attempting to generate the sentence in
question. If our production mechanism cannot do so, then we judge the sentence
ungrammatical, unless we have some relevant conscious knowledge about other
dialects.1 It seems that linguists may have better access to this kind of hypotheti-
cal production than untrained speakers, if Kroch (1981) is correct in his claim that
resumptive pronouns can be generated by the production system despite being
ungrammatical; linguists seem to find these more acceptable (see Section 2.2).
Second, production strategies might be employed in the scalar rating, locating,
explaining, and correcting of errors. Intuitively, it seems plausible that all of these
activities involve comparison to a correct or predicted version of the sentence,
and so it must be generated somehow. I am assuming that, while the parsing
mechanism might embody some expectations about its input, it is not capable
of generating a grammatical sentence from an intended meaning. In rating a
marginal sentence, for example, one might first extract the intended meaning,
then generate a grammatical sentence that is the expression of that meaning,
then compare the two to decide how far off the original sentence was. But we
cannot simply employ the regular generation process for this purpose, because
wewish to follow the syntax of the original sentence insofar as it is correct; hence
the use of production strategies referring to the input utterance.
Finally, let us consider those components implicated in grammaticality judg-
ments but not in standard linguistic processing. The analyzed linguistic knowl-
edge component is taken directly from Bialystok & Ryan (1985), and is meant to
include consciously known rules of language such as the prescriptive rules one
learns in school, which might be entirely independent of (unconscious) gram-
1 I thank LouAnn Gerken for discussion of this idea.
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matical knowledge. These would be responsible for labeling a sentence as un-
grammatical if it ends with a preposition, for instance. Bialystok (1979) uses her
experimental findings to argue that an initial good/bad decision is based mostly
on implicit knowledge, while the explicit knowledge just described comes into
play during subsequent error diagnosis. The control strategies are also inspired
by Bialystok & Ryan’s proposal. These strategies, which I take to be indepen-
dent of language or any other particular cognitive function, are responsible for
bringing the focus of attention to the form of an utterance, coordinating all the
sources of information brought to bear in the process, and perhaps even coordi-
nating the other sets of strategies.The lattermight be requiredwhen, for instance,
the parser fails on a sentence that one has been told is grammatical (e.g., a gar-
den path). While many parsing models have been proposed to account for initial
parsing failure on such sentences, very few have dealt with how one can eventu-
ally succeed in finding a valid structure for the sentence. One possibility is that
control strategies intervene to prompt a search for obscure alternatives, such as
verbs that could also be passive participles, as in The horse raced past the barn fell.
Another possibility is that some sort of sentence frame matching takes place, so
that while attempting to figure out The prime number few, one would try to think
of other sentences that end in number few.
The final set of strategies has been simply labeled as metalinguistic, following
the terminology we have seen in much of the literature. This module is meant
to include any algorithm or heuristic used expressly for the purpose of making
grammaticality judgments (in the broad sense). This is where we would find, for
example, the strategy of trying to imagine a plausible context for some ques-
tionable sentence, or enriching the given context to make it seem more natural,
as proposed by Nagata and discussed in Sections 5.2.3–5.2.5. It would also in-
clude procedures for interpreting the trace of execution of the parser (if this is
possible) or the final state of the parser. For instance, failure with a certain set
of conditions indicates that the parser could not find a suitable antecedent for
some anaphor. Other possible strategies include thinking of a parallel construc-
tion to compare the given sentence to (e.g., The child seems tired for The child
seems sleeping); considering the truth or plausibility of the situation described,
by consulting world knowledge (to the extent that these criteria influence judg-
ments); preliminary checking routines that would be run before parsing begins,
as proposed by Levelt et al. (1977); and other strategies discussed in Section 3.4.
Recall that in Section 1.4, it was hypothesized that there are no language-specific
extragrammatical factors involved in the process of grammaticality judgment. It
might appear that the presence of a set of metalinguistic strategies contradicts
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this hypothesis, but in fact it does not, unless the strategies contained in that
module require language-specific means to be implemented. For example, the
imagining of plausible contexts could be carried out in the sameway as any other
sort of imagination, (presumably) independent of language. The fact that such a
strategy can be employed for the purpose of judging grammaticality must be a
fact about language behavior, however. One possible component that I have not
shown explicitly is a decision-making or judgment component for cognition in
general, which might reflect, say, the tendency to use rating scales in a particular
way. Obviously the mindmust have a mechanism for decision making, and it will
be implicated in judgments, but it is hard to conceive of this as a separable mod-
ule of the mind, as opposed to an inherent feature of the low-level processes that
underlie higher cognition. I also have not included any reference to general cogni-
tive processes such as analogical reasoning, and the oft-mentioned but ill-defined
perceptual strategies that are sometimes implicated in language processing. At
this point I consider the evidence for their involvement to be marginal at best.
A couple of other omissions are mostly for the sake of diagrammatic clarity. For
instance, it is possible that some or all of the three components that are shown
connected exclusively to the judgment computation could be used in everyday
comprehension if some special need arose. Also, under certain circumstances,
regular communicative output could be filtered through the judgment compo-
nent as a means of quality control or self-monitoring; perhaps language teachers
regularly do something like this, and everyone might do it to some extent.
If this picture is at all on the right track, then it is clear that we do not expect
judgments to give all sentences the same status that linguistic performance does.
The differences would be attributable to any or all of the components discussed
in the previous two paragraphs. (The results of different metalinguistic tasks will
differ as well, by virtue of how the contents of the modules are used, e.g., which
metalinguistic strategies are employed under what conditions.) In fact, it might
appear that grammaticality judgments are the worst way to get at linguistic com-
petence, as compared to production and comprehension, because they involve
the interaction of many more factors. This conclusion has been reached by oth-
ers before: “Contrary to what has generally been claimed, the relations between
explicit intuitions and underlying competence are less direct than those between
phenomena of primary language use (speaking, listening) and competence” (Lev-
elt, Sinclair & Jarvella 1978: 5–6). However, this by no means constitutes grounds
for abandoning them as a source of data. Several arguments for their use were
presented in Section 1.1; I can now provide two more. First, while more factors
are involved in grammaticality judgments, they might be less mysterious than
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those that are connected to language use. For instance, what exactly is the under-
standing of a sentence, and how would we ever get at it and draw conclusions
about grammaticality from it? The same goes for communicative intentions. Sec-
ond, grammaticality judgments provide an alternative path to the grammar. To
the extent that they are subject to different influences than language use is, we
have a basis on which to search for the common core that underlies both kinds
of behavior. This in turn might help us to factor out various nongrammatical
contributions, so that each path by itself becomes more informative as well. (Of
course, not nearly enough attention is paid to usage data by theoretical linguists
for such a convergence to be applied at this time. While the above is an argument
for not abandoning judgment data, it is also an argument for increasing the at-
tention paid to other types of data.) Studying nonlinguistic judgment tasks in the
framework of this model, as proposed in Section 1.4, will aid in this process by
helping to clarify the role of its nonlinguistic elements.
One thing that is not reflected explicitly in the model presented in Figure 6.1
is the time course of the process of judging grammaticality. Would all the fac-
tors be assessed in parallel, or would some parts necessarily precede others? My
hunch is that it can be usefully thought of in three main phases: parsing, deci-
sion, and diagnosis. The first is fairly uncontroversial, when taken to include the
kinds of heuristics mentioned earlier. The second involves determining what the
rating will be: yes/no, or a number on a scale, or whatever. This might involve
an analysis of the remnants of the parsing process, for instance. The third, diag-
nosis, which might not always occur, involves consciously determining reasons
for the particular ratings chosen, which could be used in explaining the error or
correcting it. As we have discussed before, these might or might not bear any
relation to the actual causes of the decision. This sketchy account will suffice for
the rest of the discussion here; obviously many details remain to be worked out.
6.2.3 Applications of the Model
In order to see how my model might actually account for some interesting facts
about grammaticality judgments, a bit more needs to be said about how the
pieces of this picture are implemented. I will assume the widely used principle
of spreading activation, together with the parallel-processing concept of com-
petition.2 That is, multiple processing paths might be active in parallel, and the
first one to succeed will determine the outcome of the computation. This ap-
proach has already been used by McRoy & Hirst (1990) to implement so-called
2 This is just one possibility that strikes me as promising, but certainly not the only one.
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race-based parsing. In their model, each parsing rule takes a certain amount of
time to execute, determined partially by its complexity but also influenced by the
lexical content of the sentence, previously parsed sentences, etc. Multiple parse
paths are tried in parallel, and whichever succeeds first is used to interpret the
sentence. If none succeeds before a time-out deadline, the parse is considered to
have failed. Thus, different readings of a structurally ambiguous sentence might
be found on different occasions because the time weights associated with the
relevant rules can change. Many order-of-presentation effects can be accounted
for in this way. For instance, a sentence that could not be parsed at one time
(e.g., a garden path) can be parsed at some other time if the required rules have
been strengthened or sped up.This might be accomplished by employing them in
parsing structurally similar non-garden-path sentences. More generally, context
effects due to structural similarity or dissimilarity (see Section 5.3.1) can be de-
rived as well. Bock (1986) provides experimental evidence suggesting that some
mechanism of this sort is needed. Her paradigm involved having subjects repeat
a sentence they had just heard, and then describe an unrelated picture they were
shown, using a single sentence. The pictures were constructed so as to allow two
natural types of sentence descriptions: either active versus passive or dative ob-
ject versus double object. Bock found that the type of sentence that subjects had
to repeat influenced their choice of a syntactic form used in describing the pic-
ture. She argues that this result cannot be attributed to lexical repetition effects,
socially motivated matching of the form of another speaker’s utterance, or per-
sistent discourse strategies that trigger the same syntactic rules, but rather must
be attributed to some purely syntactic decision process.
This scheme can be extended very naturally to deal with graded judgments
of (un)grammaticality. I shall incorporate the idea of constraint relaxation from
Catt’s (1988)’s work, discussed in Section 6.2.1. While it is fairly clear that relax-
ing constraints will allow ill-formed input to be processed and the well-formed
parts recovered, not all constraints can be of equal status if we are to get graded
judgments based on grammatical properties (as opposed to imagery content of
lexical items or other nongrammatical features). That is, it is not sufficient, as it
was for Catt, to know which constraint must be relaxed in order to get through
a sentence. We must know how much of a concession it was to relax that con-
straint. While one can imagine an ad hoc weighting function for this purpose,
it is perhaps more naturally served using the race-based framework. The speed
with which a parse path can be followed if its constraint is violated is inversely
proportional to the importance of the constraint on that path. That is, a path
with a very fundamental constraint (e.g., the lexical category of an input word)
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can be traversed only extremely slowly if the constraint is not satisfied, whereas
a path with a lesser constraint (e.g., a semantic feature restriction on an input
word) can be followed faster than the path with the greater constraint when its
condition is not met, other things being equal.3 Thus, degrees of grammaticality
could be equated with parsing speed, where it is understood that speed is meant
in a somewhat metaphorical sense that need not correspond to actual processing
speed.4
This measure could yield both absolute and graded judgments. The absolute
distinction is based on whether or not any constraints are violated, the graded
measure is based on speed, so that a grammatical but hard-to-parse sentence (e.g.,
a garden path) would be rated the same as a truly ungrammatical sentence, which
is exactly what Warner & Glass (1987) found (see Section 5.3.1). The relative le-
niency for ungrammaticality in spoken, as opposed to written, language could
result from an across-the-board reduction in the time cost of traversing paths (in-
cluding ones whose constraints are violated), in order to keep up with the real-
time demands of continuous speech. Situationally related context could speed
up parsing by decreasing the time required to access meanings and other proper-
ties of relevant words. In the same way, a processing advantage is predicted for
frequently versus infrequently occurring words. The relative strengths of parse
paths should also be reflected in corrections, i.e., how you change a bad sentence
to make it good. Presumably, whatever was implicated in the constraint that got
relaxed will be changed, since it is the only known locus of error. If you were to
make a correction somewhere else, you could not be assured that it would be suf-
ficient. Of course, we have seen that graded judgments can arise on awide variety
of nonlinguistic tasks as well. In my view, this occurs because race-based imple-
mentation is a feature of cognitive processing in general. I conclude this section
by suggesting that the same competition principle can be applied at a macro level
as well. Consider the situation where an ungrammatical but comprehensible sen-
tence is encountered, e.g., I just bought a CD for me. Different knowledge com-
ponents contribute to different views of this sentence. According to linguistic
3 It seems that this approach could be applied quite directly to account for prototypicality effects
of the kind discussed in Section 3.3.1. If an exemplar of a concept (e.g., bird) lacks a fundamental
property (e.g., ability to fly), it will take longer to verify than one that lacks a less important
property of the prototype.
4 This scheme bears a certain resemblance to the concept of fuzzy grammar (see Mohan (1977)
for a concise review). The idea is that each derivational rule that applies to generate a sentence
rates its output on the basis of features of its input, eventually yielding a well-formedness
rating between 0 and 1 for the sentence as a whole. But note that I am crucially not attributing
this mechanism to the grammar itself.
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competence, the sentence is ill-formed because it contains an improperly bound
pronoun. Our knowledge of the world, and specifically the knowledge that Boris
just walked in the door with a CD in hand (still in its factory shrinkwrap), allows
us to interpret the sentence without any difficulty. Which component will be al-
lowed to determine our reaction to the sentence – to ignore the error and take
up the conversation, to make a mental note that Boris does not speak perfect En-
glish, to tell him he has made a mistake and see if he can discover it, or to blurt
out the correct version of the sentence? This decision can be seen as the result
of a competition, where the “speed” of each processing module is determined by
the demands of the situation. Thus, teaching an ESL class primes grammatical
competence and correction strategies, everyday conversation favors parsing, the
current situation activates relevant knowledge of the world, seeing oneself in a
mirror might strengthen the communicative over the structurally based strate-
gies, and so forth. Of course, for speakers we know, this choice might have been
made for good when we first got to know them. Under this interpretation, the
control strategies themselves might not exist as strategies per se, but as the by-
products of spreading activation and race-based competition.
6.3 Methodological Proposals
More and more subtle theory is now
being constructed on less and less
clear cases. In such a situation one
would expect linguistics to turn to
appropriate behavioral methods
of data gathering and (statistical)
analysis. Nothing of the sort occurs,
however.
(Levelt et al. 1977)
6.3.1 Materials
There are basic precautions that could easily be taken in preparing materials for
the elicitation of grammaticality judgments in order to avoid certain obvious
kinds of bias.5 One potential confound is the order in which sentences are pre-
sented to subjects. It has been shown experimentally (e.g., by Greenbaum (1973))
5 Several of the suggestions in Section 6.3 have been synthesized from Birdsong (1989), Ray &
Ravizza (1988), and Snow (1975).
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that sentences will be rated differently depending on their order of presentation.
A simple way to factor this effect out of results is to counterbalance orders across
different subjects, thus controlling for nervousness at the beginning of the ses-
sion, fatigue at the end, practice effects, the influence of surrounding test items,
and any other serial position effects. (Of course, this requires that one consult
more than one subject.) A second kind of bias is introduced if there are sub-
stantially more grammatical sentences in the test materials than ungrammatical
sentences or vice versa. Subjects will tend to get into a yea-saying or nay-saying
mode or will come to expect deviance.Thus, the numbers should be kept roughly
equal. (We will need pilot trials to gather preliminary data for this purpose, since
we presumably do not know the outcome of all the judgments in advance.) A
third factor in our list of potential confounds in stimulus materials is the seman-
tic content of the lexical items in the sentence.6 As mentioned in Section 5.3.5 it
is simply not true that people will rate all structurally identical sentences equally
grammatical. For example, Levelt et al. (1977) found that different ratings could
be induced by varying the imagery content of a sentence, i.e., the degree to which
it represented an imaginable or concrete situation. With a good understanding
of such a factor, one can reduce its effect by avoiding sentences at the extremes
of imagistic content,7 and by using several different exemplar sentences with
the structure in question across subjects. That is, the lexical content of the sen-
tences should be varied to guard against the influence of imagery, and any other
potential biases of lexical items, such as word length, frequency, and semantic
peculiarities. In light of the findings by Hill (1961), it might also be best to inform
subjects that only common words will be used, or that if they are not sure about
the status of a word, they should ask the experimenter. This would circumvent
the possibility of subjects interpreting of as an unfamiliar noun, for instance.
More controversial than any of these issues in preparing materials is the sur-
rounding contextual material, of all the various types. We have all had the expe-
rience of thinking at first that a sentence is totally ungrammatical, only to have
someone suggest a real-world situation where it is quite plausible and sounds
fine. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, there are numerous ways that context can in-
fluence grammaticality, from bringing out rarewordmeanings to priming certain
6 Obviously, some semantic features of words are directly relevant to grammaticality; here, as in
Section 5.3.2, I am concerned with properties not generally considered grammatically relevant.
7 Alternatively, Birdsong (1989) proposes that only high-imagery content words should be used,
so that all subjects can see the sentences as potentially referential and meaningful. Whether
this is a good idea should probably be determined on the basis of experiments comparing the
two methodologies; to my knowledge Birdsong’s proposal has not yet been followed.
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parsing procedures.8 There is certainly no universally correct answer to the ques-
tion of what sort of context, if any, is suitable for particular elicitation purposes,
but it is a variable that cannot be ignored. Ratings of sentences in context cannot
be compared with those made in isolation, for example. The consensus among
the authors surveyed in the present work seems to be that a supporting pragmat-
ically related context should always be provided, unless that would somehow
defeat the purpose of the experiment. Since only structural well-formedness is
at issue, not pragmatic appropriateness, if there exists a situation where the sen-
tence would be appropriate, why should we not lead the subject to that situation?
Furthermore, we will reduce between-subject variability by not leaving subjects
to their own devices in imagining situations where the sentence might occur,
which many researchers claim would otherwise be a major part of the judgment
process. Of course, the question that then arises is what to do with sentences that
seem to have no imaginable context. Householder (1973) claims that a sentence
can be ungrammatical for that reason alone, i.e., that usability is not entirely sep-
arable from structural well-formedness. (The example he gives, which I do not
find particularly problematic, is Harry reminds me of himself.)
Depending on the purpose of the experiment, one might wish to avoid choos-
ing sentences whose rating is likely to be confounded by parsing difficulty. For
instance, the garden paths studied by Warner & Glass (1987) showed extreme
parsing difficulty. Since these researchers were interested in the parsing pro-
cess, rather than in grammaticality per se, these were sensible choices, but if
one wishes to know whether a sentence is accepted by the grammar, it does not
make sense to confuse grammaticality with low parsability. Of course, the dis-
tinction might not always be obvious ahead of time, but one could call on a pilot
study with a post-test questionnaire, where the intended interpretation of a sen-
tence that was judged ungrammatical is stated, and the subject is asked whether
the sentence is still bad under this reading.
If one wishes to detect very small differences between sentences, then it is cru-
cial that they be matched as closely as possible on as many features as possible,
including semantic plausibility (Carden & Dieterich 1981). That is, they should
be minimal pairs at the sentence level. When the relative grammaticality of two
or more related forms is at issue, it is best to allow subjects to see them side by
side and draw their attention to the comparison. The order among the related
sentences, and the order among the sets of such sentences, should still of course
be counterbalanced. Judgment tests are likely to give misleading results if the
8 For some striking demonstrations of how apparent word salad can be made plausible by con-
text, see Hill (1961), especially fn. 4.
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sentences used contain features that are unrepresentative of the whole range of
sentences to which the results should generalize. Thus, Levelt (1974: vol. 3) and
Bolinger (1971) plead for the avoidance of additional unnaturalness that has noth-
ing to do with the crucial issue at stake but takes attention away from it. Levelt
cites numerous cases where this seemingly obvious admonition has been vio-
lated, e.g., by what he views as unnecessary loading of short term memory (That
Tom’s told everyone that he’s staying proves that it’s true that he’s thinking that it
would be a good idea for him to show that he likes it here) or by the extra semantic
load resulting from an unusual situation (I dreamed that I was a proton and fell
in love with a shapely green-and-orange-striped electron), when these were not
required for the issues under investigation (Levelt 1972). Again, to guard against
unintentional distractions of this type, multiple sentence frames should be built
around the same crucial construction wherever possible.
6.3.2 Procedure
Good practice in the more advanced
sciences distrusts most of all the
memory and impressions of the
investigator himself.
(Labov 1978)
Once we have minimized potential confounds in the stimulus materials, the next
logical step is to remove confounds from the process of gathering judgments.
The first issue is the selection of subjects, perhaps the worst offense with regard
to experimental method in linguistics to date. Here I would implore that these
must be people with no linguistic training. If it is the competence of normal
native speakers that we claim to be investigating, we need to study random sam-
ples of normal native speakers. This is almost never done by theoretical linguists.
(Bolinger (1968), Greenbaum (1976a) and Derwing (1979) also make this point.)
They first consult their own intuitions (one cannot find a more biased subject
than the investigator), then their colleagues in the next office (almost as biased),
and if they are really ambitious, perhaps a couple of their students (not exactly
objective either, since students likely knowwhich result their professors are hop-
ing for and would like to gain their favor.) While striking differences between
linguists and nonlinguists have not been convincingly demonstrated empirically
due to poor experimental designs (see Section 4.4.1), we have enough reasons to
expect them to be different that linguists simply ought to be excluded. Also, the
small samples of linguists that are usually available are bound to lead to unre-
liabilities (Bradac et al. 1980). Nonetheless, linguists continue to insist that the
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ease of obtaining data is a reason for preferring oneself as a subject, ignoring the
inferior quality of the data so obtained (Newmeyer 1983: 50) claims this justifi-
cation is uncontroversial!). If linguists wish to live up to scientific standards of
data validity, it is time for them to abandon the convenient fiction that data is
never further away than their own minds.
Subjects must be sufficient in number in order for the assumptions of the re-
quired statistical tests to be met and to avoid distorting the results with atypical
speakers. If there is any reason to suspect regional variation on the issue at hand,
an effort should be made to find speakers of various dialects (this would usually
be a good idea in any case). Snow (1975) and Ringen (1979) suggest that subjects
be pretested and screened for their ability to judge reliably,9 but such a procedure
might systematically exclude a relevant class of judgments. A similar objection
could be raised against the exclusive use of expert language users, e.g., prominent
authors. Judgment tests should be carried out in a controlled setting, to decrease
the chances that subjects will be “inebriated, inattentive, mendacious or whim-
sical” (Grandy 1981); the pub where everyone goes at the end of a conference is
probably not an ideal locale. Individual differences on potentially relevant factors
such as age, sex, and education should at least be noted on a personal question-
naire so that variability attributable to them can be examined in the analysis. If
multiple conditions are being used (e.g., with context versus without), random
assignment of subjects or counterbalancing on these factors is important.
The next problem linguists have is with the instructions to subjects. What ex-
actly should one ask them to do? No two studies seem to agree. Certainly we
have seen that one cannot hope for the terms grammatical or acceptable to have
their intended meanings for naive subjects. Chaudron (1983) and many others
point out the potentially nonunitary measure that would result. Experimenters
must put considerable effort into designing an explanation for their subjects on
how they want them to make their judgments, at least until such time as the field
can agree on a standard set of instructions.10 This will require linguists to make
9 Reliability here means judging consistently on different occasions and under different circum-
stances, as well as giving reports that correlate as closely as possible with one’s true intuitions,
e.g., thinking carefully about possible contexts before deciding a sentence is impossible.
10 Standardized instructions might seem unlikely ever to be adopted, given that there are ap-
parently very few such cases in psychology, which is generally much more concerned with
procedural matters than linguistics. I would argue that, unlike in psychology, large numbers
of linguists are interested in asking exactly the same questions about their stimuli (sentences).
At the very least, we can hope to make widely known what sorts of directives do and do not
work. In fact, Bley-Vroman, Felix & Ioup (1988) reproduce their complete set of instructions
and encourage other researchers to use it so that their results will be comparable. The instruc-
tions essentially ask the subjects to consider whether they feel the stimuli sound like possible
English sentences for them, and to concentrate on structure.
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explicit exactly what counts toward grammaticality, which perhaps can only be
done with reference to particular types of theoretical issues being investigated.
For this reason, I cannot propose a generally applicable set of instructions here,
but I can suggest how to make them effective. Most experiments seem to have
erred on the side of describing the task too briefly and vaguely. Instructions
should be specific, should mention possible reasons why a sentence should be
considered bad, and should also mention potential reasons that should not come
into play. Asking subjects to say sentences out loud rather than just reading them
silently may help to overcome some prescriptive compunctions associated with
written norms. Give examples of sentences that you consider unequivocally good
and unequivocally bad (but that do not contain the construction you wish to test)
and explain why the good one is good, despite some irrelevant properties (e.g.,
meaninglessness) and why the bad one is bad, despite other irrelevant properties
(e.g., interpretability). The examples should cover a wide enough range to avoid
problems like the one Birdsong (1989) encountered. He reports that his subjects
claimed a stimulus item was not a sentence because it was a question! Run some
practice trials in which the subjects think aloud during the judgment process, so
that you can point out if they are using inappropriate criteria. It is important
to keep the statement of instructions itself down to a reasonable length. Other-
wise it “becomes an essay on linguistics that only a sophisticated informant can
understand, and only an unusually patient one will read” (Carden 1970a: 296).
If the field had a standard set of instructions, then at the very least everyone
would be testing the same thing, even though considerable refinement would
be required to make it the thing we are interested in. Results could be meaning-
fully compared across experiments, which is currently not possible.11 This must
become possible, however, if there is any chance of making linguistics a more ob-
jective endeavor. If the only people we can gather data from are other linguists,
all hope is lost. (See Newmeyer (1983: 61) for the view that this state of affairs
is unlikely to change anytime soon.) An alternative suggestion, made somewhat
tongue-in-cheek by Hirst (1981: 101), is the establishment of a central sentence-
testing service to which linguists would send their crucial sentences (and some
money) and get back in the mail a standardized set of experimentally elicited rat-
ings. This would eliminate the time and effort that would be required to set up
appropriate testing facilities in each department, ensure consistent procedures,
and reduce the overhead expense by dividing it among a larger user population.
Of course, it would create a new set of problems, too.
11 There is still an idealization here: while we can make instructions the same for all subjects, we
cannot control for possible differences in the way they interpret those instructions.
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Having dealt with how the concept of grammaticality is to be conveyed, we
must now consider what to ask subjects to do with it. The biggest issue here is
whether to use absolute ratings, and if so on what scale, or relative rankings,
and if so on how many sentences at a time. If rankings are used, should we ask
for a grammaticality threshold to be drawn, as some studies have done? The is-
sues surrounding this choice are discussed in detail in Section 3.3.4, and will not
be repeated here. The goals of the experiment will obviously play a role in this
decision. All other things being equal, most researchers advocate comparative
judgments, on the basis of their higher reliability. If a rating scale is used, I argue
that it should be a balanced one. That is, unlike Nagata’s scales (see Section 5.2.3)
where 1 = grammatical, and 2–n are degrees of badness, it should range evenly
from good to bad, with middling being in the middle. If verbal descriptions of
the various positions on the scale are given, some care is called for.12 Green-
baum & Quirk (1970) and Ellis (1991) advise against calling a middle rating “not
sure,” for instance, because this carries the potentially negative connotation that
the subject is unable to make a decision, rather than labeling the sentence as in-
termediate in grammaticality. In fact, both answers should be available, so that
cases where the subject truly is unsure can be treated separately. Greenbaum
& Quirk also recommended against calling the middle category “marginal or
dubious,” as Quirk & Svartvik (1966) did, because this terminology sounds too
technical. In fact, I believe the use of more than one rating criterion should be se-
riously considered. If one gives subjects a chance to rate grammaticality, stylistic
felicity, likelihood of occurrence in conversation,13 and their own (un)certainty
separately, this should reduce the chances that the latter factors will play a role in
subjects’ ratings of the first. People seem to want to express their feelings about
these other matters, so it is best to give them the opportunity to do so explicitly.
The effectiveness of the rating scale(s) also depends on warm-up trials that en-
compass a representative range of sentences. At this stage (unlike the detailed
examples advocated earlier) they probably should include sentences of the type
that will occur in the experimental trials, otherwise there is a risk that novel stim-
uli will show a primacy effect. Using relevant sentences in practice trials is not a
problem as long as experimenters do not bias the subjects with their own opin-
ions of these sentences. In general, the purpose of warm-up trials is for subjects
12 Wayne Cowart (personal communication) recommends anchoring only the endpoints of the
scale with descriptions, because labeling intermediate points might induce subjects to use the
scale unevenly.
13 Householder (1973) lists numerous other questions that might be usefully posed, depending




to arrive at the response strategy that works best for them, so that subsequent
experimental trials will reflect a fairly stable process.
Carden (1970a) points out a problem with eliciting grammaticality judgments
only on a questionnaire, rather than in an interview: “You often must focus on a
particular reading or construction. It is of no value to know that speaker X con-
siders a sentence ungrammatical if you do not know that his reason for rejecting
it is unrelated to the construction you are studying” (p. 296). He thus argues for
greater use of interviews, an issue to which I return below. I agree that asking
for some sort of explanation is crucial to knowing that a sentence was rejected
for the right reasons in many cases. However, there are ways of getting at which
feature(s) of a sentence cause a subject to reject it, even with a written question-
naire. One can ask subjects to indicate the location of any errors they perceive,
to explain why sentences are incorrect, and/or to correct them. If this is done,
however, it is crucial to balance these tasks with corresponding ones to be per-
formed if the sentence is good, otherwise subjects might be biased toward good
ratings just to avoid the extra work. (Studies by Snow (1975) and Hakes (1980)
had this problem.) As mentioned in Section 3.2, the most obvious candidate task
is paraphrase: ask the subject to rewrite the sentences in a different way while
preserving their meaning. This can additionally tell us how the sentence was in-
terpreted, which could be useful information. (Of course, whether paraphrasing
is as demanding as explaining errors is hard to assess, but it is a step in the right
direction.) A similar kind of bias to that just discussed was exhibited by Rose’s
(1973) study, described in Section 4.4.1. His materials contained equal numbers
of good and bad sentences (according to the sources they were drawn from), but
subjects were divided by being asked to mark either the good or the bad sen-
tences, while leaving the other kind unmarked. The groups differed significantly
in the number of sentences accepted, with each group leaving more than half the
sentences unmarked. This seems to be another instance of bias toward minimal
action. To avoid it, subjects must be given the same amount of work to do no
matter how they rate a sentence.
The issue of by what means judgments are to be elicited is another important
question of methodology.Themost detailed examination of this problem is found
in Carden (1976b). His main concern was to find ways of increasing the reliability
of elicited judgments, that is, the extent to which later ones by the same speak-
ers or separate ones from other speakers of the same speech community will be
consistent. Carden concurs with my own position that the major difficulties lie
in explaining the task to naive subjects, particularly in noninteractive forms of
data elicitation, such as (forced-choice) questionnaires. At the opposite end of the
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interactivity scale is the open-ended interview, which is rarely used systemati-
cally by linguists, but is claimed to yield considerably cleaner data than question-
naires. Carden cites two examples of interview studies that were later replicated
with questionnaires. In both cases, the interview results showed clear patterns,
whereas virtually no systematic patterns could be found in the questionnaire
results. A plausible explanation for this is that interviews provide more opportu-
nity for the experimenter’s bias to influence the subjects (Newmeyer 1983), but
Carden argues that there is evidence to suggest that interviews also allow real
improvement in data quality, because the task can be explained in more detail,
subjects’ questions can be answered, and misunderstandings can be set straight.
In follow-up interviews to the questionnaires, he found that much of the noise in
the data was due to irrelevant readings of stimulus sentences, and in cases where
statistical analysis was available, it did show significant patterns of the same sort
found in interviews, although they were much less obvious from casual inspec-
tion of the unanalyzed data. Still, Carden acknowledges that until potential bias
effects are studied in more detail, interviews remain suspect. In fact, he paints a
gloomy overall picture that might not have improved much in the intervening
years:
The linguist’s own intuitions are plainly untrustworthy. Direct observation
of performance, while potentially important as a means of validating other
methodologies is impractical as a primary technique. Performance tasks
seem to be even less reliable than evaluation [judgment] tasks, and are dif-
ficult to adapt to the more interesting syntactic problems. Forced-choice
questionnaires are also difficult to construct, and have at best marginal re-
liability and very noisy data. Open-ended interviews seem to produce clear
results, but are very time-consuming and may have bias problems. (p. 103)
I suggest following the standard practice in social science of using interviews
in the preliminary phases of an investigation only. Once potential ambiguities,
misunderstandings, etc., have been discovered, the materials can be adjusted to
deal with them and controlled experiments run, so that statistical analysis can
legitimately be applied to the results. Another standard technique that could be
useful in preliminary investigations is the focus group (Graeme Hirst, personal
communication). Speakers could discuss test sentences among themselves, em-
ploy them in different contexts, point out problematic features, etc., while the
experimenter observes surreptitiously. In this procedure, grammaticality judg-
ment would be a group, as opposed to an individual, activity. Hirst believes this
approach is valuable even beyond the preliminary stages. Citing the work of
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Schober & Clark (1989), who argue that understanding in a conversation is a col-
laborative process wherein the participants work together moment by moment
to achieve comprehension (which explains why overhearers do not understand
as well as addressees), he proposes that judging grammaticality in a group set-
ting could be profitably carried out in a parallel manner. I am not aware of this
approach having been systematically tried.
Moving on now from the task itself, psychology has identified several kinds
of experimenter effects, induced by the behavior of the experimenter, which can
bias results (see also Labov (1975) and Greenbaum (1988)). In the linguistic case,
there is great potential for the investigator to influence a subject’s judgments,
even if the experiment is not an interview per se. Experimenters might influence
judgments by demonstrating the procedure using sample sentences that are re-
lated to the test materials; by the idiolect of their own speech, which might be
different from the subject’s; or by subtleties of their interaction with the subject,
e.g., how they respond when the subject gives a judgment they do not expect.
Heringer (1970) raised many of these issues over 20 years ago, in a passage that
has been widely cited by psycholinguists, but that seems to have been ignored
by most theoreticians: “In the casual interaction between linguist and informant,
there are many opportunities for self-fulfilling prophesies to take effect, both
ones conditioned by theoretical position and also ones conditioned by the lin-
guist’s own idiolect. This could occur even without the conscious knowledge of
the linguist, especially if stress and intonation are not controlled” (p. 294; see
also Bradac et al. 1980). These dangers are fairly easily removed, if one is aware
of them, by not using the investigator as an experimenter and by scrutinizing the
instruction and elicitation phases for potential influence. Carden (1970a) warns
us that the linguist could also bias results by inconsistent coding of speakers’ re-
sponses, so this should be done by disinterested parties as well. Typically, each
set of responses would be coded independently by two judges, and consistency
between them should be measured and reported.
Sentence judging is also particularly susceptible to what are known as matu-
ration effects (also sometimes called order effects). These include the results of
being asked for too many judgments at one sitting, such as boredom, frustration,
and fatigue, which lead to inaccurate responses because the subject stops caring
about the outcome. Satiation, whereby symbols lose their meaning after repeated
exposure, strips subjects of their intuitions altogether (Quirk & Svartvik 1966). As
Carden (1976a) puts it, “being an informant is very tiring; they find that after a
while all sentences begin to sound alike” (p. 8). Short sessions and varied stim-
ulus materials are the obvious remedies. Closely related to the effects just men-
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tioned are testing effects. These include practice or training, whereby the subject
gains skill in the judgment task over time, making early results not comparable
with later ones. These can be controlled for across subjects by counterbalancing
orders, as discussed in Section 6.3.1, but they will still distort within-subject com-
parisons. There is also potential for the subject to become aware of what particu-
lar issues the experimenter is interested in, which can cause the crucial sentences
to be treated specially. Again, Carden (1976a) has recognized this danger: “If the
informant hears similar constructions in quick succession, his remembered re-
sponse to the previous sentence influences his response to the current one” (p. 8).
For instance, subjects might identify parasitic gap constructions as the items of
interest and decide that they ought to rate every one of these identically, regard-
less of their actual intuitions. (In Section 2.3.4, I suggest that linguists regularly
do this.) This should be avoided by using enough filler or distractor sentences,
i.e., ones that are unrelated to the crucial construction. These will also serve as
anchors, to remind subjects of the range of potential goodness and badness; oth-
erwise, after looking at marginal sentences for a long time, subjects might start
spreading their ratings out farther on the scale.|israting scale, subjects’ use of
A more bizarre variable that can apparently affect subjects’ perception of the
purpose of the study is experimental setting. In a study by Greenbaum & Quirk
(1970), performance tests were conducted on two groups of college students, one
in a lecture hall with white-coated strangers as experimenters, the other in the in-
vestigators’ own English department with familiar professors as experimenters.
The test itself was tape recorded, so there could be no bias in the stimulus mate-
rials themselves, and yet the authors found significant differences between the
two groups in the number of relevant noncompliances (RNCs):compliance tests
the group with strangers showed fewer RNCs, i.e., they obeyed the instructions
more strictly. Subsequent interviews showed the two groups of subjects had been
put into different mental sets, thinking the test had a linguistic versus a psycho-
logical purpose.Those with the former opinion were more inclined to make their
sentences into correct English, while the latter group was more concerned with
remembering the stimulus sentence accurately. The authors conclude, “We have
seen that opinions of the test’s purpose can importantly affect RNC scores and
that the opinions themselves can be easily affected to a significant degree by
small changes in test (and pre-test) conditions” (p. 58). Greenbaum (1977c) rec-
ommends telling subjects what the experiment is really about, so that they will
not introduce variability in the results by making differing guesses. A final pro-
cedural consideration is the mode of presentation of the sentences. It is common
knowledge that spoken and written language have vastly differing norms (which
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might be attributable to the dimensions of interactivity and/or permanence of the
communicative medium), so we should expect that judgments of sentences in the
two modalities will reflect these differences (as discussed in Section 5.2.6); the
two cannot be directly compared. If oral presentation is used, sentences should
be read by a disinterested person, not the linguist, and audio recorded to ensure
uniformity of intonation, and to edit out any speech errors; trained announcers
serve this purpose well. If instructions are orally presented, these too should be
recorded to ensure uniformity.
6.3.3 Analysis and Interpretation of Results
Levelt (1974) has complained that linguistics lacks a theory of interpretation, that
is, a standard specification of how data are considered to bear on the theory.
I conclude this section with some specific suggestions about the interpretation
of grammaticality judgment data. The first seems almost too obvious to mention,
and yet linguists consistently ignore it: without performing statistical tests of sig-
nificance, we cannot knowwhether trends in our data are likely due to chance or
to actual facts about grammars (or some other part of the mind), unless we truly
have sledgehammer results. The more levels of grammaticality we try to distin-
guish, the less unanimitywe find, and themorewe need to rely on statistics. Hirst
(1987: 157, fn. 31) cites a particularly serious example of this type of shortcoming.
In an empirical study of ambiguity, Ford, Bresnan & Kaplan (1982) argue for a
particular parsing theory on the basis of slight preferences of sentence readings
among their subjects (e.g., an 11-to-9 majority in one case). Hirst shows that 12 of
the 51 preferences they present as evidence are not statistically significant. (See
Birdsong (1989) for other examples of spurious interpretations of experimental
data.) Another problem of statistical ignorance, originally pointed out by Clark
(1973), is the language-as-fixed-effect fallacy. Clark’s point is that even when we
find statistically significant results on a grammaticality test, we cannot necessar-
ily generalize from the actual sentences used in the study to all sentences of the
same form. The statistical analysis must treat the materials as a random rather
than a fixed factor, which results in more stringent criteria for significance, but
many studies have failed to do this. Additionally, the implications of the way the
stimuli are gathered must be considered. It might not be crucial to do true ran-
dom sampling of sentences (it is not entirely clear what that would mean), but, as
suggested in Section 6.3.1, experimenters must consider the extent to which their
materials are representative of the population of sentences to which they would
like their results to generalize. (Clark also points out other common statistical
problems with psycholinguistic experimentation.)
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Simple statistical comparison of judgment ratings is not the only type of anal-
ysis that can be used to learn about grammaticality. Bradac et al. (1980) were
motivated by the belief that looking at a single measure, such as grammatical-
ity/acceptability, might conceal the “rich, multi-dimensional nature of language
judgments.” Thus, their technique was geared to multiple factor analysis. Their
stimuli were broken down similarly to those of Maclay & Sleator (1960), by the
various types of errors in sentences, including “school grammar” errors, typical
foreign learner errors, and sentences that are supposedly grammatical although
unacceptable. They asked 13 questions about each sentence that were answered
on 7-point scales, including “Is this grammatical?”; “Is this English?”; “Is this
clear?”; and “Is the speaker educated?”. As usual, none of these terms were ex-
plained to the subjects, so it should not surprise us to see the authors conclude
that “persons may be quite sensitive to the precise way in which such questions
are asked,” especially since half their subjects were linguists, the other half non-
linguists. They also recorded various other attributes of the subjects. The experi-
mental procedure was very carefully controlled. For instance, ratings on the var-
ious scales were elicited in different orders on different trials and the positions
of the extremes of the scales were reversed for half the trials. The problem with
this and most other multivariate studies is that it is very hard to draw any firm
conclusions from them; what one is left with is a bunch of correlations among
variables. For instance, the 13 rating scales were factored into four major dimen-
sions, one of which was interpreted as grammaticality/acceptability.14 Among
the personal attributes, linguistic training or lack of it was a systematic source
of variation in judgments, and so were the number of sisters the subject had and
the subject’s birth order, whereas sex and handedness accounted for very little
variation. Still, this type of analysis can yield useful insights that might otherwise
be overlooked.
One principle of interpretation thatmany researchers in this area have stressed
(e.g., Chaudron (1983)) is that any conclusion on the basis of a single kind of ex-
perimental test is dubious. Wherever possible we should appeal to cross-method-
ology validation (Carden & Dieterich 1981). Even in cases where one kind of task
(e.g., judgments) yields reliable results, its validity as an indicator of linguistic
competence is suspect because of the numerous potential intervening factors, as
discussed in Section 6.2. But if the same results show up reliably across additional
types of task, such as unwarned judgments, performance tasks like those used by
Quirk& Svartvik (1966), short-termmemorymeasures, unintrusive reactionmea-
14 The scales that comprised this dimension were “is grammatical/is ungrammatical,” “is accept-
able/is unacceptable,” and “is correct/is incorrect.”
192
6.3 Methodological Proposals
sures such as event-related brain potentials, sentence completion tasks, or natu-
ralistic observation of speech and writing, then the odds are much higher that
the evidence does represent a convergence on fundamental underlying knowl-
edge. In his review of early work, Carden (1976b) as showing that judgments are
correlated with other performance measures.
This raises the more general question of replication. Following basic scientific
principles, the elicitation of grammaticality judgments ought to be a replicable
method of data gathering. Greenbaum (1977c) proposes four possible types of
replication experiment. First, one can perform the same experiment on a differ-
ent set of subjects. However, while the same outcome will support the original
result, it is not so clear how to interpret a different outcome. Is the procedure
flawed, were the first results a fluke, or do the new subjects actually have differ-
ent grammars? Thus, one might prefer to repeat the experiment with the same
subjects after some time has elapsed. Then interpreting the results is straightfor-
ward, but procedural problems might arise in getting subjects to attend a second
session and there is the possibility that they will take a different approach to
the task based on their first experience. A third possibility would be to keep
the subjects, but replace the stimulus sentences with lexically varied but struc-
turally equivalent ones. Of course, it is hard to know in advance which lexical
items could actually be syntactically relevant, so once again negative results are
problematic. The fourth possibility is essentially that discussed in the previous
paragraph, namely, to keep the stimuli and subjects the same, but take a different
measure of intuitions, e.g., change from a rating to a ranking task. Here the blame
assignment problem is somewhat easier: differences are most likely caused by ex-
tragrammatical factors that differ across the two tasks. The problem is then to
determine which set of judgments (if either) reflects the grammar more directly.
The final and perhaps most troubling problem I will comment on in inter-
preting grammaticality judgments is what to make of inconsistencies, be they
changes in one subject’s judgments over time or disagreements among subjects.15
Fillmore (1979) points out that we must first rule out the possibilities that our
data gathering was faulty, or that our subjects were uncooperative, insensitive,
or unreliable, before concluding that different grammars are the cause. Gener-
ative linguists have often suggested that the between-speaker differences that
are found represent minor disagreements on fringe data, but that the major sub-
15 In Section 3.3.2, I raise the issue of what should count as an inconsistency. Different exper-
imenters have used different criteria for deciding when two judgments are consistent. Some
require them to be identical, while others allow a one-point variation on a scale of three or four
values. Birdsong (1989) points out that a yea-saying bias, as found by Mohan (1977), reported
in Section 3.3.4, can artificially inflate consistency scores.
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stance of the grammar is the same for everyone, being a function of, say, UG
plus parameter settings.16 Others have disagreed, e.g., Grandy (1981) and Lev-
elt (1972). Carden & Dieterich (1981) claim that “data disagreements, regrettably
but perhaps not surprisingly, tend to center on theoretically crucial examples”
(p. 584).17 Under a principles-and-parameters approach, we might expect the pe-
riphery, that part of the grammar not specified by UG but somehow learned, to
vary with people’s learning abilities and experience, but we would presumably
not expect variation on matters directly within the scope of innate universals.
While it is hard to find data bearing directly on this point, my suspicion is that it
is untrue.18 My own experience is that Binding and Subjacency, conditions that
are paradigmatic examples of the domain of UG, are two of the areas of great-
est variation. (In fact, recent evidence suggests that Subjacency might not be a
grammatical phenomenon after all; see Section 7.2.) As one example, see again
the discussion of that-trace effects in Section 2.3.2. For another, see Kitagawa’s
(1991) paper on copying identity. With regard to sloppy versus strict identity
interpretations of coreference in VP-Ellipsis, Kitagawa identifies five “dialects”
among fifteen speakers.19 Here one really cannot argue that the disagreements
involve unimportant or fringe sentences. As rare as they might be in everyday
speech, if they are governed by innate principles then this degree of variation
is unexpected. The standard appeal to performance factors is also unconvincing
here, at least in the usual narrow sense of the term, which typically refers to
memory limitations or processing by analogy. While it is reasonable to suggest
that people’s ability to process multiply center-embedded sentences could be a
function of their short-termmemory capacity independent of their grammar, the
same does not ring true for coreference constraints.
16 Newmeyer (1983) explicitly argues that the vast majority of alleged data disagreements in gen-
erative grammar are actually disagreements about the role of the theory, not about judgments.
My own experience has been that such a position is untenable, as exemplified by the cases
discussed in Section 2.3.2.
17 Newmeyer (1983) correctly points out that the particular example that Carden & Dieterich use
to exemplify the situation (the debate between Chomsky on the one hand and Katz & Postal
on the other over the interaction between passivization and quantifier scope) is probably not
a true instance of data disagreement.
18 This is not to deny that there is an (arguably very small) core of simple sentences that all
speakers of a language will agree are grammatical. But this set is not identical to the core in
Chomsky’s technical sense; far from it.
19 It should be noted that while coreference is in the domain of Binding Theory, the explanation
that Kitagawa tentatively proposes for the range of dialects involves differences in feature-
copying rules rather than in the conditions of Binding Theory per se. Still, these rules are
presumably part of UG too.
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Are we forced to conclude, then, that UG exhibits individual differences, that
we are not all born with identical principles and parameters? This is certainly a
possibility, and would not be a particularly surprising result – in general, people
do exhibit individual differences on many, perhaps all, innately specified behav-
iors, while sharing the gross features. In fact, Chomsky (1991) takes it as a truism
that genetically based UG will be subject to individual variation. It is merely a
theoretically simplifying assumption that UG is invariant. Apparently this view
has not been much stressed in the literature, since Lieberman (1991) believes that
“until the past year, virtually all theoretical linguists working in the Chomskian
tradition claimed that the Universal Grammar was identical in all humans” (p. 53,
emphasis in original). One way to get at the extent to which inter-speaker vari-
ation in judgments can be traced to differences in UG might be to compare the
degree of agreement on intuitions between identical versus fraternal twins. In
principle, areas in which identical twins always agree but fraternal twins do not
would be candidates for UG differences, while areas in which identical twins
disagree would be candidates for a learning account. Whatever the source of in-
dividual differences, linguists must take responsibility for the range of variation
that is actually found.20
An explanation in terms of extragrammatical factors seems more likely in
the case of changes in one person’s judgments from one elicitation to the next.
(Either that or, as Snow (1975) suggests, poor experimental design could be to
blame.) While grammars certainly do change in some aspects over the course of
a lifetime, most linguists would probably not want to say that this happens on a
day-to-day basis in adulthood.That is why Carden (1973) suggests that individual
differences be attributed to the grammar only if they are reliable (he gives several
ways of computing reliability indices) and if they correlate with other linguistic
differences. Another alternative that has been bandied about occasionally is that
grammars are probabilistically defined, so that some sentencewill be judged good
90% of the time, bad the other 10%, based on variation in neural signal strength
or some such factor. (In fact, the race-based approach predicts such a pattern of
events, because the speed with which a given rule can be used depends in part
on how recently it was used in the past, according to an activation function that
decays over time.) The problem with this general line of probabilistic analysis is
that it denies that there are any systematic causes behind the variation we find.
20 Haj Ross seems to have felt that some linguists were not doing so; he paraphrased the standard
research directive as “Write a grammar of what you find in your heart” (class lectures, MIT and
Harvard University, 1966–67, attributed to Ross in Carden (1973)). In contrast, Noam Chomsky
(personal communication) believes that variation has always been taken seriously in linguistic
theory.
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If instead we start with the assumption that it has a cause within the system of
judgment performance, then as we understandmore about that process wemight
eventually be in a position to say precisely what governs variation over time and
predict it as a function of other cognitive and situational variables. Only after we
have exhausted the search for such an explanation should we resort to random
probabilities.
Labov (1975) has proposed a widely cited set of working principles for dealing
with variation in grammaticality judgments and interpreting their relationship
to the grammar:
I. The Consensus Principle: if there is no reason to think otherwise, assume
that the judgments of any native speaker are characteristic of all speakers
of the language.
II. The Experimenter Principle: if there is any disagreement on introspective
judgments, the judgments of those who are familiar with the theoretical
issues may not be counted as evidence.
III. The Clear Case’ Principle: disputed judgments should be shown to include
at least one consistent pattern in the speech community or be abandoned.
If differing judgments are said to represent different dialects, enough inves-
tigation of each dialect should be carried out to show that each judgment
is a clear case in that dialect. (p. 31)
IV. The Principle of Validity: when the use of language is shown to be more
consistent than introspective judgments, a valid description of the lan-
guage will agree with that use rather than introspections. (p. 40)
For the most part, these suggestions strike me as quite reasonable, although
a note of caution is in order. Principle I is intended to allow the field to con-
tinue without having to resort to experimental verification of sentences whose
(un)grammatical status no one has ever questioned. Principle II is intended to
guard against experimenter effects; I suggest strengthening it so that the investi-
gating linguists’ own intuitions are never counted as evidence, even if their data
have not been disputed.21 Principle IV jibes well with my comments in Chap-
ter 3 concerning the potential for differences between use and intuitions. Unfor-
tunately, there is still no way of knowing when primary data from linguistic use
21 Of course, linguists’ intuitions will always be used to inspire theoretical work; I merely wish
to exclude them from the verification of the data.
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need to be sought out (since such relevant data are often not immediately avail-
able), and there is no obvious procedure for determining whether they are more
consistent than judgment data. But the major problem comes with Principle III.
Its wording (and that of Principle I) indicates that Labov is interested in account-
ing for the grammar of groups of speakers (as inferred also by Newmeyer (1983)),
but I have argued that it is entirely possible for individuals to have unique gram-
mars, so that discarding judgments that are not shared by other speakers could
involve throwing away real data. As Ringen (1979) points out,
Linguists frequently and publicly acknowledge that the reports of intuitions
they are using provide data only about the dialect of a single speaker. … Such
acknowledgements characteristically come as responses to evidence of dif-
ferences between informant intuitions. …Where conflicting informant judg-
ments indicate differences of idiolect or dialect, linguists do not conclude
that the judgments are not judgments on which a [transformational gener-
ative grammar] should be based. Rather they conclude that the judgments
must be taken into account by different grammars. (pp. 121–122)
Certainly, the more speakers we can find who share a set of intuitions, the more
confident we can be of the legitimacy of those intuitions, but at a certain point
we will have to hope that our methods have removed as many confounds as pos-
sible and treat the resulting data as significant, even if it applies only to a single
speaker. While there might be little interest in studying individual idiolects for
their own sake, the range of possibilities that are found is crucial to the construc-
tion of theories.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented two major proposals that assemble the infor-
mation gleaned from the first five chapters of this work. The first is an initial
attempt at a model of mental components of metalinguistic activity, with a focus
on grammaticality judgments. There is clearly much more work that could be
done in this vein. First, we might now go on to suggest specific experiments that
could clarify aspects of the model or show where changes are required. Second,
we could derive new empirical predictions regarding how certain effects should
manifest themselves in tasks that implicate certain components of the mental
structure, and run these tasks experimentally to see whether the predictions are
borne out. Third, we might consider whether there is something to be gained
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from implementing a computer simulation of the model. Since it is highly paral-
lel, and relies on very many microcopmutations, simulation could lead to better
understanding and refinement, as it has for connectionism and race-based pars-
ing. The second major proposal in this chapter takes the form of methodological
guidelines for eliciting grammaticality judgments. I do not go so far as to propose
a particular experimental design, since this must vary with the specific purpose
of the experiment, but if even some of my suggestions are followed, significant
strides toward a solid empirical foundation for linguistic research will have been
made. Whether this is likely to occur will be the subject of part of the final chap-
ter, after I propose some more general directions for future research.
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Recent trends in linguistic research
have placed increasing dependence
on relatively subtle intuitions. …
Subtle intuitions are not to be trusted
until we understand the nature of
their interaction with factors that
are irrelevant to grammaticality.
If we depend too much on such
intuitions without exploring their
nature, linguistic research will per-
petuate the defects of introspective
mentalism as well as its virtues.
(Bever 1970b)
7.1 Introduction
The epigraph from Bever above concurs very well with my own findings in the
preceding six chapters. By way of a response, it seems fair to say that the field
has begun taking steps to explore the nature of grammaticality judgments, and
I hope that the present work makes its own contribution to that exploration. In
this final chapter I concentrate mostly on what lies ahead in this endeavor.
I will not attempt to summarize the discussion to this point in any detail, but
will very briefly review the structure of the argumentation and illustrate that a
major intention has been to provide substantive support for the views of gram-
maticality judgments that have been expressed succinctly and eloquently by pre-
vious researchers in this area. It might be hoped that their observations will carry
more weight with the underpinnings of the extensive experimental and theoret-
ical literature that this book has assembled.
In Chapters 1 and 2, I reviewed some of the history of how the concept of gram-
maticality has evolved since the 1950s, various opinions on its empirical status,
and how it is used and misused today among theoretical linguists. On this basis I
argued that theory is no longer being based on clear cases, and that detailed study
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of the judgment process is therefore required to establish how to deal with un-
clear cases. Botha (1973) extends the argument even further: “consider the status
of the so-called clear cases of linguistic intuitions. Today, it can be seen that na-
tive speakers may make, concerning a particular linguistic property of some sen-
tence, judgments which are at once, clear, decisive, and consistent without there
necessarily being genuine linguistic intuitions at the basis of these judgments”
(p. 205). I also pointed out that concern with these problems has been sorely lack-
ing to date in linguistic work. As Pullum somewhat cynically puts it, “Themedian
number of speakers on whom the entire corpus of examples in an English syntax
paper is checked before publication, including its author, is zero” (Pullum 1987:
453). I made the specific proposal that the sources of the perturbations in gram-
maticality judgments exist independent of the language faculties of the mind. In
retrospect, that position has probably turned out to be too strong. Some of them
might be attributable specifically to the parser, for instance. Nonetheless, the
more phenomena we can reduce to language-independent sources, the better, by
Occam’s razor, so I maintain that one should always seek evidence for this posi-
tion first. Chapter 3 was devoted to pursuing the suggestion that grammaticality
judgments be studied as an instance of (meta)linguistic performance: as part of
a larger family of such tasks, as an instance of graded behavior, perhaps as an
instance of introspective behavior, and as just one more source of evidence about
grammars. By this point, it was already apparent that “in many ways, intuition
is less regular and more difficult to interpret than speech” (Labov 1972a: 199).
Chapters 4 and 5 were devoted to detailed examinations of the range of causes
for variability in judgments. Chapter 4 was concerned with the degree of varia-
tion between subjects and its attribution either to inherent characteristics or to
life experiences. Chapter 5 examined task factors, which were broken down by
being (mostly extragrammatical) features of the sentences being judged, or fea-
tures of the procedure used to elicit judgments. It is clear that in neither case do
we have a full understanding of the way these factors work, so that Birdsong’s
plea still stands: “thorough study of the psychological and epistemological in-
tricacies of metalinguistic performance is necessary if we are to achieve an un-
derstanding of the linguistic knowledge it is often thought to reflect” (Birdsong
1989: 49). Finally, Chapter 6 was an attempt to integrate these findings in terms
of an abstract view of the implied mental structures and a proposed methodol-
ogy for more rigorous data collection among linguists. The componential view
of the judgment process as involving many more pieces than language use lent
credence to another of Birdsong’s statements: “the hypocrisy of rejecting linguis-
tic performance data as too noisy to study, while embracing metalinguistic per-
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formance data as proper input to theory, should be apparent to any thoughtful
linguist” (p. 72). If it was not apparent before, it should be now!
The format of the remainder of this chapter is straightforward. In Section 7.2, I
consider the sorts of research that naturally followmost directly from the present
work, including both experimental and theoretical undertakings. I conclude in
Section 7.3 with some speculation about the future in the field of linguistics,
specifically about the role that grammaticality judgments are likely to play down
the road, and the chances that attitudes toward their collection and application
will change.
7.2 Directions for Further Research
As acknowledged in Section 1.5, what I have presented here is far from a com-
plete picture of the state of the art in studying grammaticality judgments. There
is great potential for elucidating many of the issues we have confronted by con-
sidering kinds of data that have been excluded here. For example, experiments
involving people with amnesia could clarify the memory mechanisms underly-
ing structural priming effects, repetition effects, context, etc. Research on the
development of metalinguistic skills in children should tell us more about the
interdependence of these skills and primary language skills. Work with second-
language learners should help to establish the relationship between intuitions
and use as skill in the language increases, while avoiding some of the method-
ological problems involved in eliciting judgments from children; experiments
with aphasics could serve a similar purpose. Finally, more about the process of
linguistic judgment in general could be learned by more detailed work on the na-
ture of lexical, phonological, semantic, and pragmatic judgments, in comparison
with syntactic ones. The larger open question of the existence of linguistic com-
petence and its role in language processing remains a major unresolved issue in
the psychological investigation of language processing.
As for specific lines of investigation that would follow more directly from the
present work, many potentially informative experiments have been proposed in
response to specific problems with published research; these will not be repeated
here. One major area into which I have not delved deeply is the substantiation of
the hypothesis proposed in Section 1.4, namely, that we can find a non-linguistic
analog for all of the perturbations that grammaticality judgments are subject to.
In many cases we have seen implicitly that this is true to a certain degree. For in-
stance, individual differences correlated with field dependence, handedness, age,
sex, creativity, and world knowledge are certainly not unique to linguistic intu-
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itions. Neither are differences due to expertise, which parallel those of linguistic
training and literacy. Likewise, most of the procedural factors considered in Sec-
tion 5.2 are familiar from other branches of psychology, although the particular
changes that some of them induce in grammaticality judgments (e.g., repetition
and mental state effects) are not obviously analogous to those in other domains.
Parallels to other cognitive spheres are hardest to draw in the area of stimu-
lus factors, since many of these are closely tied to the nature of language itself.
While at least some types of context effect have perceptual analogs, it is hard to
think of a nonlinguistic equivalent of structural well-formedness being affected
by meaning, lexical content, morphology, etc. It seems that the best we can do
for the moment is to point to domains where supposedly orthogonal features of
a stimulus affect judgments of the target feature. Thus, the first major hurdle in
this line of work is to find suitable domains of cognition in which to look for
such parallels to the manipulability of grammaticality judgments. By way of an
example, in addition to possibilities discussed in Chapter 1, one intriguing area I
have come across involves judgments in legal cases. Kaplan (1977) reports a num-
ber of phenomena that look promisingly parallel to the stimulus effects we have
seen. For instance, it has been shown experimentally that jurors are influenced
by factors totally irrelevant to the legal merits of a case in ways that depend on
the nature of the crime. An attractive defendant will be judged less likely to be
guilty of a burglary but more likely to be guilty in a confidence swindle. Personal
traits such as race, sex, and marital status have been shown to affect outcomes
of cases even when jurors are explicitly instructed not to pay attention to them.
Even when jurors are told that a certain variable is or is not statistically a predic-
tor of guilt, they do not use this information in deciding how to treat the data in
question.
A second major area that cries out for follow-up is the methodology of judg-
ment elicitation itself. The logical next step in the research program would be
to design and run case study experiments incorporating the proposals made in
Section 6.3, developing a specific set of instructions along the way. Such a study
will undoubtedly point out problems with the proposals, suggest refinements,
etc., and will allow the resulting data to be assessed for reliability and to be
compared with results from more casual data collection. To the extent that the
data are more reliable, one of the goals of the exercise will have been met. The
third and perhaps most ethereal line of research to follow from the present work
would involve finding independent motivation (outside linguistic judgments) for
the components of the model proposed in Section 6.2, for instance the general
control strategies. It is not at all obvious how to proceed here.
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I would like to close this section by mentioning some excellent new experi-
mental work that begins to address the three research areas just outlined, with
very encouraging results. First I summarize the findings of several independent
lines of investigation into the nature of Subjacency effects, all of which converge
on the conclusion that these should not be attributed to the grammar, but rather
to some extragrammatical component, perhaps the parser. Then I discuss work
that shows the viability and benefits of taking judgment-gathering methodology
seriously. Neville et al. (1991) present some event-related brain potential (ERP)
results (see Section 3.2) that could be a step toward using this technology to con-
firm independently certain kinds of judgment data. They found, in addition to
the frequently observed N400 response to semantic anomaly, distinct responses
to certain types of syntactic ill-formedness. Neville et al. tested the following sort
of paradigm, wherein the first four sentences are grammatical controls for the
remaining ill-formed sentences:
(1) a. The man admired a sketch of the landscape.
b. The man admired Don’s sketch of the landscape.
c. What did the man admire a sketch of?
d. Was a sketch of the landscape admired by the man?
e. The man admired Don’s of sketch the landscape.
f. The man admired Don’s headache of the landscape.
g. What did the man admire Don’s sketch of?
h. What was a sketch of admired by the man?
Sentence (1e) exemplifies a phrase structure violation in contrast with (1b), where
sketch and of are in the correct order. Sentence (1f) supposedly instantiates se-
mantic anomaly, in contrast with (1b), although it is not obvious that one could
not just as well analyze it as a subcategorization failure, because headache can-
not take an argument PP and that is the only function the following phrase can
serve; hence, it might still embody a syntactic type of ill-formedness. The con-
trast between (1c), which is fine, and (1g), which is degraded, is attributed to the
specificity of the NP from which the latter extraction has taken place (due to
the genitive). Finally, the contrast between (1d) and (1h) illustrates the effect of a
Subjacency violation in the latter. Neville et al.’s basic finding was that only the
supposed semantic anomaly generated N400 responses. The Specificity violation
generated an N125, which was similar to the effect of the phrase structure viola-
tion, while the Subjacency violation generated a substantially different pattern.
The authors take these results as supporting the notion of a distinct syntactic
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type of ill-formedness not tied to meaning, and as suggesting that Subjacency
may be of a different character from the other two types of syntactic violation,
perhaps due to processing difficulty rather than grammatical prohibition. These
conclusions are obviously speculative, but encouraging nonetheless. The weak
link in this study is that it has not yet been shown that different sentence struc-
ture types that violate the same grammatical constraint yield the same type of
ERP response. For instance, do Subjacency violations of the type (1h) (extraction
from a complex NP) yield the same pattern as those of the typeWhat did you won-
der who bought? (extraction from a wh-island)? Until this is found, one cannot
exclude the possibility that every sentence type simply yields a distinct pattern
of activity. (See Kluender & Kutas (1993) for more evidence, from judgments as
well as ERPs, bearing on the nature of Subjacency.)
Snyder (1994) has taken a different approach to the same question, conduct-
ing experiments into the nature of syntactic satiation effects on judgment tasks
and what they might tell us about the nature of grammars and the extent of the
problem of “linguists’ disease,” i.e., the possibility that linguists come to accept
ill-formed structures due to repeated exposure. Snyder was able to experimen-
tally induce some satiation effects that were specific to certain types of sentence,
i.e., that did not involve an across-the-board change in the subjects’ liberality
of judgment, but did generalize somewhat across different lexical items within
each type. He found that some classes of sentences were susceptible to satiation
while others were not. The particular paradigm involved yes/no judgments of
grammaticality of 58 sentences, where sentence types recurred over the course
of the questionnaire. The measure of satiation was whether a particular subject
judged a sentence type grammatical more often later on in the experiment. The
types of ungrammaticality tested are exemplified in (2).
(2) a. Who does John want for Mary to meet? [want-for]
b. What does John know that a bottle of fell on
the floor?
[subject island]
c. Who does John wonder whether Mary likes? [whether island]
d. Who does Mary think that likes John? [that-trace]




f. Who did John talk with Mary after seeing? [adjunct island]
g. How many did John buy books? [Left Branch
Constraint]
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Sentence types (2c) and (2e) showed statistically significant satiation effects (with
order of presentation counterbalanced), type (2b) tended towards such an effect,
and no other sentence types showed any effect.
Somewhat surprisingly, those sentences that did satiate were not those among
the sentence types that seem to show the greatest degree of interspeaker varia-
tion in general, namely, that-trace (see Section 2.3.3) and want-for violations.
Snyder suggests that the sentences that are subject to satiation may be those
whose ill-formedness has its roots in processing rather than in the grammar
proper. Perhaps with repeated exposure, subjects develop alternate parsing strat-
egies to deal with Subjacency violations, and having done so they do not find the
sentences as bad. Conversely, violations that do not improve with repeated ex-
posure are therefore less likely to be purely a result of parsing restrictions. This
evidence converges with that of Neville et al. from ERP research as a compelling
story in which judgments of badness involving Subjacency may not reflect the
grammar at all. It is also interesting that Snyder did find two types of Subjacency
violation that patterned the same way and differed from the other types of vio-
lation he looked at.
Turning more directly to issues of methodology, (Cowart 1997: 12–27) con-
ducted a series of experiments to test the skeptics’ claim that judgments from
naive speakers would not be useful to linguists even if systematically collected.
He focused on the question of whether their judgments were stable, i.e., whether
the relative acceptability of a set of sentences stayed the same across different
groups of subjects at different times under different conditions. With a careful
experimental design involving counterbalanced orders and multiple instances of
each crucial sentence type, several contrasts important to syntactic theory were
shown to be highly statistically reliable. In each case, the amount of variability
across subjects was much less than that across sentence types, i.e., there was
a great deal of agreement on the relevant contrasts. One experiment tested wh-
extraction from different kinds of picture NPs and found that four sentence types
all showed significantly different judgments of grammaticality. In particular, in
contrast to the standard judgment in the literature, an extraction like Who did
the Duchess sell a portrait of?, while better than Who did the Duchess sell Max’s
portrait of?, is significantly worse than a simple adjunct question like Why did
the Duchess sell a portrait of Max?, a result that was confirmed by comparison
with other closely related sentence types. Cowart also demonstrates how these
gradations of acceptability can be interpreted. A dialect-split interpretation can
be excluded because of the very small amount of variation among subjects for
the crucial sentence type, as compared to variation across sentence types. Thus,
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these sentences do seem to have an intermediate status for individual speakers.
Another set of sentences studied by Cowart involves that-trace effects. Again, he
found very stable results, with subject and object extractions ((3b) and (3d) below)
being equally acceptable without that, but subject extractions being much worse
in the presence of that ((3a) versus (3b)), confirming the standard judgments in
the literature. However, object extraction is significantly worse with that than
without it ((3c) versus (3d)), a fact that standard theories have not taken into
account. (See Cowart (1997: 12–27) for some qualifications on this finding.)
(3) a. I wonder who you think that likes John.
b. I wonder who you think likes John.
c. I wonder who you think that John likes.
d. I wonder who you think John likes.
It remains to be argued whether the grammar should be responsible for these
unexpected contrasts.
7.3 The Future in Linguistics
In Sections 1.3 and 7.2 I describe some recent work in the generative paradigm
that I feel makes exemplary use of grammaticality judgments. Obviously if this
trend of linguists basing their theories on experimental data is to continue and
grow, linguists will have to be trained in areas that they traditionally have not
been required to know anything about: statistics and experimental design in gen-
eral, and the psychology of grammaticality judgments in particular. I would echo
Greenbaum’s (1977c) recommendation that every linguistics department should
offer a course in experimental linguistics. In addition to reasons internal to our
own field, this would give students a leg up in joining the blossoming interdis-
ciplinary enterprise of cognitive science. It would also seem to be a natural out-
growth of Chomsky’s own suggestion that linguistics be viewed as a branch of
cognitive psychology. Somehow, the focus on cognitive issues has not yet been
accompanied by adoption of the scientific standards and concern with method-
ology of that discipline.1 But even if only a small proportion of linguists were
actually to carry out their own experimental data collection, all could benefit by
1 Noam Chomsky (personal communication) believes that research practice in linguistics ought
to follow that in the natural sciences, where (in contrast to the social sciences) “almost no one
devotes attention to ‘methodology’.” Obviously, I disagree.
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knowingmore about problems of experimental bias, individual differences, intro-
spection, etc.The question is whether theoretical linguists are likely to heed such
advice. I suggest that part of the reason for linguists’ lackadaisical attitude in this
regard is not so much that they believe their data are clear-cut, but that there is
little motivation for putting effort into a systematic approach because, unlike in
most of the social sciences, there is no standard publication format requiring au-
thors to describe how their data were gathered. (Grandy (1981) makes a similar
point, and suggests other possible reasons why the deplorable state of lack of
rigor continues.) Also, since linguists typically have no training in experimental
design, they do not appreciate how useful and important it is. On this question,
we can do little more than keep our fingers crossed. It does seem, based on my
assessment of the literature, that more and more linguists are coming around.
Carden & Dieterich (1981), who make proposals similar to my own, give a
typical response to their work, suggesting that many linguists will oppose such
methodological changes. They cite Green (1978) as saying that if proposals like
theirs were adopted, “research would come to a standstill.” Certainly this would
be true if every sentence had to be subjected to extensive experimental verifi-
cation (Labov 1975), but that is unnecessary. If we adopt Labov’s Clear Case
Principle (see Section 6.3.3), this will only be required when we have reason to
believe that there is disagreement. Green continues with a second objection: “I
doubt if any experimental results, no matter how clean, would affect the sta-
tus of crucial disputed examples. Linguists will still trust their own intuitions
of grammaticality.” A third objection that I have frequently heard is that much
more money will be required to carry out linguistic research under these propos-
als (Elan Dresher, personal communication). Ringen (1979) believes that is only
a rationalization for inaction: “The cost of data does not explain the traditional
reliance on small numbers of informants since many linguistic research projects
are extremely well-funded. One suspects that even if time and funds were un-
limited, surveying large numbers of informants would be judged an unnecessary
and indeed trivial endeavor” (p. 120, fn. 39). All I can say in response to the latter
two objections is, I hope not.
Somewhat more optimistically, Labov suggests that introspective linguists are
most likely to resort to experimentation on data that are crucial both ways, i.e.,
that can either clinch their argument or destroy it. This would be a reasonable
first step. Certainly, intuitive judgments by native speakers (but, one hopes, fewer
and fewer linguists) will not be replaced by other kinds of language behavior as
the major source of data, at least on syntactic questions, in the foreseeable fu-
ture. But it is perfectly legitimate to keep using judgment data while we attempt
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to understand them better. While their potential contamination by extraneous
factors is an important concern, once we are willing to actively explore the na-
ture of these factors the problem becomes manageable.Theymight add sufficient
noise to obscure actual grammatical phenomena, but they cannot systematically
change the pattern of results unless they too are stable. If so, they can be studied
directly and then factored out, as people have attempted to do with Subjacency
effects in the studies mentioned above. The key is that we must always ask our-
selves whether a systematic effect we find might be attributable to a combination
of grammatical and extragrammatical factors, rather than purely grammatical
ones. If the best account we can find of a pattern of variance in judgment data
involves some discrete grammatical construct, that is the closest we can come
right now to knowing that the mind really embodies such a construct. One find-
ing from the literature should leave us optimistic: relatively few experiments
have shown that the pattern of results is changed by the various manipulations
that have been tried. This should increase our confidence that judgments do tell
us about something real and important. It is up to a critic who believes that even
carefully collected systematic judgment evidence is distorted and not relevant
to grammar to show that that is the case, by being explicit about what the con-
founding factor is and how it distorts the results.2
Linguistics has much to gain and nothing to lose by taking data collection,
and particularly judgment collection, much more seriously, both with regard to
the insights that will be gained and the theoretical issues that will be clarified,
and with regard to the standing of the field as a scientific endeavor in the larger
academic setting. The realization seems to be growing that the psychology of
grammaticality judgments can no longer be ignored.
2 I thank Wayne Cowart for discussion of issues raised in this section.
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grammatical status of, 23






effect on grammaticality judg-
ments, 157–159
see also plausibility; truth of sen-
tence
memory for sentence, as evidence of
(un)grammaticality, 22
memory limitations, 21, 31, 173, 194








as skilled behavior, 61
definition, 57n3
development of, 92, 95







versus primary linguistic per-
formance, 61, 89
see also strategies, metalinguis-
tic
metalinguistic tasks, 56
ambiguity detection, 58, 107
correcting ungrammatical sen-
tences, 57, 169, 174, 177, 187,
190
explaining one’s judgments, 56
paraphrasing, 57, 187
sentence matching, 76, 77
skills involved in, 87
tone location, 108
see also compliance tests
metaphoric and metonymic read-
ings, effect on grammati-
cality judgments, 160
methodology in generative gram-
mar, 4, 8, 27, 34, 206n1
mirror-gazing, effect on self-
awareness, 138, 140, 141
modality, see speech versus writing









117, 184, 187, 205, see
also linguist/nonlinguist
differences
naive versus expert judgments, 14,
113–118, 120
Necker cubes, 14, 34
negative information, 2
New Guinea, 123
nonintrusive measures of grammati-
cality, 86
nonlinguistic behavior, parallels
with language, 14, 15
nontransitive paradox, 79, 80
objective self-awareness (OSA), 138–
143
observational study, difficulties of, 2
olfactory judgments, 14
operation tests, 59
order of presentation (of sentences)
effect on grammaticality judg-
ments, 132, 153, 181
effect on parsing, 178
orthography, see spelling




parasitic gap, 47, 190
parsing, 176
effect on grammaticality judg-
ments, 31, 157, 160, 182
of incomplete structure, 12
race-based, 178–180, 195, 198
strategies, 171, 173, 205
versus grammar, 89, 160, 170,
205
versus judgment, 81
see also memory limitations;
garden path sentence
passivization, 194n17
perceptual strategies, and grammat-
icality judgments, 111, 176
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Subject index
performance, 20, 21, 24, 25, 30, 32, 35,
see also competence
phrase structure violation, 203
picture NP, 203, 205
plausibility, effect on grammatical-
ity judgments, 12, 175, 181,
182
position of violation in sentence,
effect on grammaticality
judgments, 161
positive anymore, see anymore, posi-
tive use of
practice trials, 73n14, 78, 132, 186
prescriptive rules, 83, 87, 131, 158,
158n22, 174, 185












prototype theory, 67, 179n3
psychophysics, xii, 48, 50
punctuation











versus interview, 100, 101, 130
ranking versus absolute rating (of
acceptability), 79, 80, 102,
119, 133, 154, 186
rankings of acceptability, paradox in,
see nontransitive paradox
rating scale
change over time in use of, 135,
137
choice of, 16n9, 59, 131, 186
defining consistency on, 78
examples of, 59
interpretation of, 150n18
subjects’ use of, 176
usingmore than one dimension,
186, 192
reading speed, as evidence of
(un)grammaticality, 86
register, effect on grammaticality
judgments, 128, 144, 145
relevant noncompliance (RNC), see
compliance tests
repetition, effect on grammaticality
judgments, 99n1, 107, 133
and context effect, 135
and introspective set, 141
replication of experimental results,
193
response bias, 11, 93n34, 102, 132
resumptive pronouns, 31, 174
rhetorical structure, effect on gram-
maticality judgments, 165
RNC (relevant noncompliance), see
compliance tests
Rubin vase figures, 14
242
Subject index
satiation, 117, 117n25, 136, 189, 204,
205
scanted out, 113
second-language learners, 88, 94, 95,
107, 124
selection tests, 59
selectional restriction violation, 67,
71, 72, 72n11, 72n12, 73, 74






semantic effects, see meaning
semigrammatical sentences, 70
sentence matching task, 76, 77
setting of experiment, 184, 189, 190
sex, effect on grammaticality judg-
ments, 109, 110
social facilitation effect, 138
Specificity, 203, 205
Specified Subject Condition, 109
speech versus writing, effect on
grammaticality judgments,
100, 130, 144, 145, 179, 185,
190
speed of judgment, 146, 156, 160, 163
spelling, effect on grammaticality
judgments, 164
spontaneous versus prepared pro-
duction, 145
spreading activation, 177, 180
squish, 63, 65, 105n12, see also fuzzy
grammar
SSC, see Specified Subject Condition







see also grammaticality judg-
ments, strategies for
style, effect on grammaticality judg-
ments, 145
subcategorization violation, 67, 71,
72, 72n12, 73, 74
Subjacency violation, xii, 43, 47, 109,
203–205, 208
and satiation, 205
in sentence matching task, 77
interspeaker variation on judg-
ments of, 194
versus ECP violation, 43
subject island, 204
subjective self-awareness (SSA), 138,
140–142
subtle judgments, 34, 37, 43, 45, 52
Superiority violation, 151
testing effects, 190
that-trace effect, see Comp-trace ef-
fect
θ-Criterion, 43
three levels/kinds of deviance (As-
pects)
experiments on, 71
three levels/kinds of deviance (As-
pects), 67
experiments on, 70, 71, 73, 74,
137
tone location task, 108




truth of sentence, effect on gram-
maticality judgments, 130,
159, 160, 175
twins, use in investigating UG, 195
UG, see Universal Grammar
unclear data
use in theory construction, 24,
27, 28
see also letting the grammar de-
cide (on unclear cases)
ungrammatical sentence, correction
of, 57, 77, 95, 122, 122n29,




Universal Grammar, xiii, 29, 33, 39,
40, 170, 195
usability versus grammaticality, 170,
182
use, see grammaticality judgments,
versus language use
Vai, 95, 120–122, 122n30





warm-up trials, see practice trials
wh-island, 204
whether island, 39, 204
word order violations, effect on
grammaticality judgments,
60, 76, 101, 123
world knowledge, see general knowl-
edge
writing, see speech versus writing
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The empirical base of
linguistics
Throughout much of the history of linguistics, grammaticality judgments
– intuitions about the well-formedness of sentences – have constituted
most of the empirical base against which theoretical hypothesis have been
tested. Although such judgments often rest on subtle intuitions, there is no
systematic methodology for eliciting them, and their apparent instability
and unreliability have ledmany to conclude that they should be abandoned
as a source of data.
Carson T. Schütze presents here a detailed critical overview of the vast
literature on the nature and utility of grammaticality judgments and other
linguistic intuitions, and the ways they have been used in linguistic re-
search. He shows how variation in the judgment process can arise from
factors such as biological, cognitive, and social differences among subjects,
the particular elicitation method used, and extraneous features of the ma-
terials being judged. He then assesses the status of judgments as reliable
indicators of a speaker’s grammar.
Integrating substantive and methodological findings, Schütze proposes
a model in which grammaticality judgments result from interaction of lin-
guistic competence with general cognitive processes. He argues that this
model provides the underpinning for empirical arguments to show that
once extragrammatical variance is factored out, universal grammar suc-
cumbs to a simpler, more elegant analysis than judgment data initially
lead us to expect. Finally, Schütze offers numerous practical suggestions
on how to collect better and more useful data. The result is a work of vital
importance that will be required reading for linguists, cognitive psycholo-
gists, and philosophers of language alike.
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